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INTRAPSYCHIC CORRELATES OF TRANSPERSONAL 
EXPERIENCES IN FOUR CREEDAL GROUPS
ABSTRACT: Attributes associated with mystical experience among Christians, 
Buddhists, Jews and Pagans are explored in psychometric data presented in this 
thesis. Two such attributes in particular, the personality trait of psychoticism 
and attitudes held towards mysticism, are given focal attention.
Psychoticism, a trait at one time supposedly linked with vulnerability 
to psychosis, has been much assessed in previous research into religiosity- 
personality correlates, and a more recent emerging literature has assessed this 
trait in relationship to religious experience. However, as this thesis clarifies, 
good grounds exist for challenging the view that this is a homogeneous trait. 
Assessments of traits relating to distinct facets of psychoticism, specifically the 
three traits of agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience, 
provided solid grounds for taking apparently significant positive correlations 
between mystical experience and psychoticism as evidence that the former is 
associated with creativity rather than psychosis.
In each religious group studied, a significant positive correlation was 
found between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. However, this 
thesis also presents grounds for distinguishing these concepts. The possibility 
that psychoticism relates in different ways to these constructs, and the 
implications this has for the question of whether mysticism arises through social 
learning or reflects an innate tendency invariant across creed, are considered.
1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
This thesis will present original data collected for the assessment of the 
attributes of transpersonal experience in four creedal groups. Psychometrics, 
traditionally a methodology used for assessments of long-term attributes such as 
intelligence or stable personality traits, may seem a somewhat unusual means to 
learn about states as transient and allegedly ineffable as mystical and spiritual 
experiences. Grounds to defend such methodology to study such phenomena 
will therefore be given. Arguments will be presented that such research is both 
possible and useful, having important implications for philosophy as well as 
psychology.
The studies presented in this thesis will extend previous research, 
which has assessed relatively broad personality components in those who report 
transpersonal experiences, by assessment of more specific facets of personality 
germane to such experiences. It will also be argued that research in this field 
should consider an additional variable to personality, namely attitudes to 
mysticism, a construct that can be distinguished from mystical experience per 
se. The original approach this thesis will take to assessment of individual 
differences between those who report transpersonal experiences and those who 
do not has implications for major theoretical debates on the nature of mysticism, 
such as that of whether transpersonal experiences are learnt constructs.
1.1 Aims of the Study
Previously published psychometric research into mystical and 
transpersonal experiences (Francis & Louden, 2000a, 2000b; Hood, 1970;
2Hood, 1975; Hood, Hall, Watson & Biderman, 1979) neatly dovetailed much 
empirical study of the personality correlates of other dimensions of religiosity, 
such as ritual or doctrinal dimensions (see below, Section 1.4). The emerging 
research in this field (Caird, 1987; Francis & Thomas, 1996) has typically 
assessed people on the same dimensions of personality that have frequently 
been assessed in research into the personality traits associated with other 
expressions of religiosity, namely the three traits of psychoticism, extraversion 
and neuroticism described in Eysenck’s model (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976; 
Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985). Problematic in such research has been the 
sheer breadth of the traits described in the Eysenckian P-E-N model, especially 
that of psychoticism (see Chapter Two). A central aim of the current thesis is, 
therefore, to examine whether assessment of more fine-tuned personality 
measures that distinguish between those who do versus those who do not report 
mystical experiences will replicate the findings that have been reported in 
previous scholarship when broader measures of personality, such as assessment 
of psychoticism as a global construct, have been employed.
This particular issue will be addressed directly in the key original 
empirical study presented in this thesis, reported in Chapter Six. In Chapters 
Four and Five, reports of two empirical studies, the first assessing whether a 
more narrow-band aspect of a potentially positive facet of psychoticism 
(increased liberalism) correlates with mystical experience and the second 
examining the need to distinguish between mystical experience and attitudes to 
mysticism, will be reported. The aims of each of the three original psychometric 
studies to be presented in this thesis can be set out in detail as follows:
(a) Study One aims to assess whether a form of religiosity indicative of
increased religious liberalism, quest religious orientation, is associated with 
greater likelihood of reported mystical experience;
(b) Study Two will present data on a new scale, original with the current thesis, 
that assesses attitudes to mysticism as a distinct concept from mystical 
experience (the importance of assessment of this variable is spelt out in 
subsequent sections of this chapter);
(c) Study Three will assess the extent to which six personality traits - 
psychoticism and the more fine-tuned measures of the five-factor model of 
Costa and McCrae (1992a), namely extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience, correlate with 
mystical experience in four different religious groups, Christian Protestants, 
Jews, Pagans and Buddhists. A further important aim of Study Three is to 
compare these four groups on both mystical experience and attitudes to 
mysticism, and to examine the extent to which these two variables correlate in 
each of the four groups.
1.2 Importance of Proposed Research Study
To collect empirical data germane to these questions is important on a 
number of theoretical levels. Firstly, such data will help to uncover the reasons 
for potential divergences between past findings on the personality correlates of 
religiosity in general and the personality correlates of mystical, religious and 
transpersonal experiences. Secondly, to approach these questions using 
psychometrics presents an original approach to a philosophical question for 
which the full implications of psychometric data have not been fully appreciated 
in previous scholarship. This is the question of whether mystical experiences
4should be viewed as social constructs, and are therefore learnt; or whether 
elements common to such experiences as reported in different religious 
traditions justify the view that such experiences are innate. Finally, data in 
response to these questions will help to indicate which specific aspects of the 
broad dimension of psychoticism may be most relevant to transpersonal 
experiences. This is an issue which has the potential to offer important 
information on the mental health status of those who believe they have had 
mystical experiences, especially as there are certain facets of psychoticism 
which, at least in normal nonclinical samples, could be construed as positive 
traits.
To assess participants from different religious populations is 
important in pursuit of data pertinent to these questions. Previous studies in this 
area have frequently been based on only one creed (e.g. Francis & Thomas. 
1996), and thus the use of cross-denominational and cross-creedal populations 
in the studies reported in this thesis itself presents an original contribution to 
research. Flowever, aside from being interesting from a purely descriptive 
viewpoint, important theoretical reasons exist for use of different creedal groups 
in the studies reported in this thesis. Data from a cross-creedal population will 
enable assessment of whether there are empirical as well as theoretical grounds 
for the taxonomy of religions that will be presented at the end of Chapter Two. 
Such data are also essential for empirical assessment of the questions that 
emerge from the philosophical questions which will be discussed in a later 
section of this chapter.
The use of a new scale, assessing attitudes to mysticism as opposed to 
mystical experience, is important insofar as it enables, for the first time,
collection of empirical data germane to considerations on similarities and 
differences between these two variables. The scale’s use in helping to see how 
the personality traits related to this variable and whether this variable relates to 
social learning will be highlighted throughout this thesis.
1.3 Defending Psychometric Study of Transpersonal Experience.
Religious fundamentalists and positivistic scientists may both oppose 
empirical study of concepts such as "religious experience", "transpersonal 
experience" or "mystical experience", the former through beliefs that such 
phenomena are beyond empirical scrutiny, the latter through fears that such 
concepts are too evasive to be meaningful. However, a third tradition, which has 
produced important texts (Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993; Cohen &
Phipps, 1979; Greeley, 1974; Hardy, 1979) has been based upon convictions 
that such concepts are both meaningful and capable of being studied 
empirically. This thesis exemplifies this third tradition.
Wide-ranging empirical techniques, including projective techniques 
(Brown & Engler, 1978; Jonte-Pace, 1998), psycho-pharmacological research 
techniques (Doblin, 1991) and electro-encephalography (Zohar & Marshall, 
2000) have been used in transpersonal psychology. However, as the preferred 
methodology of the current thesis is the psychometric questionnaire, emphasis 
here will be on the value of this empirical tool in particular. Fears that both 
positivistic and fundamentalist persuasions may have about the use of 
questionnaires to study religiosity in general have, to some extent, been 
adequately answered by Miller and Thoresen (2003) and Hill and Pargament 
(2003), but the focus here will be on the application of questionnaires to the
study of religious, mystical and transpersonal experiences in particular.
The empirical study of religious, transpersonal and mystical experience 
has produced important publications in journals in various disciplines, including 
religious studies (Hood, 1975), gerontology (Levin, 1993), and psychology, 
both abnormal psychology (Spanos, Cross, Lepage & Coristine, 1986) and more 
mainstream psychology (Caird, 1987). Furthermore, an impressive range and 
number of psychometric scales have been developed to assess transpersonal 
experiences and related constructs, reviewed by McDonald. Friedman and 
Kuenzel (1999), McDonald, Kuenzel and Friedman (1999) and McDonald, 
LeClair, Holland, Alter and Friedman (1995). This illustrates how the use of 
psychometric scales to assess transpersonal constructs has been an integral part 
of scholarship.
Deeper grounds for defending psychometric research into transpersonal 
experiences were outlined by the author of this thesis (Edwards, 2003). The 
argument defended in this paper was that if the use of such methodology 
resulted in merely meaningless data, published research findings in this field 
would only yield random statistical patterns. As published psychometric studies 
of transpersonal experiences have produced meaningful correlations and 
between-groups differences, it is safe to conclude that such research is 
providing psychologically meaningful information.
Limitations of the scope of empirical psychometrics to solve all 
philosophical questions on mystical experience are acknowledged here. 
Questions on the ontological and epistemological status of such experiences, 
such as those discussed by Gellman (1999) and Fales (1999), may be considered 
outside the scope of psychometric study, and thus it is with good reason that
7these authors' papers have appeared in journals on philosophy and religious 
studies rather than social science journals. What is defended here is not a grand 
statement that psychometrics will solve all philosophical questions about 
mysticism, but the more modest claim that psychometric data have potential 
relevance to some philosophical questions on mysticism. A good example of 
such a question is that of whether mysticism arises through learning or is innate
(see below, Section 1.5).
Purely practical advantages exist for use of the psychometric 
questionnaire as a research tool to study transpersonal experiences. Such scales
may be administered to a large number of respondents, allowing researchers to
collect a wide pool of data. As such scales may be returned to researchers
anonymously, use of this methodology can respect the privacy that many
respondents may attach to personal records of transpersonal experiences. Value
can therefore be observed in research programmes in transpersonal psychology
that both use existing tools to assess transpersonal experiences and construct
new tools of potential relevance to this area.
Careful use and construction of psychometric questionnaires requires 
clarification of the concepts that such scales have been designed to assess. Thus,
attention will now shift to definitions of the concepts under consideration in this
thesis.
1.4 Definitions of "Religion*1, "Mystical Experience” and Related Terms
The focus of this thesis is on religious experience rather than 
religiosity in general, so definitions of religion will be discussed only cursorily. 
Discussions of how to define religion are available in major texts in this field
(Batson et al., 1993; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Fontana, 2003). To present 
several such definitions will, however, form a neat prologue to presentation of 
an issue of more immediate relevance to the current thesis, that of whether 
religion should be viewed as multidimensional (as favoured by Glock and Stark, 
1965) or as unidimensional (as favoured by Gorsuch, 1988). It will also indicate 
why quest, assessed in the first of the three psychometric studies presented in 
this thesis, can be regarded as a form of religiosity.
Several definitions of religion will be commented on briefly here, and 
will be followed by outlines of multidimensional models of religion. This 
section will conclude by considering approaches to defining one particular 
dimension typically included in such schemes, the experiential dimension of 
religion.
1.4.1 Definitions of Religion
The following three definitions have featured in different works on the 
psychology of religion:
- "the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men (sic.) in their solitude, 
so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 
consider the Divine" (James 1902/ 1960; p50).
- "system of beliefs in supernatural power, and practices of worship and of 
other forms of ritual devoted to such power" (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; 
pi).
"whatever we as individuals do to come to grips with the questions that 
confront us because we are aware that we are and others are like us and that 
we will die" (Batson et al., 1993, p8; italics in original).
Subtle differences in meanings of "religion" are implied by each 
definition. Batson et al.'s (1993) definition implies the widest meaning, 
implying that an individual can be religious without creedal assent or regular 
practice of ritual. This justifies treating Batson's concept of quest (see Chapter 
Three) as an example of religiousness. To adopt this as a working definition of 
religion, as will be endorsed here, also offers justification for treatment of non- 
theistic systems such as certain forms of Buddhism as religions. Thus, this 
thesis will take the position that Buddhism can be regarded as a religion.
Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle's narrow focus on religion as a system of 
belief and practices failed to address purely experiential dimensions of religion. 
James' celebrated definition acknowledged the importance of experience and 
emotions in religion, but can be criticised for its reference to individuals and 
solitude. Such a definition would be hard to defend when describing religious 
experiences that take place in obvious social contexts, such as the enthusiasm of 
crowds at charismatic healing services. Limitations inherent in James' definition 
are also challenged by sociological models of religion such as those of 
Durkheim, cited in Hardy (1966), stressing religion as a feeling of effervescence 
generated by social forces. Problems inherent in overly narrow definitions of 
religion will be evident following the review that will now be given of 
multidimensional models of religion.
1.4.2 Dimensions of Religion
Multidimensional models of religion date at least as far back as Fromm 
(1950). Interest in such models gained momentum during the 1960s. Such
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models can be distinguished from the taxonomies of religious orientation that 
will be reviewed in Chapter Three. The latter classify motivations underlying 
religiosity (Stark & Glock, 1968/ 1969) and carry sub-texts of value-judgments; 
the multidimensional models reviewed here imply no value-judgments and 
classify different modes of expressing, rather than motivations for, religiosity.
Reviewers of psychometric findings on religion should be aware that 
findings for a particular dimension of religion may not be replicable for other 
dimensions. Thus, caution should be exercised before predicting that 
psychometric studies of religious experience will replicate what has been found 
for other dimensions. While Gorsuch (1984; 1988) tried to defend treatment of 
religion as being unidimensional, previous research data do suggest important 
grounds for distinguishing the experiential from the doctrinal and ritual 
dimensions of religion (see Chapter Three).
Fukuyama (1961; cited in Demerath, 1965/ 1969) presented an early 
multidimensional model of religion. This described the creedal, cultic, cognitive 
and devotional dimensions of faith, referring respectively to religious beliefs, to 
church attendance, involvement and participation, to knowledge of one's faith 
and to religious activities beyond one's church, such as private prayer at home. 
The more famous scheme of Glock and Stark (1965) listed five dimensions, the 
ideological, experiential, ritual, intellectual and ethical-consequential, of which 
the first corresponds to Fukuyama’s cultic dimension, the second concerns 
religious experience, the third corresponds to Fukuyama’s cultic and devotional 
dimensions, the fourth to Fukuyama’s cognitive dimension and the fifth relates 
to moral teachings of religions. Stark and Glock (1968/ 1969) subsequently used 
simpler terms for each dimension - belief, experience, practice, knowledge and
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consequences - and bifurcated ritual into ritual (public worship) and devotional 
(private practices such as private prayer in one's own home) sub-dimensions. 
Seven dimensions, the doctrinal, mythological, ritual, ethical, experiential, 
social and material-artistic, are described in similar taxonomy outlined by Smart
(1989).
All these models distinguish religious belief (creedal, ideological or 
doctrinal dimensions) from religious practice (cultic, practice or ritual 
dimensions). To distinguish these dimensions helps to resolve the ambiguities
in literature on social class and religion and on generational changes in degrees
%
of religious participation (Demerath, 1965; dock  & Stark, 1965; Stark & 
dock, 1968/ 1969). Inclusion of a separate experiential dimension as was done 
by dock  and Stark (1965) and Smart (1989), is considered important in this 
thesis, as this helps to explain some of the inconsistent findings on religion and 
personality (see Chapter Three).
Stark and dock  (1968/ 1969) claimed that the five dimensions of their 
model feature in all religions, but that religions differ in which particular 
dimension(s) they emphasise. They claimed that religions typically grant central 
status to belief and that mainstream Christianity places second most emphasis 
on practice, but that in "more mystical religions, and in some more extreme 
Protestant sects, more emphasis is placed upon experience than practice" (Stark 
& dock, 1968/ 1969; p258).
Empirical research needs to address more explicitly such cross-creedal 
variations in dimension of emphasis. This may be achieved through 
development of appropriate psychometric methodology. Faiths may vary in how 
much emphasis they attach to the experiential dimension of religion, as is
indicated by the taxonomy of attitudes to mysticism, proposed at the end of 
Chapter Two. Data collected using a new scale, original with the current thesis, 
will indicate in later chapters of this thesis how different faiths do vary in how 
much emphasis they attach to at least one manifestation of the experiential 
dimension - mystical experience.
1.4.3 Religious Experience and Related Terms
Stark and Glock (1968/ 1969) clarified that they did not intend their 
descriptions of each individual dimension to refer to entirely homogeneous 
phenomena. Various phenomena exemplify the experiential dimension. All- 
encompassing definitions of "religious experience" may therefore be elusive, 
and scholars are likely to vary in their definitions of this term. However, many 
scholars may agree that the term "religious experience" should not be equated 
with the term "mystical experience". These and related terms will now be 
discussed, and consideration will be given as to what is the best generic term (if 
any) to describe all phenomena that exemplify this dimension.
Religious Experience
Popularity of this term dates from the publication of James' (1902/ 
1960) The Varieties o f Religious Experience, although observations of what are 
now termed religious experiences clearly date back centuries earlier. Records of 
states deviant from normal waking consciousness exist in the Hebrew Bible, and 
the ancient Mesopotamian language uses words indicative of the existence of 
such states. The somewhat Darwinian ring to the title of James' work suggested 
that, just how naturalists had studied varieties of flora and fauna, social
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scientists could now study different varieties of religious experience. Yet, 
despite this clear commitment to a scientific approach to the study of religious 
experience, James' book is unclear on how to define this term, if it did offer 
grounds for defining the more restricted term ‘'mystical experience”.
Implicit rather than explicit definitions of religious experience appear 
in works by Hardy (1966) and Greeley (1974). Questions used by these authors 
to collect empirical data on religious experience suggest that Hardy and 
Greeley, respectively, would have defined the term as (a) a feeling of being 
influenced by a Power or a Presence, whether referred to as "God" or not, 
different to one's everyday self and (b) a feeling of close contact with a 
powerful spiritual force that appears to lift one out of oneself. Both definitions 
imply qualitative differences between normal waking consciousness and 
religious experience. Such an approach contrasts with that of Donovan (1979), 
who held that "religious experience" is a term that may be applied to an 
experience "when it is the sort of experience in which religions may be 
interested, which religions value or consider important" (Donovan, 1979; p3). 
Boyatzis (2001) defended a similar viewpoint. The circularity inherent in such 
approaches has been criticised in a paper co-authored by the author of this thesis 
(Edwards & Lowis, 2003). These authors explained how definitions of religion 
such as Donovan's are uninformative unless they also delineate which 
experiences a specific faith is likely to value. Edwards and Lowis accepted that 
such approaches acknowledge personal significance that an individual may 
attach to his/ her experiences. However, they cited a definition of altered states 
of consciousness (Giesler, 1996) to clarify how a definition can still do this 
while acknowledging significant deviations between such experiences and
ordinary waking conscious states:
(Such states are) "a sufficient deviation from general norms for that 
individual during normal, waking consciousness (Kokoszka, 1992). MacDonald, 
LeClair, Holland, Alter and Friedman (1995) noted that such events can 
probably only be understood through direct experience. They are, in fact, 
unshared sensory experiences (Stevenson, in Liester, 1996). Robinson (in Hay, 
1990) stated that they are self-authenticating; if a person has experienced a 
significant event, then that event is very real to him or her, then that event is 
sociologically real" (Giessler, 1996; cited in Edwards & Lowis, 2003, p55).
Related Terms
Waldron (1998) listed thirteen possible alternative terms to the term 
"religious experience", namely transcendental experience, transcendent 
experience, spiritual/ religious experience, mystical experience, cosmic 
consciousness, peak experience, core-religious experience, praeternatural 
experience, ecstasy, bliss, numinous experience, exceptional human experience 
and transpersonal experience. Not all should be seen as truly synonymous with 
religious experience. For example, peak experience, ecstasy and bliss, while 
valuable terms and ones featuring in writings of authors such as Greeley (1974) 
and Maslow (1968), all describe states of intense joy. That religious experiences 
may also be linked with intense sorrow was noted by May (1991), who cited 
research using the famous Alister Hardy question: "Have you ever felt as if you 
were influenced by a Power or a Presence, whether you call it "God" or not, that 
was different to your everyday self?" which found depression to be a more 
common antecedent trigger for religious experience than intense happiness. A
1rather more technical matter, however, is that of whether the term religious 
experience should be equated with the term mystical experience.
These terms have sometimes been treated as synonyms in empirical 
research, such as that of Back and Bourque (1970). However, grounds exist for 
holding that only certain kinds of religious or transpersonal experiences qualify 
as mystical experiences in the technical sense. To distinguish these concepts is 
consistent with the position advanced by Daniels (2003), who went further than 
the position taken here in holding that not all mystical experiences can be 
classified as religious experiences. The need to look at qualities unique to 
mystical experience, as outlined below, is essential to understand subsequent 
empirical and theoretical work presented throughout this thesis.
The term used in this thesis as the generic term to cover all phenomena 
indicated by the terms on Waldron's list is transpersonal experience. This avoids 
the difficulties inherent in term such as bliss, as it does not specifically link any 
particular emotional valence to an experience. It also avoids the ontological 
assumptions inherent in transcendental experience, transcendent experience and 
praetematural experience, which preclude materialistic interpretations of such 
phenomena. Furthermore, it removes the difficulty inherent in religious 
experience, as it eschews implications that doctrinal interpretations are 
inevitably attached to such experiences.
1.4.4 Qualities Unique to Mystical Experience: James’ View
Grounds for supposing that religious experiences are only "mystical 
experiences" if they possess certain features can be found in James' (1902/
1960) work, which listed four qualities of mystical experiences:
(a) Ineffability - such experiences are incapable of expression using 
conventional language;
(b) Transiency - such experiences typically last no more than around thirty 
minutes;
(c) Noetic quality - new information is disclosed during them;
(d) Passivity - the experience happens to the recipient, and is not a state over 
which the experiencing mystic has dominating control.
Problematic in this list is that although these qualities may be 
necessary criteria for mystical experience, they are hardly sufficient. Taking 
them as sufficient would imply that even brief cat-naps, being short in duration, 
passive, hard to describe in words and experiences which may offer new 
insights during dream sleep, could be described as "mystical experiences". 
Clearer grounds for distinguishing mystical experiences from other types of 
experience are explicit in the lists of features unique to the former proposed by 
Stace (1960) and Happold (1963). These lists require close consideration here, 
for they relate to psychometric scales used in this thesis.
1.4.5 Qualities Unique to Mystical Experience: Views of Stace (1960) and 
Happold (1963)
For Stace (1960), the central feature of mystical experience properly so- 
called was, ironically, a quality absent from James' list - a sense of unity with 
qualities beyond the self. Stace's position has frequently been seen as a form of 
perennialism, holding that whatever the learning experiences and doctrines to 
which mystics in different traditions have been exposed, all mystical
1experiences share certain core features. Experience of union was taken by Stace 
to be the core feature of all mystical experiences, making them 
phenomenologically identical, differing only in post hoc interpretations attached 
to them. This union could be interpreted as union with Christ (in Christian 
mysticism), with God (in monotheistic faith), with Nature (in nature-mystics 
such as Jefferies), with the cosmos (in pantheistic religion) or with the physical 
world (as in Aldous Huxley's experiments with mescalin).
Stace did not see a sense of unity as the only important attribute of 
mystical experience. He listed core features of two types of mystical experience, 
introvertive and extrovertive (see Table One).
Table 1. Introvertive and Extrovertive Mystical Experiences 
After Stace, 1960
INTROVERTIVE EXTROVERTIVE
Unitive quality 
(defined as unity 
between self and the 
world).
Unitive quality (defined as perceived 
unity in all things).
Ineffability Ineffability
Noetic quality Noetic quality
Joy Joy
Sacred Quality Sacred Quality
Space-Time
Transcendence
Space-Time Transcendence
Loss of False Ego Objectivity - (a sense of all things 
becoming conscious).
Experience of union, if defined in slightly different ways for the two 
types of mystical experience, was seen by Stace as the key feature of both types. 
Table One indicates how Stace attributed virtually identical lists of qualities to 
both types of experience; apart from subtle differences regarding the unitive 
feature, the only other distinguishing feature is that introvertive mystical
1experience involves ego loss, (focussing on changes in the experiential state 
insofar as it relates to the inner world of self), whereas extrovertive mystical 
experiences involves changed perception of the external world (the objectivity 
attribute).
Using Stace's (1960) model, mystical experience may be defined 
succinctly as a sense o f union with qualities beyond the self, so that normal 
barriers beyond self and non-self at least throughout the duration o f the 
experience, are not apparent. This definition is non-committed to any statement 
as to what the object of such sense of union may be, thus allowing for 
experiences accompanied by diverse doctrinal interpretations to qualify as 
mystical experiences. It also distinguishes clearly between mystical experiences 
and other religious experiences, such as a sense of prayers being answered, 
healing experiences, glossolalia, a sense of the dead being present, a sense of an 
evil presence or a sense of ordered coincidences, which do not involve a sense 
of union. This interpretation of mystical experience as meaning a sense of union 
is what is to be understood when the term is used throughout this thesis.
Stace's belief that introvertive mystical experiences represent a more 
advanced state than extrovertive has been challenged (Schlamm, 2000), but 
appreciation of his commitment to this position helps to clarify consistencies 
between Stace’s work and that of Happold (1963). Such a belief implies that 
ego loss is important in the more advanced forms of mystical experience; this 
view was echoed by Happold (1963), who believed that mystical experiences, in 
addition to possession of the four qualities described by James (1902/ 1960), 
contained three additional features. These were a sense of unity, a sense of time- 
transcendence and a sense of ego-loss. This approach is clearly consistent with
1that of Stace, implying that a sense of union is an important and necessary 
feature of mystical experience.
1.4.6 Definitions of Mystical Experience and Psychometrics
Heuristic value in the approaches taken by Stace and by Happold is 
evident from how their lists have acted as conceptual bases for psychometric 
scale design. Hood's (1975) M-Scale is based on Stace (1960), while Happold's 
(1963) scheme inspired development of the Francis-Louden Mystical 
Orientation Inventory (Francis & Louden, 2000a).
More information on these scales will be presented in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. Previously published work using the M-Scale has offered 
grounds for distinguishing the terms "mystical experience" and "religious 
experience", and factor analysis of this scale has suggested that introvertive and 
extrovertive mystical experiences can be distinguished (Hood, Morris &
Watson, 1993).
Both the M-Scale and the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale are 
divided into sub-scales. Common to both is a sub-scale to assess unitive 
experience, considered by Stace to be the core feature of mystical experience. 
These questionnaires have led to research, reviewed in Chapter Three, into 
personality traits associated with mystical experiences.
1.5 Is Mystical Experience a Social Construct?
These psychometric scales have certainly helped to increase confidence 
in theoretical statements on the nature of mystical experience. Findings using 
the M-Scale have been used as evidence for Stace's (1960) distinction between
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mystical experiences, and religious interpretations of such experiences (Hood, 
Ghorbani. Watson, Ghramaleki, Bing, Davison, Morris & Williamson, 2001). 
The Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, being a more recent scale, has 
yet to produce the same amount of published research data as the M-Scale, but it 
is likely that this position will change over time.
These scales mean that personality research into mystical experience can 
now neatly dovetail much empirical research into other dimensions of 
religiosity, as explained in Chapter Three. The latter body of literature has 
frequently included assessments of psychoticism, driven by the theoretical 
position (for which empirical support exists) that psychoticism is inversely 
related to likelihood of acquisition of conditioned responses. The tacit 
assumption behind such thinking is that dimensions of religiosity arise through 
social learning. This means that a similar focus on psychoticism into research 
into mystical experience is defensible if such experiences are also viewed as 
learnt constructs. A meta-theoretical position that holds that this is indeed so 
represents one side in a philosophical debate, which will be reviewed briefly 
here.
1.5.1 Social Constructivism versus Perennialism
Stace (1960) believed that mystical experiences, defined strictly as 
unitive experiences, feature in all religions, differences being in interpretation 
not phenomenology. Katz (1978) disagreed, claiming that such experiences are 
absent (for example) from Judaism. Using Forman's (1998) terminology, the 
former position, with its implications that mystical experience is innate, can be 
termed perennialism, the latter position, that implies that mystical experiences
arise through social learning, can be termed social constructivism. No a priori 
reasons exist for suggesting that the latter viewpoint implies general rejection of 
realist ontology. "Social constructivist" as used in this context should therefore 
be understood as having a more restricted meaning than is commonly 
understood by the term.
Brief juxtapositions of these two positions will highlight how certain 
theoretical perspectives imply that mystical experience is learnt. Assumptions 
that have been made about why psychoticism has typically been found to 
correlate negatively with other expressions of religiosity therefore provide 
grounds for conducting psychometric research into psychoticism as a potential 
personality correlate of mystical experience. However, as this thesis will 
highlight, the heterogeneity of psychoticism calls for some qualification here.
Perennialism and social constructivism imply different answers to the 
question "Do mystical experiences arise from a learned, socially conditioned, 
constructive process, or are they the expression of some sort of innate 
capacity?" (Forman, 1998, pviii). Katz (1978) made his commitment to the 
former viewpoint explicit. He argued passionately that Jewish experiences, 
such as devekuth (literally “cleavage”, a state marked by feelings of clinging to 
a higher being, such as Yahweh), differ fundamentally from Buddhist 
experiences, such as nirvana or satori, states characterised respectively by 
extinction of the ego and profound enlightenment. Katz concluded that such 
experiences arise through learning:
"(T)he Hindu mystic does not have an experience of x which he (sic) 
then describes in the, to him, familiar language and symbols of Hinduism, but 
rather he has a Hindu experience, i.e. his experience is not an unmediated
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experience but is itself the, at least partially, pre-formed, anticipated experience 
of Brahman. Again, the Christian mystic does not experience some unidentified 
reality, which he then conveniently labels God, but rather has the at least 
partially prefigured Christian experiences of God, or Jesus, or the like" (Katz, 
1978, p26).
"Because the Jew is taught that such experiences of unity do not happen 
for reasons flowing out of Jewish theological tradition, he does not, in fact, have 
such experiences" (Katz, 1978, p35; italics added).
Similar positions have also been defended by Gimello (1978; 1983), 
Payne (1984), Penner (1983), Streng (1970; 1978) and somewhat more
implicitly by Sunden (see Holm & Belzen, 1995). Depictions of mystical 
experiences as being affected by social learning directly were offered explicitly 
by Proudfoot (1985), who, adapting Schacter and Singer's (1962) two-factor 
model of emotion, argued that such experiences may acquire a sense of 
numinous quality if people having such experiences have been taught to label 
them as such. Similar implications are apparent in Sunden's "role theory" (Holm 
& Belzen, 1995) and in Keller's (1978) essay on mystical literature.
Perennialism, the other side of this debate, implies that mysticism is 
innate. This is evident from the title of the work edited by Forman (1998) The 
Innate Capacity. He described the state common to mystical experiences from 
different traditions as a state of knowing without intentional object, a state of 
"Pure Consciousness" characterised by neither knowing-how nor knowing-that 
but simply knowing. Superficially, such a state appears different from the
umtive experience identified by Stace (1960) as the core feature of mysticism 
However, Stace's position implies, at least in the case of introvertive mystical
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experiences, that unitive experiences achieved by mystics do not involve a 
separation between knowing-subject and perceived-object and thus 
consciousness during such states lacks intentional objects. Differences between 
Forman and Stace may therefore be more apparent than real.
Forman's arguments for perennialism were typically based on conceptual 
analysis rather than empirical evidence, notably his claim that such experiences 
typically involve a state of Vergessenheit or "stripping away" of learnt concepts 
and thus arise through processes antithetical to learning. However, some of 
Forman's arguments for perennialism are amenable to empirical scrutiny. 
Longitudinal study, for example, could be used to assess Forman's claim that 
states such as the Buddhist concept of satori may be experienced prior to 
learning about them. The issue that must be addressed here is how these rival 
positions of Katz and Forman relate to psychometric research into mystical 
experience in general, and into psychoticism and related traits as potential 
correlates of such experiences in particular.
Research into nonmystical dimensions of religiosity has assessed 
psychoticism through a tacit assumption that religiosity is associated with 
conditioning, psychoticism inversely so, and that, therefore, the two will be 
negatively correlated (see Chapter Three). To use similar theoretical arguments 
to predict inverse relationships between mystical experience and psychoticism 
implies a tacit endorsement of social constructivism. Alternative ways to assess 
whether a variable arises through learning or is innate obviously exist; insights 
from longitudinal studies, from developmental psychology and from cross- 
cultural psychology can all make potential contributions here. However, the 
relative ease of collecting psychometric data on psychoticism and mysticism
shows how psychometrics is a relatively straightforward means to evaluate the 
debate between perennialism and social constructivism using empirical 
psychology rather than philosophy.
A final point to be addressed here is that of how, even if psychometric 
data were to indicate that traits such as psychoticism or other traits related to 
propensity for social learning bear no relationship at all to mystical experience 
per se, such traits could still theoretically relate to another conceptually distinct 
variable - attitudes to mysticism. Strong perennialist claims have had a long 
history, as is explained in Huxley's (1946) The Perennial Philosophy, the title 
itself coming from a Latin term used much earlier by Leibniz, perennia 
philosophalis. Forman (1998), termed his viewpoint “perennial psychology”, to 
distinguish it from the more extreme claims of “perennial philosophy”, in that 
while this perennial psychology implies that experience per se is identical in 
different creeds, this position acknowledges that considerable variations exist in 
the doctrinal and ideological teachings of different creeds. Such a position is 
consistent with hypotheses that learning, while having little direct influence on 
mystical experience, is highly relevant to attitudes to such experiences. Thus, 
both Katz and Forman may be declared as being at one in holding that 
assessment of traits indicative of learning potential may be used to predict the 
likely attitudes an individual holds towards mysticism.
Debates on how beliefs about and attitudes to mysticism relate to 
experience need to be more specific than has been the case in previous work. 
Katz criticised perennialism for its assumptions about experiences taking causal 
primacy, claiming that “the symmetry (that is, the relationship perennialism 
assumes between belief and experience) is always one-directional: from
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"experience” to "beliefs" ” (Katz, 1978, p30; parentheses added). Katz did not 
clarify, however, whether he took such a position to mean that both beliefs and 
experience relate in equal measure to traits indicative of learning potential. 
Relevance of assessments of traits such as psychoticism to this area will be 
outlined throughout the current thesis.
1.6 Is Mystical Experience Really Pathology?
As well as the debate on whether mystical experiences arise through 
learning, an important psychological issue that may benefit from assessment of 
psychoticism's relevance to mystical experience is that of the mental health
status of those who report mystical experiences. This is particularly evident if 
Claridge's (1990; 2001) dimensional model of psycho-pathology, which views 
psychological disorders as existing on a continuum with normality, is endorsed 
This perspective avoids both the extremes of a medical model, implying that
disorders such as psychoses are totally discrete from normality, and anti-
psychiatry, with its radical denial of such disorders.
Applied to the psychometric study of mysticism, Claridge's dimensional 
model implies that if mysticism is really linked to any pathology, traits linked 
with proneness to such pathology should correlate with self-reported mystical 
experience in sub-clinical populations. If mystical experiences are really 
psychotic delusions, for example, predictions can be made that assessed 
mystical experience will correlate with those traits, such as psychoticism 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976) or transliminality (Thalboume & Delin, 1994;
1999) that have been linked with psychosis-proneness.
Superficially, questions on the health status of mystical experience
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recipients may appear unrelated to the conceptually distinct question of whether 
mysticism is learnt. However, assessments of psychoticism are relevant to both 
questions. This trait has been linked with both low levels of learning propensity 
and high levels of psychosis-proneness.
The sheer breadth of psychoticism means that certain facets of this trait 
may actually be positive attributes. An example is creativity (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1976; Woody & Claridge, 1977). Accurate assessment of the mental 
health status of participants who report mystical experiences should therefore 
assess individuals on separate facets of psychoticism as well as this trait as a 
global variable.
Pathology may be linked not merely with mystical experience itself, but 
with interests in and beliefs about such phenomena. This position is explicit in 
Thalboume and Delin's (1994; 1999) link between interests and beliefs in the 
paranormal as well as self-reported mystical experience with transliminality; 
and with the American Psychiatric Association's (1994) Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual's list of criteria for the schizotypal personality, which refers 
to interest in paranormal matters (not necessarily personal experiences of the 
paranormal). Such approaches to psychosis-proneness suggest that such 
vulnerability may relate more heavily to attitudes to mysticism than mystical 
experience, underlining why research in this area should assess individuals on 
both variables.
1.7 Summary. Implications and Agenda for Thesis
A defence of applying psychometric study to the study of transpersonal 
experiences and definitions of terms relevant to such research were presented in
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this chapter. The term "religious experience" itself refers to diverse phenomena, 
of which one specific (but by no means the only) example is mystical 
experience, defined here as a sense of unity with qualities beyond the self. 
Psychometric tools have been developed to assess self-reported mystical 
experiences. Questions about such phenomena, such as whether they are learnt 
or innate phenomena, or whether or not they are linked to pathology, may gain 
potential benefits from data obtained using such scales.
Conjoint assessments of individual differences in (a) mystical 
experience and (b) traits related to propensity for learning and latent 
dispositions towards mental illness, such as psychoticism, can be fruitful in 
addressing such questions. In addition to mystical experience and personality 
traits, another important variable that should be considered when these 
questions are addressed from a psychometric perspective is attitudes to 
mysticism. In previous scholarship, this variable has not received the attention it 
deserves.
Conceptual questions implicit in this brief synopsis of this introduction 
will be tackled in Chapter Two. This will begin with focus on the trait of 
psychoticism, showing how it is relevant to both social learning and to 
pathology, but also offer grounds for supposing this trait to be heterogeneous. 
Consequently, recommendations will be made for psychometricians who wish 
to assess this trait in conjunction with assessed mystical experiences. Chapter 
Two will conclude with discussion of the variable of attitudes to mysticism, 
using it as the foundation for a taxonomy of religion amenable to empirical 
assessment. Chapter Three will review previous empirical findings on the 
intrapsychic correlates of mystical experience, as reported in previously
28
published psychometric studies.
Whether liberal attitudes, a specific and arguably positive facet of 
psychoticism, are associated with mystical experience, is discussed in a new 
empirical study, original with the current thesis, reported in Chapter Four. 
Construction of a new scale to assess attitudes to mysticism is reported in 
Chapter Five.
In Chapter Six, which will present data from the main empirical study in 
this thesis, earlier themes will be brought together in one study. A report will be 
presented of a study, which assesses (a) mystical experience (b) personality 
traits (including both pyschoticism and those linked with specific facets of this 
broad trait) and (c) attitudes to mysticism in a study of four creedal groups. 
Considerations will be given as to how far the reported data support the 
taxonomy presented in Chapter Two. A key question that will be asked with 
reference to data presented in Chapter Six is that of whether mystical experience 
relates only to specific facets of psychoticism, rather than to broad measures of 
this trait. The implications of the data from this study for the questions of 
whether mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism are learnt phenomena 
will also be considered. Key themes emerging from the three empirical studies 
will be discussed in Chapter Seven, in conjunction with interview data obtained 
from several participants.
Following presentation of psychometric data original with the current 
thesis, deeper insights into the precise manner in which mysticism may relate to 
the Eysenckian trait of psychoticism, discussed in Chapter Eight, will become 
possible. These will have implications for questions on the mental health of 
people who report such experiences. Potential differences that the variables of
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mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism have to traits germane to 
learning propensity will be used to fuel an original suggestion for progress in 
the perennialist-constructivist debate. Unlike much previous debate in this area, 
these suggestions will be rigorously grounded in the results of careful 
psychometric study.
CHAPTER TWO:
POTENTIAL INTRAPSYCHIC CORRELATES OF
TRANSPERSONAL EXPERIENCES
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter One, a defence of psychometric methodology in 
transpersonal psychology was given. Two theoretical debates with potential to 
reap huge benefits from such research, namely the question of to what extent 
such experiences are pathological, and the more philosophical question of 
whether such experiences are better viewed as learnt or innate constructs, were 
outlined. While these two are by no means the only theoretical questions that 
can benefit from psychometric research into transpersonal psychology, both are 
germane to questions of assessment of psychoticism in such studies. An 
important conceptual issue that is intimately bound to the nature of 
psychometric research, the heterogeneity of the trait of psychoticism as 
represented by Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) will be discussed in detail 
throughout this chapter.
Mystical experience, as with other dimensions of religiosity (see Chapter 
Three), has been assessed in conjunction with the three traits used in the model 
of personality defended by Eysenck and Eysenck (1976), namely introversion- 
extraversion, stability-neuroticism and psychoticism. Both empirical and 
theoretical reasons exist for a focus, of these three traits, on psychoticism when 
examining the personality correlates of such experiences. As well as being 
pertinent to the above theoretical questions, much empirical research has 
suggested inverse correlations between this trait and other dimensions of
religiosity, raising the question of whether such a correlation will exist for 
religiosity’s experiential dimension. However, the many grounds for 
questioning the assumption that this trait is homogeneous suggest that 
psychometric assessment of the personality correlates of transpersonal 
experience should consider specific facets of, as well as global measures of, this 
trait.
This chapter will also consider in more depth the variable of attitudes to 
mysticism. In Chapter One, a plea was made that this variable should be 
considered, in addition to personality traits and mystical experience itself, in 
psychometric studies of mystical experience. The latter part of this chapter will 
present a theoretical taxonomy of religion, distinguishing religions according to 
likely standing on this variable. Data which assess the extent to which this 
taxonomy stands up to empirical investigation will be presented in later chapters 
in this thesis.
2.2 Personality Models Reviewed in Chapter Two
Numerous personality models have inspired research into the 
psychology of religion. This chapter will focus on four of these models. These 
are Eysenck's psychoticism-extraversion-neuroticism model (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1969; 1976; Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985), the five-factor model 
of Costa and McCrae (1992a), the Myers-Briggs typology (described in detail 
by Bayne, 1994, 1997) and Cattell's 16 Personality Factor model (Cattell & 
Kline, 1977). Alternative models have been used to look at the phenomena of 
transpersonal experience from a psychometric viewpoint. These include the 
Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1976; cited in Kaplan & Saccuzzo,
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1997) and Hathaway and McKinley's (1943) Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (see Chapter Three).The latter has been named as the "most widely 
used and referenced personality test in existence" (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 1997, 
p22), but this and other personality inventories that continue to be used 
primarily for clinical diagnosis, such as the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Clinical 
Inventory (Millon, 1983; cited in Gregory, 1992), will not be reviewed here as 
focus will be on those inventories which are not only widely used, but which 
have been used in numerous studies of nonclinical respondents. The focal 
question being discussed here is whether psychoticism, as a broad trait, can 
withstand attempts to measure personality as a broad construct in nonclinical 
samples. Thus, despite the wide usage of the MMPI, it will not feature in the 
following discussion.
As Kaplan and Saccuzzo explained of the Jackson Personality Inventory, 
this inventory is based on a theory of motivation rather than traits, being 
designed with the explicit purpose of assessment of needs based on Murray's 
(1938) theory of motivation. Anxiety, breadth of interest, complexity, 
conformity, energy level, innovation, interpersonal affect, organization, 
responsibility, risk-taking, self-esteem, social adroitness, social participation, 
tolerance and value orthodoxy are those needs assessed by the Jackson 
Personality Inventory. Some of these may be linked to separable aspects of 
psychoticism, such as risk-taking, value orthodoxy and organization. 
Nevertheless, comparisons between personality trait models and models of 
motivation may be accused of a failure to compare like with like. Despite its 
favourable psychometric properties (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 1997), the Jackson 
Personality Inventory has not been as widely used in research studies as, say,
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the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire of Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett (1985). 
Considerations of the Jackson Personality Inventory will not, therefore, form a 
substantial part of the following discussion. Instead, attempts will be made to 
indicate how comparisons of Eysenck's P-E-N model with personality models 
assessed by inventories which are widely used as research tools to assess traits 
in nonclinical samples challenge the view that psychoticism is univocal.
The different facets of psychoticism that become apparent following 
such comparisons are not invariably negative. Creativity may be a facet of 
psychoticism, as considered by Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) and supported in 
empirical studies by Woody and Claridge (1977) and Thalboume, Bartemucci, 
Delin Fox and Nofi (1997), suggesting that heightened psychoticism scores for 
respondents who report mystical experiences could imply links between 
mysticism and creativity rather than pathology. Questions of whether enhanced 
creativity and a willingness to challenge social convention represent only 
specific facets ofpsychoticism should therefore be considered in future research 
into potential relationships between mystical experience and psychoticism.
Psychoticism’s relevance to social and cultural learning will be outlined 
in this chapter. An important issue that will be discussed is how the 
heterogeneity of psychoticism implies that certain facets of psychoticism may 
bear more central relevance to propensity for social learning than other facets. 
Links to the perennialist-constructivist debate on mystical experience will keep 
in mind that the form of perennialism being evaluated here, unlike earlier 
perennial philosophy, stresses the innate character of mystical experience, but 
allows for a considerable role in social learning of beliefs and attitudes 
pertinent to such experiences. Psychometric assessment of correlations between
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mysticism and psychoticism therefore relate to debates between perennialists 
and social constructivists in terms of potential relevance to both mystical 
experience per se and to attitudes towards and beliefs about mysticism. 
Predictions based upon social constructivism differ for those religions taking 
pro-mystical and those taking less pro-mystical attitudes. A taxonomy in which 
some religions (such as Zen Buddhism or modem Druidry) can be classified as 
“pro-mystical** and other religions (such as the more Calvinist forms of 
Christian Protestantism or Ashkenazi Judaism) can be classified as “anti- 
mystical'* will therefore be presented in the final part of this chapter.
Personality Models
Psychoticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976; Eysenck, Eysenck & 
Barrett, 1985) is a trait that, for both empirical and theoretical reasons, merits 
particularly close scrutiny in thinking about how psychometric assessment of 
personality relates to questions on transpersonal experiences. Most published 
empirical research papers on personality correlates of religiosity published since 
1990 have employed measurements of the three traits in the Eysenckian P-E-N 
model, and, since the mid-1990s, an emerging database has looked specifically 
at the experiential dimension of religion in connection with this model. This 
literature will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter Three, and the existence of 
such empirical data mean that certainly, considerations of potential correlates of 
transpersonal experience should consider (among other variables) psychoticism. 
There are, however, also good theoretical reasons for considering psychoticism 
here (see below, Section 2.3).
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The acronym P-E-N stands for the three traits in Eysenck’s model - 
P. for psychoticism, E. for extraversion and N. for neuroticism. Of these, P. 
(Psychoticism) not only relates most closely to theoretical foundations for 
empirical research programmes on the question on whether transpersonal 
experiences should be viewed as innate or socially constructed, but is the most 
controversial of the three traits. Its relevance to questions on human potential 
for acquisition of any psychological attribute or experience that may accurately 
be deemed a learned construct will be elucidated more fully after expositions of 
the model and of Eysenck's theoretical grounds for inclusion of P. (Section 
2.2). Criticisms of these theoretical foundations imply that psychoticism may 
more adequately be represented by descriptions of several distinct traits - thus, 
several alternative personality models that describe more than one trait in place 
of broad psychoticism will be outlined in Section 2.3. Empirical evidence 
against treating P. as univocal is considered in 2.4.
2.2.1 Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism
The late Hans Jurgen Eysenck (1916-1997) showed a considerable 
shift of interest in his research career from the late 1960s onwards (Gibson. 
1980). Eysenck's early work, based upon factor analytic data, described human 
personality in terms of two broad traits - introversion-extraversion and stability- 
neuroticism. Introversion-extraversion corresponds to the term as used in 
common English; stability-neuroticism is best defined as proneness to negative 
emotions, rather than as any prima facie ground for diagnosis of clinical 
neurosis or any other form of recognised psycho-pathology (these traits were 
described by Eysenck in such a way as to cover normal ranges of individuals,
most of whom, including high scorers on N. (neuroticism), would have had no 
history of psychiatric diagnosis). Largely orthogonal, these two traits gave 
Eysenck a form of vindication of the Ancient Doctrine of the Four Humours, 
albeit as a trait rather than type model (introverted stable individuals, 
introverted unstable individuals, extraverted stable individuals and extraverted
unstable individuals corresponding respectively to phlegmatic, melancholic, 
sanguine and choleric types in the famous ancient Hippocratean model of 
personality). However, as from the end of the 1960s, Eysenck introduced a third 
trait into his model - psychoticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1969). Theoretical
foundations for inclusion of this trait are best understood with reference to the
nineteenth century concept of Einheitspsychosen.
2.2.2 Einheitspsychosen and Vulnerability to Psychoses
The doctrine of Einheitspsychosen, proposed by Heinrich Neumann
in 1859, declared that all psychoses - whether manic-depressive psychosis, 
what later came to be known as schizophrenia or any other form of psychotic 
illness - were, in reality, a unitary phenomenon, in short, a single illness 
(Shorter, 1997). Neumann was therefore implying that a common root cause 
lay behind disorders that, on the surface, appeared different. The theory soon 
met with opposition; as early as 1863, Karl Kahlbaum proposed that different 
psychoses were far more heterogeneous than the Einheitspsychosen doctrine 
implied (Shorter, 1997). Many psychiatrists since Kraepelin have rejected full 
commitment to the doctrine, agreeing with Kraepelin that sharp distinctions 
should at least be made between schizophrenia (termed dementia praecox in 
Kraepelin’s time) and manic-depressive psychosis. Full evaluation of the
doctrine is not the purpose of this thesis; the theory is referred to here as it helps 
us to understand both theoretical bases for Eysenck’s postulation of P., and the 
many criticisms that have been levelled against Eysenck's conceptualisations of 
this trait.
I o attribute all psychoses to a common root raises the question of 
what this common denominator might be. Eysenck's portrayal of P. can be 
understood as a tentative answer, implying that the characteristic that links all 
psychotics is elevated scores on psychoticism. This is not to say that there is 
such a thing as "the gene" for psychosis, especially as Eysenck's account of the 
ontogenetic bases of P. implies that P. is more likely to be polygenic rather than 
linked to a single gene (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). It is merely to say that a 
high level of the subclinical trait of psychoticism is, in Eysenck's view, the 
common factor that underlies all psychoses. Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) linked 
psychoticism with heredity, a position that may be challenged by more recent 
research data (see below).
Implications of this for an understanding of both normal personality 
and abnormal personality have been outlined well by Eysenck's critics, perhaps 
most notably by Bishop (1977). Bishop noted the following three implications 
of Eysenck's position:
(a) Psychosis and normality can be regarded as being part of the same 
continuum;
(b) Qualitative distinctions exist between neurosis and psychosis - psychoses 
should not be regarded as more advanced stages of neurosis, but as qualitatively 
distinct phenomena, with neurosis associated with high scores on N., psychosis 
high scores on P., in Eysenck's model;
(c ) Psychoses form a homogeneous set of psychological disorders.
The third of these implications is most immediately relevant to the 
nineteenth century doctrine of Einheitspsy chosen, but is also that which most 
readily invites criticism. Grounds exist for supposing that psychoses do indeed 
represent diverse nosological categories, opening the possibility that if they are 
linked by elevated scores on P., this is only because P. is, in reality, assessing a 
number of different facets. Extensive empirical literature in the psychology of 
religion (reviewed in Chapter Three) has employed broad assessments of P.; 
however, the possibility that P. is not entirely univocal implies important 
grounds for fundamental revision to future research programmes in this field.
2.2.3 Impulsivity, Conditionability and Propensity for Social Learning
Implications for levels of P.
Caution must be exercised in treating P. as a univocal construct; 
however, the question which needs to be addressed at this stage is that of why 
this trait has attracted so much research interest in the psychology of religion. 
Approaching this question theoretically rather than empirically, the answer lies 
in the trait's theoretical importance for understanding variance in 
conditionability, in impulsivity and, more specifically, in conditionability into 
tender-minded social attitudes (Beyts, Frcka, Martin & Levy, 1993; Rocklin & 
Revelle, 1981). These theoretical considerations give the trait an immediate 
relevance to the constructivist-perennialist debate on mystical experience.
Although psychoticism may be multi-faceted, one may still delineate its
central facet as low propensity for socio-cultural learning. Indeed, P. is 
arguably better defined as an inhibition against readiness to acquire social and
39
cultural mores than as any trait linked with increased vulnerability to psychosis 
(a definition that soon runs the risk of circular reasoning). To understand why P. 
can be defined in this manner, it is of relevance to look at one of its sub-facets - 
impulsivity, linked with low conditionabililty.
Impulsivity was initially portrayed by Eysenck as a facet of extraversion, 
but good empirical grounds exist for accepting Eysenck's later shifting of 
impulsivity from a facet-level trait loading on E. to the domain of P. (Howarth, 
1986; Rocklin & Revelle, 1981). Since high impulsivity is linked with reduced 
conditionability this means that P., rather than E., of the three traits in Eysenck's 
P-E-N model, can be taken as a marker of how readily individuals will acquire 
commitment to anything that can be deemed a learnt construct. Links between 
impulsivity and low conditionability relate to degrees of cortical inhibition 
associated with different levels of impulsivity. Full evaluation of these 
theoretical links would require an in-depth analysis of neuro-psychological 
processes that is somewhat beyond the concerns of the current thesis.
Such an approach to psychoticism has important implications. For 
example, the typically high psychoticism scores of criminals, noted by Eysenck 
and Eysenck (1976), can be understood as evidence that criminals do not learn 
appropriate codes of social behaviour that the bulk of a more law-abiding 
population do learn successfully. Applied to the study of religion, an important 
implication is that if a dimension of religion really is learnt, it should correlate 
significantly negatively with psychoticism. Psychoticism may be predicted to 
correlate negatively with agreement with orthodox doctrine or engagement in 
conventional religious practices, for example, if these are learnt phenomena. 
Similar arguments apply when attention is shifted to religious experience. If
religious experience is, as constructivists such as Katz (1978) hold, a largely 
learnt phenomenon, significantly negative correlations can be expected between 
P. and sell-reported religious, mystical or transpersonal experience. If, however, 
as perennialists claim, religious experiences arise independently of social 
learning, such theoretical grounds for supposing statistically significant negative 
associations between P. and self-reported mystical experience are more difficult 
to defend. An important qualification to these statements is that the negative 
correlation between mystical experience and P. implied by social constructivism 
should be stronger in religions that value mysticism than those that do not. This 
necessitates classification of religions as being either pro-mystical or anti-
mystical (see below).
2.3 Alternative Personality Models to Eysenckian Theory
If psychoticism is not homogeneous, it is plausible that some of its facets
relate more strongly to socio-cultural learning than do others. Research that
aims to assess correlations between self-reported religious, transpersonal or 
mystical experience and psychoticism should take particular cognizance of this 
possibility, for theoretical grounds exist for supposing that some facets of P. 
may actually correlate positively with religious, transpersonal or mystical 
experience (cf. Thalbourne & Delin, 1994; 1999). Thus, blanket measures of P
that appear to be orthogonal with self-reported mystical experience could 
actually be obscuring how different facets within the trait may have 
diametrically opposed relationships with mystical experience. Discussion 
below will indicate how there is no a priori, necessary logical contradiction for 
supposing that mystical experience could be both socially constructed, and
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related positively to at least certain highly specific, well-defined aspects of P. in 
certain samples.
Comparisons between Eysenck's P-E-N model and other models reveals 
how, although such models frequently describe traits that can be equated with 
E. or N., they typically represent P. by descriptions of several distinct traits, 
thus stressing the heterogeneity of psychoticism. It may therefore be 
advantageous to the researcher into transpersonal experience to adopt 
measurements of these alternative models in his/ her research programme if 
such personality models satisfactorily distinguish those facets of psychoticism 
that are most germane to socio-cultural learning from other specific facets of the 
trait. If psychoticism is typically represented by several traits in models other 
than Eysenck's, it follows that such models should typically describe more than 
three traits. This is indeed the case, as comparisons of Eysenck’s P-E-N model 
with three other personality models will now clarify.
2.3.1 Five-Factor Model (FFM)
The first of three such models to be reviewed here is the five-factor 
model, or FFM (Costa & McCrae, 1992a; 1992b; 1992c; 1995;Digman, 1990; 
Digman & Inouye, 1986; Goldberg, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1983). This model 
was initially based on factor analyses of peer ratings rather than self-reports 
(Norman, 1963), so early versions of the five-factor model can be viewed as 
contributions to social cognition literature as much as objective accounts of 
human personality structure. It can now be regarded as a model of the latter, 
being based upon factor analyses of self-ratings.
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Alternatively known as "The Big Five" model, although its most 
famous advocates, Costa and McCrae, prefer the less pretentious title "Five- 
Factor Model" (Costa & McCrae, 1992b), the model describes five orthogonal 
traits as fundamental for understanding human personality. These are (in 
descending order of variance): extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism and openness to experience. These have been described as follows:
"Extraversion summarises traits related to activity, energy, dominance, 
sociability, expressiveness and positive emotions. Agreeableness contrasts a 
prosocial orientation towards others with antagonism, and includes traits such as 
altruism, tender-mindedness, trust and modesty. Conscientiousness describes 
socially prescribed control that facilitates goal-directed behaviour. Neuroticism 
contrasts emotional stability with a broad range of negative affects, including 
anxiety, sadness, irritability and nervous tension. Openness describes the 
breadth, depth and complexity of an individual's mental life". (Benet-Martinez 
& John, 1998, p730).
McCrae and Costa (1983) developed an inventory, the NEO, that 
initially assessed three traits of these traits, neuroticism, extraversion and 
openness to experience, taking its name from the initial letters of these three 
traits. Subsequently extended to assess all five traits, two major forms of the 
NEO now exist. These are the NEO-PI-R, which assesses observer-based 
ratings, and the NEO-PI-S, which assesses self-ratings self-ratings (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992a). This instrument has been found to have both good reliability 
and good validity (Costa & McCrae, 1992a).
Research data using the NEO-PI-S, alongside data on psychoticism, will 
be presented in later chapters in this thesis. Good reasons exist for choice of this
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instrument to guide empirical research in this thesis, which will be outlined 
below. Other potential candidates for assessment of more finely graded 
personality facets than psychoticism include the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI), and Cattelfs 16 P.F. model, and as cognizance of these latter two 
models strengthens the case for holding psychoticism to be heterogeneous, 
reviews of these two models will be given. However, advantages that the FFM 
has over these models will be presented in these reviews.
Cross-cultural replications of the FFM (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; 
Katigbak. Church & Akamine, 1996; Saucier, 1997; Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999) 
are evidence that its five factors are based on more than mere perceptions of 
similarities between words in specific languages. Despite its critics (Block,
1995; Eysenck, 1992a; Waller & Ben-Porath, 1987), it has sometimes been 
viewed as a more or less definitive account of human personality (Deary & 
Matthews, 1993).
Representations of Eysencks’ Traits in the Five-Factor Model
Deary and Matthews (1993) held that reasonable parity exists between 
Eysenck's model and the FFM if (i) psychoticism is equated with both low 
conscientiousness and low agreeableness in the five-factor model and (ii) 
openness is equated with intelligence rather than personality. (Eysenck 
consistently took intelligence to be quite distinct from any personality traits). 
This assertion deserves careful scrutiny. Aside from Costa and McCrae's (1993) 
flat denial that openness to experience should be equated with intelligence, such 
statements are problematic insofar as claims that low psychoticism relates to
agreeableness and conscientiousness obscure how these two traits appear to 
represent different facets of low psychoticism.
Costa and McCrae (1995) offered both theoretical and empirical reasons 
as to why bifurcation of low psychoticism into low conscientiousness and low 
agreeableness is an improvement upon treatment of psychoticism as 
homogeneous. Theoretically, they argued that effective leadership requires 
assertiveness, which they associate with high conscientiousness but low 
agreeableness. Empirically, Costa and McCrae (1985) found that of the five 
traits in the five-factor model, agreeableness correlated most strongly with P. (r 
= -0.32), and conscientiousness second most strongly (r = -.28). Both 
correlations reached statistical significance, and although these correlations 
were not so high, in Costa and McCrae's view, to justify treating 
conscientiousness and agreeableness as equivalent, they prompted Eysenck 
(1992a; 1992b) to criticise such bifurcation as superfluous. Eysenck (1992c) 
also criticised what he perceived to be the atheoretical nature of the five-factor 
model, holding that the concept of P. was based upon a well-recognised theory, 
the nineteenth century theory of Einheitspsychosen, whereas the five-factor 
model had no equivalent theoretical grounding. However, the reservations that 
many psychiatrists would have in treating psychoses as a homogeneous 
category (see above) imply that Eysenck's attempts to defend P.'s univocality 
rest on shaky grounds here.
An approach to the five-factor model that has been popular since 1990, 
known as "The Little Thirty" approach to personality, has been to associate each 
factor with six sub-components. For example, openness to experience is 
represented by the sub-facets of fantasies (a willingness to indulge in fantasies
and daydreams), aesthetics (possessing artistic interests), feelings (perceptive 
access to one's own feelings), actions (willingness to perform a variety of 
actions in life), ideas (philosophical interests combined with love for puzzles) 
and values (holding of liberal values). A full list of the six values listed by Costa 
and McCrae (1992a) as representing each of the five-factor traits is given below 
in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1 Six Facets per Broad Trait in "Little Thirty” Conceptualisation
of Five-Factor Model. Based on Costa and McCrae (1992a)
BASIC LEVEL TRAIT SIX SUB-FACETS OF TRAIT
EXTRA VERSION Warmth
Gregariousness
Assertiveness
Activity
Excitement-seeking
Positive Emotions
AGREEABLENESS Trust
Straightforwardness
Compliance
Altruism
Modesty
Tender-Mindedness
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS Competence
Order
Dutifulness
Achievement-striving
Discipline
Deliberation
NEUROTICISM Anxiety
Depression
Angry Hostility
Impulsivity
Vulnerability
Self-consciousness
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE Fantasy
Aesthetics
Feelings
Actions
Ideas
Values
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These lists appear to have been intended by Costa and McCrae as 
being useful heuristic devices, rather than definitive lists of the facets of each 
trait. Nevertheless, the "Little Thirty" approach is illuminating insofar as to list 
the six sub-facets in this manner helps to represent exactly what Costa and 
McCrae mean by each basic-level trait in the model. This "Little Thirty" model 
also demonstrates how two individuals with differing personality profiles could 
both obtain reasonably similar scores on the same trait. For example, an 
individual who has an interest in the arts and pursues many intellectual interests 
may still have very conservative social attitudes, and yet obtain a similar score 
to an individual with radical socio-political views but only limited artistic 
interests on the trait of openness to experience.
Butcher and Rouse (1996) have used the “Little Thirty” approach to 
criticise application of the five-factor model in clinical psychology. They noted 
how Widiger's work suggested that the passive-dependent personality disorder 
is associated with high warmth but low assertiveness, yet both are facets of 
extraversion. While such criticism offers prima facie grounds for questioning 
the breadth of traits in the five-factor model, such criticisms imply even firmer 
grounds for questioning the homogeneity of the three traits in Eysenck’s model, 
as these traits are construed as being at least as broad as those in the five-factor 
model.
2.3.2 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is one of the most widely 
used psychometric tests in the United States (Walsh & Betz, 1996); good
outlines and reviews of the MBTI, empirical research with it and its possible 
shortcomings have been published by Boyle (1995), Cummings (1990) and 
Bayne (1994; 1997). Over 250, 000 computer protocols based upon MBTI 
scores have, since 1971, been published by the Center for Application of 
Psychological Type alone (Croom, Wallace & Schuerger, 1989). It is the most 
widely used of a number of psychometric available tests based on Jung’s (1921/ 
1923) personality theory. A brief review of Jungian typology is, therefore, 
necessary prior to a basic exposition of the MBTI model. However, the focus of 
this section of Chapter Two is on how models such as the MBTI pose 
challenges to Eysenck's model. Thus, the major comparisons that will be 
presented here will not be between the MBTI and Jung's model, but between 
Eysenck's model and the MBTI, especially in terms of whether the latter model 
challenges adoption of psychoticism as a univocal construct.
Jung's (1921/ 1923) typology described two separate attitude types - 
introverts and extraverts - and four separate function types - the intuitive, 
sensate, thinking and feeling types. The history of how Jung came to propose 
these distinctions has been published in good biographical sources on Jung 
(Brome, 1978, Wehr. 1987). Introverted attitudes imply focus of attention on 
one's inner mental life, while extraverted attitudes imply habitual focus of 
attention on the external world. Jung's terminology therefore differs slightly 
from common English in its usage of the terms "introverts" and "extraverts", 
and uses the term “attitude'’ to refer to direction of orientation of psychological 
energy, rather than in any way comparable to usage of the term in social 
cognition literature. Function type indicates which of four functions is the 
preferred way of gaining information or evaluating the world. The four
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functions considered by Jung, intuition, sensation, thinking and feeling, relate 
respectively to knowledge gained via hunches, raw perceptions of the world, 
evaluation in terms of logic and truth-falsity and evaluation in terms of feelings 
of pleasance or discomfort.
Preference for any of the four functions may be accompanied by either 
introverted or extraverted attitudes. This typology therefore describes eight 
types, as depicted in Table 2.2:
Table 2.2 Jung's Typology
INTROVERTED EXTRAVERTED
Intuitive (Mystical, other-worldly) Intuitive (Skilful in business hunch- 
spotting)
Sensate (Sensitive to internal 
images, as in some painting forms)
Sensate (Hedonistic)
Thinking (Scientific and theory- 
orientated).
Thinking (Legalistic, accountant-
like)
Feeling (Passive on surface, 
emotional beneath face)
Feeling (Socially adaptable - cf. 
Snyder's (1974) high self-monitor)
The three polarities implied by this typology - introversion contrasting 
with extraversion, intuition with sensation (imaginative intuitive types contrast 
with down-to-earth sensate types), and thinking with feeling - form, in part, the 
basis for the MBTI, on which separate sub-scales indicate whether respondents 
are primarily (a) introverted or extraverted, (b) intuitive or sensate and (c) 
feeling or thinking. A fourth MBTI sub-scale assesses whether respondents are 
judging, liking routine and order, or perceiving, preferring an unstructured and 
spontaneous tendency to leave options open. Scores for each MBTI dimension 
are indicated by letters as follows:
I or E - denotes Introversion or Extraversion;
49
N or S - denotes preference for iNtuition or Sensation; (N, rather than I, is 
used to denote intuition so as to avoid confusion with introversion);
T or F - denotes preference for Thinking or Feeling;
J or P - denotes preference for Judging or Perceiving.
Four letters can therefore be used to describe an individual's MBTI type. 
INFJ, for example, denotes an Introverted-Intuitive-Feeling- Judging type, one 
of sixteen possible types implied by the MBTI model. Similarities have been 
observed between this model and the FFM. Introversion-extraversion features in 
both models, while openness to experience, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness can be compared respectively with MBTI intuition, feeling
and judging, leaving only neuroticism with no clear MBTI counterpart (Bayne, 
1994; Dachowski, 1987; McCrae & Costa, 1989). Empirical data have 
supported these conceptual correspondences (McCrae & Costa, 1989).
Divergences exist between the MBTI and Jung's original typology, such
coming somewhat closer to everyday English in usage of the terms “introvert'’ 
and “extrovert”. Both MBTI advocates (Bayne, 1997) and critics (Costa & 
McCrae, 1989) have appreciated this, with Bayne (1997) seeing this as a 
strength rather than weakness of the MBTI. More germane to the questions that 
are being considered in this thesis than comparisons between Jung’s original 
model and the MBTI, however, are comparisons between the MBTI and 
Eysenck's model, especially in terms of potential representations of 
psychoticism in the MBTI.
as the former being less immediately concerned with unconscious processes and
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MBTI Representations of Psychoticism
An obvious commonality between these two models is how both describe 
a dimension of personality labelled "introversion-extraversion", while an 
obvious difference is the MBTI's lack of any counterpart of neuroticism. 
Particular attention will be given here, however, to a rather more complex issue, 
that of whether the MBTI can be taken to describe personality dimensions that 
relate to distinguishable facets of psychoticism.
Insofar as psychoticism represents a disregard for rules and protocol, 
perhaps the most obvious MBTI trait of relevance to psychoticism is judging- 
perceiving, with judging representing the low pole of psychoticism. Indeed, 
MBTI judging has been found to be negatively correlated with psychoticism 
(Francis & Jones, 2000). However, the possibility that high psychoticism may 
be linked to increased creativity, as was defended by Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1976) and subsequently considered in extensive literature and relevant to Post's 
(1994) study of how genius (scientific as well as artistic) may relate to certain 
forms of pathology, imply that MBTI intuitive preference could also be 
relevant to psychoticism. Indeed, Francis and Jones (2000) found statistically 
significant corrrelations between MBTI intutive preference and psychoticism. 
Weaker but still significant correlations were found between MBTI extraversion 
and psychoticism in their study, although significant correlations between 
MBTI thinking-feeling and psychoticism were not found. These findings 
indicate how different MBTI sub-scales describe distinguishable facets of broad 
psychoticism, suggesting a need to separate the latter trait into constituent
components.
The findings of Francis and Jones (2000) imply that certain MBTI types 
will be high in some, but low in other, facets of psychoticism, as MBTI 
literature typically treats intuitive-sensate and judging-perceiving preferences as 
orthogonal. These are those MBTI types high in both intuition and judging - the 
INFJ, ENFJ, INTJ and ENTJ. Religiously inclined individuals have typically 
been found to be judging types, but different forms of spirituality and religious 
preference have been found to be associated with intuitive and with sensate
preferences (see Chapter Three). This implies that at least some forms of 
spirituality are linked with both high J. scores and high N. scores on the MBTI, 
and therefore calls into question whether it is appropriate to relate all forms of 
spiritual commitment to broad measures of psychoticism rather than to 
distinguishable facets of this trait.
These challenges raise the question of whether empirical research 
employing the MBTI would improve upon that using Eysenck's model. 
Psychometric properties of the MBTI have been observed as good. Data from 
over 300 studies have indicated its good criterion-related validity and, generally, 
sound reliability, internal consistency being good and test re-test reliabilities 
being around 0.87 for short (seven week) intervals (Walsh & Betz, 1996). Test 
re-test reliabilities have, however, been less impressive (around 0.48) for 
fourteen-month intervals, and test re-test reliability of the thinking-feeling sub-
scale has been found to be less high (at least for male respondents) than that 
found for other sub-scales (Walsh & Betz, 1996). At least two additional 
reasons for caution in use of the MBTI in empirical research should be 
emphasised.
The first problem with the MBTI is its lack of a dimension corresponding
to neuroticism. The second is the controversy which exists over whether 
contrasts implied by MBTI sub-scales should be viewed as end-points of 
continuous dimensions, and not, as in original MBTI formulations, discrete 
types (Boyle, 1995; Girelli & Stake, 1993). These problems are not apparent 
with the FFM; cases can therefore be strengthened for adoptions of 
measurements of the latter model in empirical research.
Developments of MBTI theory: Potential for Further Challenges to
Eysenck
Conceptual thinking, rather than sustained empirical research 
programmes led Keirsey and Bates (1984) and Keirsey (1984) to propose a 
simplified version of MBTI typology. This takes the intuitive-sensate distinction
as fundamental and describes four broad types. Brief consideration of this 
model gives further ground for refinements of Eysenckian theory.
This model distinguishes individuals high in intuition according to 
preference for feeling or thinking, and those high in sensation according to 
standing on judging-perceiving. The four types implied by this scheme - the 
Intuitive-Feeling, Intuitive-Thinking, Sensate-Perceiving and Sensate-Judging 
types - were initially given names from Greek mythology, respectively, the 
Apollonian, Promethean, Dionysian and Epimethian types (Keirsey & Bates, 
1984), and have more recently been named respectively as “Idealists”, 
"Rationals", “Artisans” and “Guardians” (Keirsey, 1998). These new terms 
represent an improvement over earlier terminology, which was not only obscure 
but made questionable use of Greek myth. Epimethius, notorious for being wise
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after events (in contrast to Prometheus), hardly bore the prudence associated 
with Sensate-Judging types.
These four types can be described briefly as follows. Idealists are a 
spiritual, mystical orientation; Rationals are intellectuals who are always ready 
to challenge existing dogma; Artisans are the most Hedonistic of the types; and 
Guardians value tradition and accepted protocol. This model has immediate 
appeal and intuitive face validity. Stereotypes of accountants, counsellors, 
scientists and disc jockeys, for example, may easily be linked with different 
types in this scheme. Nevertheless, psycho-metric research based on the 
Keirsey-Bates model has yet to reach the same momentum as that based on the 
original MBTI model.
An obvious challenge the Keirsey-Bates model poses to Eysenck's is its 
implication that a trait other than introversion-extraversion should be taken as 
fundamental. However, as with the MBTI, it also challenges the univocality of 
psychoticism. It implies that strong distinctions should be made between 
intuition-sensation and judging-perceiving. Since Francis and Jones (2000) 
found both of these MBTI sub-scales to be linked to psychoticism, this suggests 
that distinguishable facets should be considered in assessments of the latter trait. 
It may be premature to adopt the Keirsey-Bates model as a favoured model until 
it has received further empirical validation, but its theoretical implications still 
mean that researchers into religiosity-personality correlates should be wary of 
treating psychoticism as a homogeneous trait.
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2.3.3 Cattell’s 16 P.F.
Further challenges to Eysenck are inherent in a model which has 
frequently been compared with Eysenck's - the Cattell 16 P.F., or Sixteen 
Personality Factor model, named after Raymond B. Cattell (Cattell & Kline, 
1977). Popularly depicted as listing sixteen traits as fundamental to human 
personality (Cattell & Kline, 1977), to describe it as a list of only sixteen traits 
would be an over-simplification. Cattell, at various points in his career, 
identified traits that never quite found their way onto the sub-scales of his 
Sixteen P.F. test. Scrutiny of Cattell's work reveals how, even when factors of 
personality are represented as broad constructs based on correlations between 
more specific traits, searching for a univocal equivalent of the Eysenckian trait 
of psychoticism is problematic.
The Cattell 16 P.F. was first published in 1949, subsequently revised in 
the years 1956, 1962, 1968 and most recently in 1988 (Cattell & Kline, 1977; 
Cattell & Cattell, 1995). Cattell, as with Eysenck, based his model on factor 
analysis, but unlike Eysenck, showed a strong preference for oblique as opposed 
to orthogonal factor rotation of factors. The greater number of traits reported by 
Cattell than by Eysenck can therefore be attributed, in part, to the former's use 
of oblique rotation, as oblique rotations are likely to represent variables that 
share considerable variance as distinct constructs. Sixteen apparently 
independent traits are asssessed on the Cattell 16 P.F., but as this includes 
groupings of traits that are correlated, five or six "global" or "second-order" 
factors can be described to summarize Cattell's model. The sixteen traits 
assessed on the Cattell 16 P.F. are displayed in Table 2.3. Early terminology 
presented in Table 2.3 shows Cattell's use of both psychoanalytic concepts and
more idiosyncratic theoretical constructs that he himself developed - such as 
Parmia, derived from parasympathetic nervous system, or Premsia, from 
Protected Emotional Sensitivity (the low pole of this trait, Harria, stands for 
Hardened Realism). Cattell later proposed more self-explanatory terms for each 
trait (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Traits of the Cattell 16 P.F.:
TRAIT OLD NAME NEW NAME
A Affectothymia Warmth
B Intelligence Reasoning
C Ego strength Emotional Stablity
E Dominance Dominance
F Surgency Liveliness
G Superego strength Rule-consciousness
H Parmia Social boldness
I Premsia Sensitivity
L Protension Vigilance
M Autia Abstractedness
N Shrewdness Privateness
0 Guilt-proneness Apprehension
Q. Radicalism Openness to Change
q 2 Self-reliance Self-reliance
03 Self-sentiment integration Perfectionism
04 Ergic Tension Tension
Cattell's evidence for the existence of these traits came from three 
sources - questionnaire-data (Q-data), biographical data (L-data or Life-data) 
and data based upon performance on so-called objective tests, e.g. analyses of 
an individual's expressive movement or performance in projective tests. Certain 
traits, namely those indicated by Q followed by a subscript in Table 2.3, were 
only observed in questionnaire-data. Traits A to O in Table 2.2 were observed in 
both L-data and Q-data, and Cattell believed that they represented a more-or-
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less completely comprehensive list of all traits needed for adequate assessments 
of human personality (Kline, 1993).
Several other traits were identified by Cattell, but lack of sufficient 
consistency across method or time resulted in their exclusion from the Cattell 16
P.F.. These were Factors D (excitability), J (neurasthenia) and K (culture). 
Although none of these three traits are assessed on the Cattell 16 P.F., the first
two (D and J) are assessed on a less widely used instrument, the High School 
Personality Inventory (Barton, Mogdil & Catttell, 1973).
Comparisons between Eysenck’s model and Cattell’s model
Pertinent to a comparison between Cattell and Eysenck are the
observations that:
(a) The low pole of Factor A was initially labelled as "schizothymia",
indicative of Cattell's conviction (for which empirical support has been found)
that schizophrenics would score at the low pole of this trait, suggesting its
relevance to psychoticism as well as extraversion;
(b) M and Q1 may - conceptually if not empirically - relate to an aspect of 
psychoticism identified by Heath and Martin (1990), that of unconventional
social attitudes;
(c) Empirical data support a link between Factor G and MBTI judging (Croom 
et al., 1989), indicating links between a trait Francis and Jones (2000) found to 
be linked with low psychoticism and Factor G. Indeed, psychoticism is 
sometimes defined as being more or less equivalent to "low superego strength"
in Cattell's sense.
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Cattell's preference for oblique factor rotation as distinct from 
Eysenck’s use of orthogonal rotation renders it somewhat misleading to base 
comparisons between these models on Cattell's primary traits. Comparisons of 
these two models should advisedly examine possible similarities and differences 
between Eysenck's traits and groups of correlated traits among CattelPs list of 
sixteen traits. Initially, Cattell used the term “second-order factors”, to refer to 
such groupings, and two examples, exvia (associated with A, F, H and Q2) and 
anxiety (associated with C, H, L, O, Q3 and Q4) are conceptually similar to the 
first two traits in Eysenck's model (Cook, 1993). Such factors are now called
global factors" and are represented by six traits (Cattell & Cattell, 1995). These
are Extraversion, associated positively with A and F and negatively with N and 
Q2; Anxiety, associated primarily with factors C (negatively) and Q4; Tough- 
Mindedness, associated primarily with Factors A, I, M and N - all loading 
negatively on this factor; Independence, associated primarily with Factors E and 
Ql; Self-control, associated primarily with Factors G and Q3 and negatively 
with M; and an unnamed factor associated with high loadings for Factor B and a 
negative loading on L (Cattell & Catell, 1995).
Of the three Eysenckian traits, extraversion and neuroticism are 
represented by the first two global factors reported by Cattell, but psychoticism 
has no single equivalent. Instead, distinguishable facets of psychoticism appear 
to be represented by three distinct global factors - tough-mindedness (a term 
which is sometimes used as a synonym for psychoticism), self-control
(negatively associated with psychoticism) and independence. These may be 
compared respectively with MBTI thinking, judging and intuitive preferences
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Taken together, therefore, both the MBTI and the Cattell 16 P.F. suggest that, 
for broadly similar reasons, it is inappropriate to treat psychoticism as univocal.
As with the MBTI model, the 16 P.F. offers prima facie grounds for 
supposing that psychoticism should be sub-divided into facet components. 
However, manifold problems have been noted with Cattell's model, such as its 
low parsimony in comparison with Eysenck's model and the modest test re-rest 
reliabilities (typically below r = 0.7) for ten of the sixteen sub-scales (Kline, 
1993). Cattell and Cattell's (1995) claim that data from 34 separate factor 
analytic studies supported the validity of the scale, and that the model has good 
cross-cultural applicability, should be compared with evidence that different 
versions of the Cattell 16 P.F. correlate only modestly, in the region of r = 0.5 
(Walsh & Betz, 1996). Such considerations imply that researchers into 
personality correlates of transpersonal experience should be cautious before 
choosing the Cattell 16 P.F. as a model to research this field. As such 
accusations of low parsimony cannot be so readily applied to the FFM, and the 
NEO-PI-S has not been found to suffer as many psychometric shortcomings as 
the Cattell 16 P.F., the NEO PI-S will the be the instrument used in later 
empirical research that will be reported in this thesis.
2.3.4 Related Traits: Schizotvpv and Transliminalitv 
and Comparisons with Psvchoticism
The breadth of the trait of psychoticism justifies devoting space to 
consideration of two traits that may be relevant to transpersonal experience, but 
which have typically been considered more narrow-band traits - schizotypy and 
transliminality. Schizotypy, orginally proposed by Rado (1953; cited in
Claridge, McCreery, Mason, Bentall, Boyle, Slade & Popplewell,1996) and 
elaborated by Meehl (1962; cited in Claridge et al, 1996), refers to a trait similar 
to psychoticism insofar as it has been proposed as a marker for latent 
vulnerability to one particular type of psychosis, schizophrenia. However, as 
Claridge et al. (1996) pointed out, recent understanding of schizotypy has 
conceptualised it as a more general marker of psychosis-proneness. This brings 
the trait into closer parity with Eysenck's concept of psychoticism.
Original theoretical formulations of schizotypy were not based upon the 
doctrine of Einheitspsychosen, and presented the trait as a marker for 
schizophrenia rather than for psychoses in general. Although this may lead to 
expectations that schizotypy is more univocal than psychoticism, this has not 
been found to be the case in empirical research. Indeed, empirical studies have 
suggested that schizotypy, if anything, appears to be even more heterogeneous 
than psychoticism. Factor analytic studies, as Claridge et al. (1996) noted, have 
almost invariably found that scores on questionnaire-based measures of 
schizotypy yield at least two distinct factors, perceptual aberrations and social 
anhedonia (Raine & Allbutt, 1989). Perceptual aberrations and social anhedonia 
may be defined respectively as a tendency to have hallucinations and an 
extreme state of social withdrawal and inability to enjoy pleasure, and 
correspond respectively to the positive and negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia. A third factor corresponding to social anxiety has been found in 
some research (Bentall, Claridge & Slade, 1989).
A study in which 1,095 respondents completed the Combined 
Schizotypal Traits Questionnaire (C.S.T.Q.), the E.P.Q. and several scales 
assessing related traits such as delusion-proneness helped to clarify how
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schizotypy compares with psychoticism (Claridge et al., 1996). The factor 
analyses Claridge et al. applied to their data suggested their data were best 
explained using a four-factor solution. The first factor related to perceptual 
aberrations, the second factor to social anxiety accompanied and cognitive 
disorganization, the third factor to asocial behaviour accompanied by 
"associated impulsiveness and mood-related disinhibition" and the fourth factor 
to social anhedonia, an extreme form of social withdrawal associated with the 
schizoid personality disorder described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(D.S.M.) - IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Of the three traits in 
Eysenck's model, P. most closely related to the third of these factors. E. loaded 
most strongly (negatively) on the fourth and N. on the second.
In this study by Claridge et al. (1996), psychoticism as described by 
Eysenck was found to relate primarily to antisocial behaviour and high 
impulsivity (with resulting low propensity for social learning) rather than to 
perceptual aberrations. If proneness to delusions is viewed as the defining 
feature of psychotic disorders, such findings challenge conceptualisations of P. 
as a trait linked with vulnerability to psychoses. They suggest that P. is better 
defined as low propensity for learning of socially prescribed codes of conduct. 
Contrasting with the findings of Claridge et al. (1996), Bentall et al. (1989), did 
find psychoticism to load on a factor linked with schizophrenia's positive 
symptoms, i.e. with perceptual aberrations. Such findings have implications for 
potential definitions of psychoticism (see below).
Transliminality (Thalboume & Delin, 1994; 1999) is a trait which has 
more explicitly been linked to perceptual aberrations than either psychoticism or 
schizotypy. Unlike the case with both psychoticism and schizotypy, initial
literature on this trait referred explicitly to mystical experience and belief in the 
paranormal. Observing how believers in the paranormal typically scored high on 
measures of (a) magical ideation - a variable strongly associated with positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia and the first factor found in factor analytic studies 
of schizotypy, (b) history of manic experience, depressive experience and 
manic-depression, and experience of hypomania, and ( c) creativity and 
mystical experience, Thalboume and Delin sought a common factor underlying 
all these variables. Their answer was a trait for which they introduced the 
neologism "transliminality", literally, "ease in crossing the threshold" 
(Thalboume & Delin, 1999, p46). This means (largely involuntary) access to 
unconscious affects and cognition generated within one's own internal 
psychological make-up. Similarities with Jung's introverted intuitive type may 
be noted. Thalboume has not portrayed the concept entirely negatively, having 
linked transliminality to creativity, echoing Eysenck and Eysenck's assertions 
that high P. scores may be linked with increased creativity, and also the findings 
of Woody and Claridge (1977).
Transliminality's relevance to psychoticism is evident from the positive 
correlation (r = .37; N = 53\p < 0.01) found by Thalboume et al. (1997) 
between these two variables. However, when these authors separated 
transliminality into the five constituent components of creative personality, 
manic experience, paranormal belief, mystical experience and magical ideation, 
they found only the first two to be significantly correlated with psychoticism.
The failure of Thalboume et al. to find a significant correlation between the 
mystical experience factor of transliminality and psychoticism is of interest, and
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may be compared with findings from other studies that will be reviewed in 
Chapter Three.
Assessments of transliminality rather than psychoticism or schizotypy 
may seem more appropriate in psychometric research into transpersonal 
experience, given the explicit reference that authors on the former have made to 
mystical experience. However, such an inference would currently be premature. 
The trait has been identified only in relatively recent research, largely confined 
to that conducted by Thalboume and his associates, and carries with it inherent 
risks of circular reasoning. To list both increased propensity to psychosis and 
increased likelihood of mystical experience as elements of a trait rests upon an a 
priori assumption that transpersonal experiences are linked with psychoses. 
Absence of significant correlations between transpersonal experiences, 
psychoses and transliminality could therefore be attributed (by defenders of the 
concept) to scale invalidity rather than conceptual shortcomings. Thalboume 
has not explicitly linked transliminality with reduced propensity for social 
learning, so assessments of transliminality as a potential correlate of mystical 
experience may be less relevant to evaluations of social constructivism than 
assessments of psychoticism. Nevertheless, that this concept has been proposed 
as a marker for proneness to manic-depressive experience highlights how traits 
that may be compared with psychoticism vary across research groups. The links 
that have explicitly been made by Thalboume between transliminality and 
creativity also stress how such traits have not exclusively been described in 
merely negative terms.
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2.4 Empirical Evidence Against the Homogeneity of Psychoticism
Considerable empirical data exist to suggest that Costa and McCrae's 
concerns about treating P. as univocal are valid (Heath & Martin, 1990; Heath, 
Cloninger & Martin, 1994; Howarth, 1986; Stallings, Hewitt, Cloninger, Heath 
& Eaves, 1996). Ironically, some of the data challenging the univocality of P. 
were collected by the Eysencks themselves. Eysenck et al. (1985) reported 
lower Cronbach's alpha coefficients, typically around r = 0.7, for the 
psychoticism sub-scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (E.P.Q.) than 
for its neuroticism or extraversion sub-scales, suggesting P. is the least 
homogeneous of the traits in their model. Early factor analytic studies 
challenging Eysenck's original conceptualisation of P. are reviewed by Howarth 
(1986). Noting that E. was found to be less homogeneous than N. in early 
research, Howarth commented on how the homogeneity of E. was improved 
when impulsivity was treated by Eysenck as a facet of P. rather than E., but also 
noted that “there are still at least four primaries combined in that scale" (i.e. the 
P-scale of the EPQ) (Howarth, 1986, p226). Howarth argued that P. quite 
consistently emerged as the least univocai of Eysenck’s three super-factors in 
factor analytic research.
Recent factor analytic study of questionnaire-based measures of the 
Eysenckian personality model by Jackson, Fumham, Forde and Cotter (2000) 
has found that a three-factor solution is a reasonably good fit to explain variance 
in psychometric data, and that the three factors reported correspond well with 
extraversion, neuroticism and psychoticism; but, unlike most studies of 
Eysenck's model, this study analysed scores on the Eysenck Personality Profiler 
(E.P.P.) and not the E.P.Q.. Earlier factor analyses of E.P.P. scores by Costa and
McCrae (1995) found that a five-factor solution offered a better explanation of 
variance in scores, and that the seven E.P.P. sub-scales designed as measures of 
primaries of P. did not load on identical factors in this five-factor solution.
Deary, Peter, Austin and Gibson's (1998) factor analysis of data 
obtained from 400 undergraduates who had completed both the E.P.Q. and the 
Structured Clinical Interview for D.S.M.-III-R Disorders Questionnaire 
(S.C.I.D.), a questionnaire assessing vulnerability to the personality disorders 
listed in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (1994) 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, found that their data were best explained 
using a four-factor solution. Unlike N. and E., which loaded on the first and 
third of their factors respectively, P. loaded strongly on two separate factors. P. 
loaded positively on Factor 2, associated with the passive-aggressive disorder, 
the narcissistic disorder and the antisocial disorder, and negatively on Factor 4, 
associated primarily with the obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality 
disorders and somewhat more modestly with the avoidant and dependent 
personality disorders. P.'s loading on two separate factors gives grounds for 
supposing that P. is not homogeneous, as Deary et al. themselves 
acknowledged. Indeed, they recognised how their data support bifurcation of P. 
into low agreeableness (associated with their second factor) and low 
conscientiousness (associated with their fourth factor).
Stallings et al. (1996) did a factor analysis of E.P.Q. scores combined 
with those from several other personality measures. They found that, at least in 
male participants, P. scores loaded significantly on a factor associated with 
novelty-seeking, impulsivity and disorder, but also significantly negatively on 
an entirely separate factor associated with dependence, attachment and
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sentimentality. The emergence of two dimensions as separate factors, 
comparable respectively to NEO conscientiousness and NEO agreeableness, is 
further support for bifurcation of P., as in the five-factor model. Other factor 
analytic data challenging the view that psychoticism is univocal have been 
reported by Zuckerman and his co-workers (Zuckerman, Kuhlman & Camac, 
1988; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta & Kraft, 1993).
Cogent evidence against the view that P. can be regarded as a univocal 
construct has come from the programmatic research of Heath and his associates 
(Heath & Martin, 1990; Heath et al., 1994). These authors have, since 1990, 
reported an impressive body of data using multivariate genetic analysis, a 
technique combining factor analysis and behaviour genetics, based on twin data, 
typically including E.P.Q. scores. Psychometric assessment of Australian twin 
pairs by Heath et al. (1994) found lower internal reliability coefficients for P. 
than for E. or for N., being as low as r = .36-.46 for males and r = .31 -.44 for 
females. Heath et al. (1994) also found that only 35% of variance in P. could be 
accounted for in terms of genetic factors (the remaining variance being 
attributable to nonshared environmental factors). Their findings that correlations 
for monozygotic twin pairs were higher for E. than for P. suggest that P. is 
likely to be more heterogeneous in terms of its ontogenetic bases than is 
extraversion.
Multivariate genetic analytic data reported by Heath and Martin (1990), 
in which three separate variables associated with (I) genetic influence (II) 
shared environmental influences and (III) nonshared environmental influences 
on personality were identified, offered particularly compelling grounds for 
rejecting the view that P. is homogeneous. Items assessing P. related to
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suspicion and paranoia were found by Heath and Martin to load significantly
negatively on the first of these variables; but so too did items assessing P
related to cautious and conforming behaviour. Since the latter items were
included in the original Eysenckian measures of psychoticism as items supposed
to load negatively on psychoticism, whereas items assessing paranoia were
intended as positive markers of psychoticism, this finding makes it difficult to
defend the view that P. is homogeneous. The shared environmental variable was
found by Heath and Martin to be associated primarily with hostility and tough-
mindedness; the nonshared environmental variable with suspiciousness and with
unconventional social attitudes (but not, apparently, with indifference to
suffering or hostility). Such findings imply that three separate facets of
psychoticism - paranoia, hostility and unconventional social attitudes - may
have quite separate patterns of ontogenetic development. The association of
paranoia with excessive caution and arguably high levels of obsessionality in
Heath and Martin's data raises the possibility that their genetic factor could be
compared roughly with MBTI judging, NEO conscientiousness and self-control
in Cattell's list of global factors. Clearer similarities may be observed between
their other two variables and (i) MBTI thinking-feeling, NEO agreeableness and
Cattell's global factor of tough-mindedness; and (ii) MBTI intuition-sensation,
Cattell's global factor of independence and NEO openness.
2.5 In Search of a Definition of Psvchoticism
The above review raises the question of how psychoticism is best
defined. Implicit in the above review' is that the trait may be defined as low
propensity for social learning, but fully comprehensive definitions of the
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concept may also need to consider other variables, such as perceptual 
aberrations (Bentall et al., 1989).
Psychoticism is sometimes equated more or less with Factor G in 
Cattell's model, as appeared to be Eysenck's later position. This suggests that 
Eysenck's later writings would certainly not define psychoticism primarily as a 
marker for psychosis. No contradiction is posed between this position and a 
definition of P. which emphasises social learning. Nor should it be considered
that definitions of P. in terms of social learning make the trait irrelevant to 
perceptual aberrations. However, it is important here to comment on why, if 
psychoticism is both defined in this way and is taken to have relevance to
perceptual aberrations, the conclusions that may be drawn are that assessments
of psychoticism alone in psychometric research into transpersonal experiences
limit the potential theoretical insights that such data may generate.
Suppose that one believed that religious experiences were, in reality (i) 
learnt phenomena and (ii) perceptual aberrations comparable to psychotic
delusions. (There is no necessary contradiction inherent in holding both
premises to be true. Psychoses could arise through peculiar patterns of learning; 
this position is a tacit assumption behind the growing body of literature
suggesting that cognitive therapy may be useful in treatment of psychoses, 
reviewed by Haddock and Slade, 1996). Such a position implies that perceptual 
aberrations would correlate positively, and reduced propensity for social
learning negatively, with reported religious experiences. It therefore highlights 
how some theoretical positions stress a need to disentangle different facets of 
psychoticim in psychometric assessments of the correlates of transpersonal 
experiences. Similar implications are raised by such data for assessments of
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schizotypy in such research. Factors such as introverted anhedonia suggest a 
reduced attention to positive reinforcements, and therefore reduced 
conditionability, and thus its relationship with transpersonal experience could be 
taken as being diametrically distinct from that of the perceptual aberrations 
factor typically found to account for most variance in factor analytic studies of 
schizotypy.
2.6 Summary and Implications of Sections 2.2 to 2.5
The above review has shown how good grounds exist for challenging 
assumptions of the homogeneity of psychoticism. These are:
(a) The nineteenth century theory upon which the concept is based, that of 
Einheitspsychosen, has been challenged, specifically by those who believe that 
psychoses do not represent an entirely unified disease category;
(b) When the Eysenckian P-E-N model is compared with other models of 
personality, it almost invariably emerges that alternative models list more than 
three traits of personality. Considered comparisons of the Eysenckian P-E-N 
model with these models reveal that while such models typically include traits 
equivalent to E and/or N in the Eysenckian model, they almost never include a 
single trait to represent P., but instead include distinct traits representing 
different facets of P.;
(c) Empirical data, from both internal analyses of P. scale scores and 
multivariate genetic analysis, challenge the view that P. is homogeneous.
Such considerations help to clarify the advantages of using a model, 
such as the FFM, which measures distinct traits in place of broad measures of 
psychoticism in psychometric studies of transpersonal experiences. The two
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theoretical questions that have been given as examples of theoretical questions 
that could benefit from transpersonal psychometrics, that of whether mystical 
experience is a learnt construct and that of whether mystical experience should 
be equated with health or with pathology, would certainly both benefit from 
studies that attempt to disentangle different facets of psychoticism. The former 
question is relevant to assessments of facets of psychoticism connected with 
reduced propensity for social learning. The latter question is relevant to 
assessments of facets that pertain to perceptual aberrations, or indeed, creativity 
insofar as mystical experience could relate to potentially positive facets of 
psychoticism.
Three alternative models to Eysenck's PEN model were reviewed in 
Section 2.3, namely the Myers-Briggs model, the Cattell 16 P.F. and the five- 
factor model. The Myers- Briggs model and the Cattell 16 P.F. may be criticised 
respectively for treatment of personality as a type rather than continuous 
variable and for low parsimony. It is, therefore, the Five-Factor Model that will 
be used, in conjunction with E.P.Q. measures of psychoticism, in collecting 
empirical data for the current thesis. An advantage of this model is that it very 
clearly assesses, as separate traits, three traits that correspond to distinguishable 
facets of psychoticism. These are openness to experience, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness.
Advantages of assessing these three traits as separate traits are evident 
when attention is given to the above two theoretical questions. If, for example, 
one of these NEO counterparts of P. is particularly germane to propensity for 
learning, it follows that assessments of this trait that will highlight the potential
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impact that psychometric data may have for evaluations of social constructivism 
more than will assessments of psychoticism alone.
Grounds exist for taking conscientiousness in the FFM to be the trait in 
this model most relevant to propensity for learning. This can be understood by 
re-considering the definition of NEO conscientiousness given by Benet- 
Martinez & John (1998):
"Conscientiousness describes socially prescribed control that facilitates goal- 
directed behaviour" (Benet-Martinez & John. 1998, p730; emphasis added).
This definition relates conscientiousness explicitly to socially 
prescribed control, suggesting that a high scorer on this trait would be an 
individual who has readily assimilated the prescriptions of social norms. It 
associates high conscientiousness with goal-directed, deliberated, considered 
actions rather than impulsive actions. Both studies of psychoticism itself 
(Rocklin & Revelle, 1981) and sketches of theoretical backgrounds to research 
into religious attitudes (Francis, 1992a) have suggested that high psychoticism 
is linked with increased impulsivity, which in turn relates to reduced 
conditionability of socially prescribed, tender-minded attitudes. To define 
conscientiousness as Benet-Martinez and John do therefore implies that it is this 
trait, of the three distinct FFM facets of P., that is most relevant to propensity 
for social learning. Thus, psychometric evaluations of positions such as those of 
Katz (1978; 1983) may gain greater benefits from assessments of the NEO traits 
than from assessments of PEN traits.
Katz’s paper “The ‘Conservative' Character of Mystical Experience” 
(Katz, 1983) indicates how Katz would now accept that mysticism is associated 
with both enhanced creativity, and reduced propensity for learning. Despite its
title, this paper indicated how Katz now accepts that mysticism does contain 
radical elements. His argument appeared to be that apparently radical re-
interpretations of Scriptures by mystics can be construed as a means by which 
mystics defend the relatively conservative position of supporting the supremacy 
of Scriptures from their particular faith tradition. Ability for such re-
interpretation implies considerable creativity on the part of the mystic.
However, it is clear that this essay of 1983 continued Katz’s well-known 
commitment to social constructivism. Katz's more recent position can therefore 
be seen as implying elevated levels of both conscientiousness and openness in 
the FFM. Since the latter is believed to be negatively correlated with 
psychoticism. the former positively associated with psychoticism, it is clear that 
psychometric evaluation of Katz can reap more benefits from use of the FFM 
than from mere assessments of psychoticism.
Eysenck’s Defence
Eysenck himself tried to defend the univocality of P. against critics of 
the P. construct such as Costa and McCrae (1992b) by claiming that such 
authors had merely looked at patterns of statistical correlation, and not 
considered homogeneous biological markers for psychoticism (Eysenck,
1992a). In response, Heath, Cloninger and Martin's study (1994) (see above) 
offered genetic evidence for challenging Eysenck here. More importantly for 
concerns in the current thesis, if psychometric assessments of correlates of 
transpersonal experience are still to prove insightful with respect to theoretical 
issues, it remains important to ask whether such issues may derive only limited 
benefit from assessments of psychoticism as a homogeneous trait.
2.7 Taxonomic Scheme: Pro-Mystical and Anti-Mystical Religions
It may be inferred from the above review that advised research 
programmes assessing the extent to which a variable is a learnt phenomenon 
will benefit from assessments of both psychoticism and five-factor model traits. 
It would be premature to claim that social constructivist accounts of mystical 
experience merely imply negative correlations between mystical experience and 
psychoticism; they also imply particular relationships between mystical 
experience and other traits such as five-factor model conscientiousness. 
However, this statement needs an important qualification. It is true for religious 
groups where a positive value is attached to mystical experience; in religions 
where mystical union as described by Stace (1960) is not a prescribed norm, 
social constructivism makes rather different predictions. In this thesis, therefore, 
a new taxonomy of religion will be presented, based upon the concept of 
attitudes to mysticism. Cross-creedal comparisons that will clarify this concept, 
and commentary germane to the hypotheses that, in the course of this thesis, 
will be tested in relation to this variable, will be presented in the concluding 
sections of this chapter.
It is important to appreciate that the taxonomy which follows is based 
upon how religions are likely to differ in terms of their attitudes to mysticism, 
and that this is presented here as a distinct concept to mystical experience. The 
stress on the heterogeneity of psychoticism outlined above can be used as 
guidance for empirical research which may uncover further ground for 
distinguishing these two concepts. Both variables may relate to psychoticism.
but to different facets of this trait. Such divergences may not be apparent when 
psychoticism is merely assessed as a broad construct. For example, the 
particular form of perennialism offered by Forman (1998) implies that both 
concepts may relate to facets of psychoticism connected with increased 
creativity, but only attitudes to mysticism will relate significantly negatively to 
facets of this trait connected with reduced propensity for social learning. 
Furthermore, between-group differences on scores on either variable may not be 
identical. These issues are relevant to the empirical study that will be presented 
in Chapter Six.
The goals of the comparisons between religions presented below are to 
emphasise the importance of the variable attitudes to mysticism in social science 
research into religion, and to indicate how it differs from mystical experience. A 
psychometric tool to assess attitudes to mysticism can therefore be seen to serve 
a different function to a scale such as Hood's (1975) M-Scale. This distinction 
also helps to clarify how psychometric evaluation of the perennial psychology 
of Forman (1998) should take different forms to psychometric evaluations of 
perennial philosophers such as Huxley (1946).
2.7.1 Comparing Abrahamic with Eastern and Western Mystical Faiths
Contrasts between the Abrahamic faiths of Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism and Eastern religions such as Hinduism or Buddhism in terms of their 
attitudes to mysticism have been outlined by many scholars. Such a contrast was 
presented explicitly in Sisikumar Ghose’s essay in Encyclopaedia Brittanica:
“Although mysticism has been the core of Hinduism and Buddhism, 
it has been little more than a minor strand - and frequently a disturbing element 
- in Judaism, Christianity and Islam”. (Ghose, 1993, p583).
This quotation appears within a context which emphasises how, in 
Ghose’s view, religions that emphasise formal social structures (such as the 
Christian church) are less likely to endorse mysticism than are those that are 
more individualistic. He quoted Inge, who claimed that mysticism and 
institutionalism are uneasy bedfellows.
Doctrinal as well as social considerations help to clarify why 
monotheistic faiths have not always been particularly positive in their attitudes 
to mysticism. Concept of God as being “totally other" challenge the view that a 
mere human mortal can achieve union with God by his or her own efforts. Such 
doctrinal foundations, which have long been a feature of certain strands of 
monotheistic theology, make the premises which allow for unio myslica appear 
to be decidedly shaky. This stands in marked contrast to the religions of the 
East, such as Hinduism, where the concept of “one without a second” indicates 
the sense of unitive experience as described by Stace appear both possible and 
desirable (cf. Zaehner, 1957). Strands of Eastern religion and philosophy other 
than Hinduism, perhaps most particularly Zen Buddhism (Humphreys, 1949/ 
1984) and Nichiren Daishonen Buddhism (Causton, 1995), also operate with 
concepts - in the case of these two forms of Buddhism, respectively jijimuge 
and Esho Funi - that imply both the possibility and desirability of unio 
my Stic a.
The presence of mystics in the history of the Abrahamic faiths appears, 
primafacie, to challenge this position. History, it is true, does reveal that a vast
body of mystics have appeared in such religions. In Christianity, examples 
include Meister Eckhart. the author of The Cloud o f the Unknowing and Dame 
Julian of Norwich from medieval Europe; Teresa d'Avila and Juan de la Crux 
from the Counter-Reformation; Madame Guyon and Francois Fenelon from the 
seventeenth century; and Teresa of Lisieux from the nineteenth century, as well 
as Protestant mystics such as the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
Lutheran Jakob Boehme. In Judaism, the traditions centred around the Zohar or 
the Kabbala, and movements such as Hassidism come to mind. In Islam, 
schools of Sufism discussed by Occidental scholars such as Nicholson (1914), 
including the Suhrawardi, the Qadiri, the Naqshbandi and the Mevlevi dervishes 
(associated with the thirteenth century Afghan Rumi) exemplify mystical 
elements. However, these trends are not - as the above quotation by Ghose 
underlines clearly - ones which have always been welcomed within 
mainstream, central teachings and institutions within Judeao-Christian-Islamic 
tradition.
The attitude that the Judeao-Christian-Islamic tradition has taken 
towards mysticism, if not always entirely negative, has frequently been 
ambivalent. Martin (1987) noted how “in Biblical Judaism, in Christianity and 
in Islam, forms of religious experience typically called mystical have been both 
suspect and deeply prized and influential. Suspicion and caution stem from the 
fear that in such experience there may be an impetus towards obliteration of the 
distinction between the creature and the creator, together with an exaltation of 
the human experience to salvific power, which stems ultimately and solely from 
God" (Martin, 1987, p326). To quote Ghose again:
“The relationship of the religion of faith to the religion of mysticism 
(“personal religion raised to the highest power'’) is ambiguous, a mixture of 
respect and misgivings. Though mysticism may be associated with religion, it 
need not be. The mystic often produces a type that the religious institution (e.g. 
church) does not and cannot produce and does not know what to do with if and 
when one appears" (Ghose, 1993, p583; emphasis in the original).
Ghose (1993), Martin (1987) and various other reference papers on 
mysticism (Dupre, 1987; Marcoulesco, 1987) presented their comments on the 
attitudes to mysticism taken by the Abrahamic faiths within a wider context, 
indicating conviction that Eastern religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism 
take a very different view of mysticism. Implicit in the works of such scholars is 
that the Abrahamic faiths can be described as anti-mystical religions, in which 
doctrinal conviction, faith and the social structures of religion are granted more 
importance than are personal mystical or spiritual experiences. Their works also 
imply that Eastern faiths such as Hinduism and Buddhism are pro-mystical 
religions, in which mystical experience viewed as a central goal of religious 
commitment. The first of the two above quotations by Ghose indicates very 
clearly that this is Ghose's view. Furthermore, an anonymous article on 
mysticism in the Micropaedia section of the same reference work as that in 
which Ghose's paper appears (the Encyclopaedia Britannica) declares 
Hinduism to be the religion most readily associated with mysticism. Brief 
reviews of such reference-work literature may give the impression that the 
distinction between religions deemed pro-mystical and those deemed anti- 
mystical can be equated with a distinction between Eastern and Western ways 
of thinking, comparable to polarities between intuitive and rational thought.
This is not merely a polarity that has influenced popular works such as Omstein 
(1977). Such assumptions have influenced psychometric scale construction, 
specifically of Gilgen and Cho's (1979) East-West Questionnaire, or E.W.Q. 
(empirical work with this scale has been reviewed by McDonald, Friedman and 
Kuenzel, 1999).
A major criticism that may be levelled against both papers of scholars 
such as Ghose, Marcoulesco, Dupre and Martin and the construction of the 
E.W.Q. is that their implicit endorsement of the view that pro-mystical religions 
can be equated with Eastern religions can be challenged. Such scholarship has 
typically said little about contemporary New Age preoccupations such as 
Shamanism, Native American tradition, Wicca or Druidry. These movements 
derive from cultures outside the Orient as conventionally defined, but still show 
an intense interest in altered states of consciousness and the experiential 
dimension of religion, including conviction that mystical unitive experience is 
possible. Thus, there are indeed Occidental religions that can be assigned to the 
category of pro-mystical religions.
Distinctions of religions into pro-mystical and anti-mystical categories 
are quite orthogonal to distinctions between Eastern and Western faiths. 
Confucianism, for example, could hardly be described as a movement which 
emphasises mystical experience. Kung's (1991) taxonomy of religions divides 
religions into the prophetic, exemplified by Semitic faiths; the mystical, 
exemplified by Indian religions; and religions-of-harmony, exemplified by 
Confucianism. This is consistent with the point being made here about 
Confucianism, but again, this taxonomy suffers from assumptions that Eastern
religions are those that are pro-mystical, overlooking movements such as Wicca 
or Druidry.
Major reasons exist as to why it is important to emphasise these mystical 
strands within the Western tradition. Such movements are attracting 
considerable interest today, as is evident in reviews of New Religious 
Movements such as Barker (1989) or Barrett (1996). Comprehensive 
assessments of religions in contemporary industrialised societies should 
therefore consider such faiths as Druidry. Psychometric grounds exist for 
emphasising such movements. A valid psychometric scale, it is held here, to 
assess attitudes to mysticism would be one on which Druids would score higher 
than members of more mainstream Christian Protestant churches. This point is 
germane to certain linguistic advantages that exist in checking out the validity 
of such a scale by use of such groups, rather than by comparisons of Christians 
and Hindus (see below). Finally, inclusion of both Eastern and Western 
religions within the broad category of ^pro-mystical religions'’ highlights how 
movements of diverse cultural background and theological orientation may still 
occupy this broad category. The religions of Druidry, Wicca and Buddhism may 
all be classified as "pro-mystical religions", even though differences can be 
observed in their doctrinal foundations.
This observation is not intended to undermine the taxonomy proposed 
here. Distinctions of religions in terms of their attitudes to mysticism may be 
considered distinction at the level of the genus, distinction of theological 
positions of different religions within either of these two broad categories may 
be considered to be distinction at the level of the species. The one common 
denominator linking the first two religions analysed in the discussion that
follows is that they are both pro-mystical, even though their theological 
viewpoints are, in other respects, often quite different.
To define mystical experience as a sense of unity with qualities beyond 
the self means that certain religions which are not theistic, pantheistic or 
panentheistic and which, indeed, in the technical sense of the term could be 
viewed as “atheistic" may nevertheless be described as “pro-mystical”. 
Buddhism is the most obvious example. Despite quite different theological 
orientations, Buddhism and Paganism (in the modem sense of the term, i.e. as a 
New Age movement that is attracting considerable followers) may both be 
termed “pro-mystical”. Discussion that follows will commence with a 
consideration of these two religions. They will then be contrasted with the “anti- 
mystical” religions of orthodox Christianity and orthodox mainstream Judaism.
2.7.2 Buddhism: A Pro-Mystical Faith
Although Buddhism is sometimes portrayed as being, at least in certain 
forms, atheistic, its reference to states such as nirvana, or (in its Zen forms) 
kensho or satori reveals its positive attitudes towards the experiential 
dimensions of religion. This can be seen very clearly when looking at the Zen/ 
Ch'an schools of Buddhism, a form of Buddhism which has become very 
popular in the West, with its almost "New Age" interest in the mystical. The 
Ch'an School of Buddhism is generally traced back to the seventh century 
Chinese teacher Hui-Nen (638 A.D. to 713 A.D.), whose teachings, recorded in 
the Platform Structure of the Sixth Patriarch, are often seen as pivotal in the 
development of what later became known, following their transmission to
Japan, as Zen Buddhism (Scott & Doubleday, 1992). The word "Zen", derived
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from the Chinese Ch'an, in turn derives from the earlier Sanskrit word
"Dhyana", which is typically translated by modem scholars as "meditation" but 
which can also be translated as "trance" (Chadwick, 1994). This etymology 
indicates a clearly positive attitude towards altered states of consciousness as a
particular feature of this form of Buddhism.
A central concept in Zen Buddhism is that of satori. This is generally 
taken to mean an enlightened state of consciousness gained after meditation, 
whether after many quiet periods (as in the Soto tradition) or after meditation on 
the paradoxes known as koans (as in the Rinzai tradition). So central to Zen is
the concept of satori that Humphreys (1949/ 1984) has defined Zen in terms of 
its emphasis on satori, holding that all else, such as meditation on koans, should
be seen as subservient to attainment of satori. Similarities can be observed with
the term kensho, meaning a sudden awakening or realization, and much 
literature on Zen equates the two terms, but Scott and Doubleday (1992) 
carefully distinguished these two terms, taking satori (or dai-kensho, literally
u The Great Awakening’’) to be the more complete state of enlightenment, with
implications that kensho represents a gradual, satori a more sudden, state of 
awakening. However, the centrality Zen accords both concepts implies positive 
attitudes towards the experiential dimensions of religiosity.
Humphreys' (1949/ 1984) comments on the Zen concept of jijimuge 
very strongly demonstrate Zen Buddhism's positive attitudes towards 
mysticism. Jijimuge may be defined as a state, experienced during kensho or 
satori, in which normal distinctions between subject and object are dissolved, in 
which the normal perceptions of reality as consisting of atomistic elements 
dissolve as one begins to perceive reality as an interrelated whole - in short,
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the state of union identified with mystical experience by Stace (1960). It would 
appear in Humphrey's view that such perception represents a more authentic 
perception of reality than normal perceptions of the world as consisting of 
discrete units. In this sense, the mystical states valued by Zen Buddhism are to 
be seen as realisations, not attainments.A concept equivalent to the Zen concept 
of jijimuge is difficult to find in Jewish or Christian teaching. This indicates 
how Zen Buddhism, in contrast to the latter two religions, merits legitimate 
description as a pro-mystical religion.
Conceptualisations of satori or kensho as realizations of how things 
really are may seem more readily compatible with Forman’s perennialism than 
with Katzian constructivism. Social constructivists could still defend their 
beliefs, however, by portraying these realizations as post hoc constructions 
rather than accurate and objective self-perceptions.
Forms of Buddhism other than the Zen tradition have also placed a high 
value on mystical experience. Among Tibetan Buddhism, for example, an 
interest in mystical states is discernible, although it is debatable that many of the 
interests of Tibetan Buddhists are closer to what Daniels (2003) calls psychic 
experiences than to mystical experiences in the strict sense taken here. Within 
Nichiren Shoshu (or Nichiren Daishonen) Buddhism, emphasis on unity with 
nature as an experiential state is evident in the concept of Esho Funi. These 
observations suggest that in a taxonomy where religions are classified as “pro- 
mystical” or “anti-mystical'’, Buddhism, despite occasional atheistic theology, 
can emphatically be placed in the former category.
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2.7.3 Contemporary7 Paganism: A Pro-Mystical Faith in the Western 
Mystery Tradition
Contrasting Buddhism with Judaism and Christianity in terms of its 
standing on the variable of attitudes to mysticism needs to be carefully 
distinguished from any comparison of the frequency of mystical experience in 
such traditions. However, distinctions along this variable must also be 
differentiated from taxonomies contrasting Eastern and Western religions. A 
pro-mystical faith largely rooted in Western, not Oriental culture, which takes
rather different theological perspectives to the belief systems endorsed by many 
Buddhists demonstrates this - contemporary Paganism.
Used to refer to contemporary social and religious movements, the term 
"Paganism" can be understood as a generic name for a certain family of the so- 
called "New Religious Movements" considered by Barker (1989), and has quite 
distinct meanings from earlier pejorative usage of the term. The fact that many 
Pagans today would quite happily label themselves as "Pagans" indicates how 
current usage of the term need not carry pejorative associations. Such Paganism 
has roots in a Romanticist reaction to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth 
century, rather than representing an unbroken continuity with ancient teachings. 
The word “Pagan" is sometimes traced back to the Latin root Paganus, meaning
urural folk” or “people of the land" (Barker, 1989; Moorey, 1996), to contrast a
religion of rural or village-dwelling people with the more urban religion of the 
city, but is also sometimes, as by Fox (1986) traced back to the Latin root 
Pagani, literally “civilian”, contrasting earlier portrayals of Christianity as a 
religion in which one acted as a soldier for Christ with the more civilian
religions of rural communes. Today, however, the term can be thought of as
referring to a wide and diverse strand of movements, including modern-day 
Druidry, Wicca, the Nordic tradition and the more solitary approaches to Pagan 
practices favoured by Beth (2001) and by Green (1991), popularly known by 
Beth's (2001) term "Hedgewitch".
For all their diversity, these movements still share considerable 
commonalities. These include motivation to commune with Nature and a 
combination of polytheistic, pantheistic and panentheistic beliefs. The example 
of a common feature that is most relevant to the current discussion is how they 
typically emphasise the experiential dimension of religion. This emphasis may 
be contrasted with that on methodical adherence to ritual protocol characteristic 
of mainstream Judaism, or that on intellectual commitment to creedal assent 
found in some forms of Christian Protestantism.
The Pagan Federation, founded in Britain in 1971, gives a very clear and 
succinct overview of the basic ideological beliefs of modem Paganism (broadly 
defined). These are summarized in the Pagan Federation's list of the movement's 
three central tenets:
(a) Love for and kinship with Nature;
(b) The Pagan ethic - “Do as thou wilt, but harm none” (actually a paraphrase 
of the Wiccan Rede, “Eight words the Wiccan Rede fulfil, An' it harm none, do 
as you will”);
(c) Acceptance of even-handed polarity between male and female deities.
(Green, 1997, p i60).
The first of these tenets suggests a desire for pantheistic union with 
Nature. As with Buddhism, therefore, Paganism greatly values unitive 
experience, but in contrast to the more abstract Buddhist concepts of jijimuge or
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Esho Funi, Paganism appears to take a more concrete, earth-bound approach to 
the belief that such unitive states of consciousness are possible. This distinction 
does not undermine any basis for placing both religions in the category “pro- 
mystical"; rather, it implies that Buddhism and Paganism may be linked 
respectively with the introvertive and extrovertive forms of mysticism described 
by Stace (1960). Polytheistic theology implied by the third of these tenets 
should not be seen as inimical to any assumptions that states of unio mystica are 
possible; the Pagan outlook can be understood by quoting Thales, “Nature is full
of gods" (cited in deQuincey, 2002, p9). This quotation suggests that elements
♦
of the natural world are imbued with their own consciousness, somewhat 
evocative of Stace's category of objectivity as one of the criteria of authentic 
mystical experience.
Whether empirical data support this classification of Paganism as "pro- 
mystical" will be explored in a study reported later in this thesis. Here, the 
interest in personal development and acquisition of altered states of 
consciousness valued in Paganism will be indicated by looking at just one 
example of modem Paganism - contemporary Druidry.
Exactly what the Druids of antiquity believed is moot. Sources of 
information on these early Druids came from non-Druid authors such as 
Poseidonos (c. 135-50 B.C.E.) and the so-called “Poseidonian School” of Julius 
Caesar, Strabo, Timogenes and Diodorus Siculus, who were not always 
favourable in their portrayals of Druids, and who claimed that the Druids were 
against committing their vast learning to writing (Ellis, 1994). However, an 
understanding of Druidry as a movement in contemporary Britain, as Ellis 
(1994) explains, can be gained from historical considerations that date back far
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more recently, specifically the times of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
antiquarians such as Toland, Aubrey and Stukeley. Such scholars may have 
based some of their teachings on decidedly shaky historical foundations. 
Nevertheless, the important point to grasp about their work from the point of 
view of understanding contemporary Druidry is how, in an era characterised by 
growing emphasis on human rationality, they were challenging the Age of 
Reason through emphasis on spirituality and intuition over and against the 
rational. Insofar as these authors believed Druids had been an intensely spiritual 
people, their promotion of interest in Druidry may be seen as a means to this 
end. Such promotion helped to bring the concept of what later became known, 
following James (1902/ 1960), as religious experience into sharp public 
awareness.
Modern-day Druid orders have been founded since 1700, such as Henry 
Hurle's Ancient Order of Druids, founded in 1708, into w'hich Winston 
Churchill was initiated in 1908 (Ellis, 1994; Green, 1997). The most famous and 
largest of such orders today, with an international membership of over 4,000, its 
own journal Touchstone and its own web-site, is the Order of Bards, Ovates and 
Druids or O.B.O.D., initially founded in 1964 as the Cairdeas More Shaoghal 
Nan Druidh (literally, “Worldwide Fellowship of Druids”).
Contemporary scholarship's appraisal of Druids today indicates how the 
movement is very much orientated towards promotion of positive attitudes 
towards mysticism. In his admirably scholarly work on the Druids, Ellis (1994) 
states how “Celtic and Druidic “truth” of every description - from “arcane 
knowledge”, “the true path”, “karmic destiny” to “mystic awareness” - are 
solicited in the commercial deluge of New Age philosophies” (Ellis, 1994,
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p280; italics added). Green (1997) has explained how modern Druidry 
emphasises the fun elements of religion, a sense of spirituality derived from 
ancestors, continuity with and concern for Nature and that favourite New Age 
preoccupation “energy*1, construed in a spiritual rather than physical sense.
Since Green (1997) lists the two main aims of O.B.O.D. as being “to help each 
individual to develop his/ her intellectual, emotional, physical and artistic 
potential, and to cherish and to protect the natural world" (Green, 1997, pi 70), 
it can be seen that modern Druidry has as much to do with post-1960s interest in 
transpersonal psychology, New Ageism and the Human Potential Movement as 
it has to do with promotion of historically authentic antiquarian scholarship 
based upon rigorous archaeological study.
To be fair to contemporary interest in Druidry, it should be 
acknowledged that experience of a Stacean mystical oneness with Nature may, 
quite possibly, have featured in the religion of the ancient Druids. Ancient 
Druids have been depicted, in works by contemporary Druid scholars, as 
perceiving supernatural presences in Nature, leading Green (1997) to state that 
“The sky, the sun, the dark places underground all had their spirits. Every 
mountain, river, spring, marsh, tree and rocky outcrop was endowed with 
Divinity" (Green, 1997, p29). Shamanism, another preoccupation of 
contemporary Pagan movements, has been linked with Druidry by John 
Matthews, who Ellis (1994) cites as the muintid or athro of modem New Age 
interest in Druidry, and who Ellis portrays as having a deeper understanding of 
Celtic culture than is typically found among contemporary Druids. Since 
Shamanism involves initiation into altered states of consciousness and a sense 
of loss of boundaries between self-perception of oneself as human and self-
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perception of oneself as part of the natural world, hypotheses that Druidry and 
Shamanism share parallels, if defensible, would offer solid evidence that 
Druidry is a pro-mystical religion. Archaeological finds, such as that of antler 
head-dress in Hertfordshire or cannabis at an Iron Age tomb in Hochdorf, 
Germany (Green, 1997), may offer some tentative evidence that early Druids 
did practice what is now termed Shamanism, although this remains a matter of 
speculation. It should be stressed again that concern here is less with the Druids 
of antiquity than with the beliefs, practices, attitudes and experiences of 
contemporary Druids.
Associations made by authors such as John Matthews between 
Shamanism and Druidry imply the latter's focus on mystical experience, unitive 
states and altered states of consciousness. Thus, contemporary Druidry and 
related Pagan movements can legitimately be described as “pro-mystical 
religions'". Earlier dubious claims made by seventeenth and eighteenth century 
scholars on Druids - perhaps most notoriously, Aubrey's now totally 
discredited hypothesis that Stonehenge was built by the Druids - should not be 
thought of as casting aspersions on the beliefs of modem Druids, but as 
evidence that contemporary Druidry can legitimately be considered a “New 
Age" movement having its roots in post-Enlightenment, anti-rationalistic 
Romanticism, and one which places a greater emphasis on the experiential 
dimensions of religion than it does on acquisition of factual knowledge or
creedal assent.
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2.7.4 Religions Adopting Negative Attitudes to Mysticism:
Christianity and Judaism
Two separate spiritual traditions have now been represented as taking 
positive attitudes to mysticism. The usefulness of this variable in classifying 
faiths will now be indicated by a review of two faith traditions taking less 
positive attitudes towards mysticism. These are Christianity and Judaism. The 
former, especially in certain Protestant forms, and the latter, especially in its 
orthodox form, may generally (if not invariably) be placed on the negative end 
of the attitudes to mysticism dimension.
As noted in Chapter One, orthodox Jewish teaching and belief does 
not, in the views of Katz (1978), refer to the concept of unitive consciousness 
that defines mystical experience in the strict sense of the term. If positive 
attitudes to mysticism are equated, therefore, with a positive orientation to any 
attempted quest for experience of unitive consciousness, coupled with beliefs 
that such states of consciousness are possible, Katz' position strongly implies 
that orthodox Judaism is an anti-mystical (or at least, non-mystical) religion. 
Observations of accounts of visions of figures such as Daniel, Ezekiel, Isaiah or 
Jeremaiah in the Hebrew Bible appear, prima facie, to challenge this assertion. 
However, these accounts are typically based on belief in a Deity that is largely 
portrayed as remaining totally transcendent, and do not describe any sense of 
union with any figure (whether natural or supernatural) beyond the self. 
Consequently, they would not qualify as “mystical experiences” in the strictly 
Stacean sense. Equally importantly, modern Jewish ideology portrays these 
visions as once-and-for-all prophecies and revelations, and makes no grounds 
for expectations of their repetitions in the contemporary world. Thus, just how
modem Druidry can be declared a pro-mystical religion, modem Judaism may 
be declared an anti-mystical religion. This is especially true of Ashkenazi rather 
than Sephardi Judaism (Greenberg, Witzum & Buchbinder, 1992).
It is true that mystical strands such as Hasidism or the Kabbala can be 
detected in Judaism's history, but these strands have generally remained on the 
periphery of Judaism. The history of Jewish mysticism indicates how:
(i) Jewish mysticism does not encourage a state of unitive consciousness - it 
therefore must be distinguished from an interest in mysticism in the Stacean 
sense;
(ii) Jewish mysticism probably represents a more heterogeneous set of 
movements than the mysticism of any other religion. As Dupre (1987) noted, 
“Judaism has produced forms of mysticism so unlike any other and so variant 
among themselves that no common characteristic marks them all (Dupre, 1987, 
p258; emphasis added).
To stress heterogeneity of mysticism in the Judaic tradition renders it 
questionable as to whether the term “mysticism" in this context really represents 
an identical usage of the term as applied to other faith traditions, and thus means 
that the acknowledgement of the existence of movements such as the Kabbala, 
Hassidism or Zohar can easily be squared with the view that Judaism holds 
negative attitudes towards mysticism if by the term “mysticism" one means an 
attempt to initiate unitive states of consciousness. Furthermore, if Dupre’s 
assertion that the diverse strands of movements within the Jewish mystical 
tradition lack a common denominator is correct, it would be logically 
impossible to claim that any attempt to initiate unitive states of consciousness is
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a common goal of all Jewish mystics, for such an assertion implies that there is 
no common goal linking all the Jewish mystics.
Orthodox Judaism emphasises the ritual, ethical and social 
dimensions of religion, rather than the experiential. For example, in defining 
Jewish consciousness, adherence to the 613 mitzvot or ethical precepts as 
described in the Hebrew Bible is seen as important. Thus, in exact contrast to 
Paganism and Buddhism, Judaism may be described as a religion o f action 
rather than a religion o f experience - stressing the ritual, social and ethical 
dimensions of religion over and above the experiential, adopting positive 
attitudes towards practice and protocol rather than to mystical experience.
Broadly similar comments may be made regarding Christianity, 
although here, as one moves into Protestant rather than Catholic forms of this 
faith tradition, the emphasis shifts from ritual and practice to belief. The belief 
that Jesus died on the Cross to save us from our sins, characteristic of much 
popular Protestant theology today, implies that any self-initiated attempt at the 
mystical quest is to be proscribed, as does the Lutheran doctrine that we are 
justified by faith in this doctrine alone. Somewhat more in common with 
Judaism than with Protestantism, Roman Catholicism emphasises the ritual and 
ethical dimensions of religion, rather than the experiential. Dupre summarizes 
the orthodox Christian position on mysticism by stating that “Unlike some other 
religions, Christianity has never equated its ideals of holiness with the 
attainment of mystical states” (Dupre, 1987, p251).
These comments are not to deny that, within Christian history, there 
have been many famous Christian mystics, and that some of these mystics - 
unlike the case with Judaism - have indeed described their visions in terms
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which can be understood as attempts to attain unitive states of consciousness 
(especially a sense of union with Christ), and which would therefore qualify as 
mystical experiences in Stace's (1960) strict sense. Examples include Julian of 
Norwich, Teresa of Avila and Juan de la Crux. In particular, Eckhart has been 
cited as an example of a Christian mystic whose understanding of the quest to 
gain unitive states of consciousness comes surprisingly close to the attitudes 
towards mysticism found within certain Eastern religions, especially Zen 
Buddhism (Marcoulesco, 1987). However, close scrutiny of the history of the 
Christian church reveals that the flowering of mysticism has frequently been 
viewed with suspicion by mainstream bodies within the Christian churches, 
insofar as taken to its conclusion, mysticism's stress on individuality renders the 
need for a socially organized church hierarchy superfluous. Thus, as writh 
Judaism, Christianity cannot be declared a pro-mystical religion, at least not in 
its mainstream forms. Indeed, the teachings of much orthodox Protestant 
theology, which stress the sovereignty of God as an “Absolute Other” and 
emphasise the transcendence rather than the immanence of God, exemplified by 
the theologies of Calvin and more recently Barth, stand in such obviously 
marked contrast to the Pagan belief in the immanent Divinity of Nature that it is 
clear that much mainstream Protestant theology would treat with suspicion 
claims to enter states of unitive consciousness with God.
Katz (1978) portrays Christianity as taking a rather ambivalent attitude 
towards attempts to gain unitive consciousness. While his descriptions of 
Judaism take unitive consciousness to be largely absent from Judaism, Katz 
concedes that entry into unitive consciousness is found among some elements 
within the Christian mystical tradition. He cites Augustine of Hippo as a case in
point. However, it would appear that in Katz’s view, this occurred due to the 
influence of neo-Platonism on early Christian thought, rather than as the direct 
result of any Christian theological teaching. Thus, the taxonomy proposed here 
allows us to place both Christianity and Judaism within the category “anti- 
mystical religion”.
2.8 Attitudes to Mysticism and Mystical Experience: Conceptual 
Distinctions
The above taxonomy of religions has been based on the variable of 
attitude towards mysticism. Previous publications have alluded to such a 
taxonomy, but in the absence of empirical data. The question of whether 
empirical data can contribute to an understanding of this distinction will be 
explored in detail in Chapters Five and Six. The original contribution to 
knowledge presented in these two chapters will describe, in part, the 
construction and use of a scale original with the current thesis, designed to 
assess attitudes to mysticism.
The construction of this scale represents an original contribution to 
transpersonal psychometrics insofar as it will be the first scale to assess this 
construct as distinct from mystical experience. Its purpose should not. therefore, 
be confused with that of earlier scales such as Hood's M-Scale (1975), which 
were designed to assess respondents' past record of actually having had a 
mystical experience, rather than attitudes to mysticism. To explain how these 
two constructs of attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience are 
conceptually distinct will help to emphasise the value in construction of a new
scale to assess the former.
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Prima facie, it may seem a truism to suggest that mystical experience 
and attitudes to mysticism are closely related, and so scores on questionnaires 
assessing these two variables can be expected to be significantly positively 
correlated. However, it is important to see that there are also conceptual 
distinctions that can be drawn between these variables. Such correlations should 
not, therefore, be so high as to lead to inferences that the two concepts are 
identical. People who have had a mystical experience may be more inclined to 
view mysticism positively than those who have not - just how those who view 
mysticism positively may be more likely to report such experiences than those 
who do not. However, through second-hand reading, people may acquire very 
positive attitudes to mysticism without themselves ever having had mystical 
experiences. Less obviously, but equally certainly, an individual who has had a 
mystical experience could still possess quite negative attitudes towards 
mysticism. One might believe oneself to have had such an experience, but 
believe that such experiences are pathology, or are actually Satanic visions, as 
considered in comments on Teresa of Avila presented in Chapter Seven.
Linguistic considerations
Value exists in sampling an Occidental religious group to assess the 
criterion-related validity of a scale to assess attitudes to mysticism. To compare 
adherents of Eastern and Western religions on such a scale in a country such as 
the United Kingdom would be problematic, insofar as many Hindus (for 
example) in the United Kingdom would not necessarily be using English as a 
first language. To compare scores obtained by Jews and Christians on such a
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scale with those obtained by pro-mystical Pagans, a pro-mystical Western 
movement, would therefore be an effective way to validate such a scale.
2.9 Perennialism and Constructivism Re-Visited: Perspectives on Attitudes 
to Mysticism
These conceptual distinctions suggest that there could be different 
patterns of ontogenetic development for mystical experience and attitudes to 
mysticism. Reasons for individual variations in attitudes to mysticism may be 
attributable, in part, to whether people have ever actually had mystical 
experiences themselves, but this seems unlikely to be the sole explanation for 
such intra-individual differences. Socio-cultural learning is likely to play a role, 
as, indeed, Forman's own version of perennialism allows (Forman, 1998). This 
raises the possibility that attitudes to mysticism could be primarily a variable 
that arises through socio-cultural learning, even if mystical experience does not. 
Thus, personality traits relevant to social learning could still theoretically bear 
particular relationships with attitudes to mysticism, even if they are found to be 
unrelated to mystical experience.
These relationships will depend upon the status one’s membership 
group grants to attitudes to mysticism. To define NEO conscientiousness, as 
Benet-Martinez and John (1998) do, as “socially prescribed control”, indicates 
that individuals who score high on this trait should learn social norms readily, a 
definition that implies a need to consider how prescriptive norms may differ for 
different membership groups in thinking about this trait. Such norms may vary 
across the four groups discussed, with Pagans and Buddhists treating positive 
attitudes to mysticism as a socially prescribed norm, Christians and Jews
treating negative attitudes to mysticism as a socially prescribed norm. If 
attitudes to mysticism is a learnt variable, and NEO conscientiousness 
represents increased propensity for social learning, hypotheses may be 
articulated that NEO conscientiousness will be positively associated with 
attitudes to mysticism among Buddhists and Pagans but negatively associated 
with attitudes to mysticism among Christians and Jews.
2.10 Summary and Conclusions to Chapter Two
Psychoticism and attitudes to mysticism are both potential correlates of 
transpersonal experience worthy of assessment in empirical studies. Theoretical 
questions, such as that of whether mystical experiences arise through social 
conditioning or are innate, may benefit from assessments of how transpersonal 
experiences relate to psychoticism. However, reasons for questioning the 
heterogeneity of psychoticism have been emphasised in this chapter, suggesting 
that future psychometric research into transpersonal experience should assess 
more narrow-band traits as well as psychoticism. If NEO conscientiousness, for 
example, has a more specific relevance to impulse control and therefore 
conditionability than psychoticism, implications are that psychometric 
evaluations of social constructivism may gain greater benefits from use of the 
NEO than from use of Eysenck's P-E-N model.
Initial grounds for assessments of whether attitudes to mysticism arise 
through social learning may be obtained through studying this variable’s 
relationship to psychoticism. The heterogeneity of psychoticism and sampling 
issues must both be considered in such research. Use of a more focussed model 
of personality than Eysenck's, such as the five-factor model, permits attention to 
traits more specifically linked to impulse control than psychoticism. Personality
correlates of attitudes to mysticism may differ in pro-mystical and anti-mystical 
religions. Psychometric study should take such sampling issues into 
consideration, and ideally consider both pro-mystical groups such as Pagans and 
Buddhists, and anti-mystical groups such as Christians and Jews.
Previously published empirical findings germane to these comments will 
be reviewed in Chapter Three. Important omissions from the available published 
literature will be highlighted. Theoretical questions that will be presented at the 
end of Chapter Three form the bases for the hypotheses that will be tested in the 
empirical studies that will be presented in this thesis.
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CHAPTER THREE:
REVIEW OF PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED DATA ON
TRANSPERSONAL EXPERIENCES
Published literature on the personality correlates of religiosity, including 
that which has looked at religious experience, will be reviewed in this chapter. 
Although psychoticism as described in Eysenck's model has frequently been 
assessed in such studies, grounds were offered, in Chapter Two, for questioning 
the univocality of this trait is questionable. Reasons why the contributions of 
psychometrics to theoretical questions on transpersonal experience may be 
enhanced by measurements of distinguishable facets of psychoticism rather than 
broad measures of this trait were given in the previous chapter.
A review of literature on the personality correlates of general 
religiosity, followed by a review of studies which have looked specifically at 
religiosity's experiential dimension, will be presented in Section 3.1. As precise 
personality correlates of religiosity may depend upon which form of religious 
orientation (intrinsic, extrinsic or quest) is being assessed, a review of literature 
on religious orientation and transpersonal experience will presented in Section 
3.2. As psychoticism may be linked with certain forms of pathology at extreme 
levels, a review of the literature on mental health and transpersonal experience 
will be presented in the final section of this chapter, Section 3.3.
Much empirical literature has been published on transpersonal experiences' 
connection to demographic variables such as age, gender, social status, 
educational level and ethnic group (Back & Bourque, 1970; Carroll, 1983; Hay, 
1982, 1990; Hay & Morisy, 1978; Levin, 1993; Levin & Taylor, 1997). This 
includes the author's own work on gender differences in M-Scale scores
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(Edwards, 1999). However, such literature will not form a central point of the 
following reviews, which will focus on "intrapsychic" rather than demographic 
correlates of transpersonal experience.
3.1 Personality and General Religiosity
Voluminous literature published since the 1950s has presented findings 
on how religiosity in general (not specifically the experiential dimension) 
relates to various personality traits. These include self-esteem, anxiety and 
hostility (Heintzelman & Fehr, 1976), intrapunitive and extrapunitive means of 
anger expression (Bateman & Jensen, 1958), variables assessed on the Edwards 
Personal Preference Schedule (McClain, 1978; Meredith, 1968), on Gough's 
California Psychological Inventory (Hoffnung, 1975; McClain, 1978), on the 
Jackson Personality Inventory (Hood, Hall, Watson & Biderman, 1979), and on 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Mayo et ah, 1969; cited in 
Koenig et al., 1990) and locus of control (Kahoe, 1974). Research which 
reflected the influences of Rokeach and of Adorno considered whether 
increased religiosity was linked with being dogmatic or authoritarian 
(Hoffnung, 1975; Kahoe, 1977; see also more recent studies reviewed by 
Paloutzian, 1996). Heintzelman (1975), while acknowledging lack of total 
consistency, noted how early studies had associated religiosity with low self-
esteem, conventionality and suspicion. Indeed, early literature has been 
summarized as portraying religious people as tending "to have more prejudice, 
rigidity, suspicion and general personal immaturity" (McClain, 1978, p i59). 
However, these early studies focussed on a particular form of religiosity linked 
with right-wing conservative ideology in the United States, and focussed on
belief and behaviour rather than experience.
A similar tendency for empirical researchers to have concentrated their 
efforts on belief and behaviour rather than experience is discernible when one 
addresses religiosity research in connection with the four personality models 
outlined in Chapter Two. Caution should therefore be exercised in making 
inferences from such literature regarding personality correlates of religious 
experience. However, this wider body of literature on personality and religion in 
general at least sets a context for a review of studies that have looked 
specifically at experience. To contextualise the latter literature in this way 
enables major differences between these two research areas to be highlighted.
3. 1.1 Religiosity and Eysenck’s P-E-N model.
Since 1980, there have probably been more published studies assessing 
religiosity in conjunction with assessments of traits from Eysenck's P-E-N 
model (e.g. Chau, Johnson, Bowers, Darvill & Danko, 1990; Francis, 1991a, 
1991b, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1997; Francis & Astley, 1996; Francis & Bolger, 
1997; Francis, Brown, Lewis, Philipchalk & Lester, 1995; Francis & Katz,
1992; Francis, Lankshear & Pearson, 1989; Francis & Pearson, 1985a, 1985b; 
1988; Francis, Pearson & Kay, 1981; Francis, Pearson, Carter & Kay, 1981; 
Francis & Wilcox, 1996; Heaven, 1990; Johnson, Danko, Darvill, Bochner, 
Bowers, Huan, Park, Pecjak, Rahim & Pennington, 1989; Katz & Francis, 1995; 
Kay, 1981; Louden & Francis, 1999; Maltby, 1995, 1999a; Maltby & Day,
2001; Robinson, 1990; Watson, Morris, Hood & Foster, 1986; Wilde & Joseph, 
1997) than with any other personality model. The clergy have been assessed in 
some studies (Francis, 1991b; Louden & Francis, 1999) but numerous other
studies have assessed respondents drawn from more general populations. A 
casual overview of this literature offers the impression that religiosity is 
orthogonal to both neuroticism and extraversion but negatively correlated with 
psychoticism (Eysenck, 1998; Francis, 1992a). However, closer scrutiny of the 
literature reveals how this broad statement requires careful qualification, 
especially when different religious orientations are considered.
Brief outlines will be offered here of three distinct forms of religious 
orientation - intrinsic, extrinsic and quest. This taxonomy of religious 
orientation should be seen as an addition to, not an enlargement of, the 
multidimensional models of religion outlined in Chapter One, for reasons 
outlined in Chapter One.
Religious Orientations
The term “religious orientation'' has been used extensively to 
distinguish between intrinsic religion (a genuine, heart-felt piety) and extrinsic 
religion (a more utilitarian ends-orientated use of religion). Popularity of the 
term dates from Allport and Ross' (1967) publication of the Religious 
Orientation Scale (R.O.S.), although the distinction is discernible in Allport's 
earlier theoretical writings (Allport, 1950). Allen and Spilka (1967) introduced 
the terms “committed' and “consensual religion - terms arguably more self- 
explanatory but which have never been quite as popular in published research 
literature. Intrinsic and extrinsic orientations bear conceptual similarities with, 
respectively, committed and consensual religion. Reported correlations between 
intrinsic and committed religious orientations have typically ranged from +.62 
to +.88, while reported correlations between extrinsic and consensual religion
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have typically been around +.5 (Wulff, 1997). Data therefore justify treating 
intrinsic religious orientation and committed religion as equivalent concepts; 
that extrinsic and consensual religious orientation have typically been found to 
correlate less strongly means that whether these two concepts are equivalent is 
more moot. However, extrinsic religious orientation may take more diverse 
forms than intrinsic religious orientation, as explained below (Section 3.2). 
Taking the two concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation as broad 
dimensions used to refer to motivations for religious (or apparently religious) 
acts of piety, Allport's distinction was summarised in his statement that
intrinsically religious individuals live their religion, extrinsically religious 
individuals use their religion (Allport, 1950).
Significant contributions to religious orientation research have been
made by Batson (Darley & Batson. 1973; Batson, 1976; Batson & Schoenrade,
1991a, 1991b; Batson et al., 1993), who has introduced terminology in which 
intrinsic and extrinsic orientations are labelled as religion-as-ends and religion- 
as-means respectively. Implicit in this terminology is that intrinsics treat their
religion as an end to be lived for in itself, extrinsics use religion as a means - 
for example, attending church to gain social approval, or saying prayers to gain 
solace. Criticisms of a simplistic distinction between religion-as-ends versus 
religion-as-means have been offered, however (see Section 3.2).
Batson (Darley & Batson, 1976; Batson, 1976; Batson & Ventis,
V
1985; Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b; Batson et al., 1993) has outlined a 
third form of religious orientation - quest religious orientation. Popular 
literature has described this as a religious orientation whereby “one may 
continuously search, but never find" (Dein, 1996, p i6). More technically, this
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concept is represented by Batson et al. (1993) as consisting of three facets that 
they believed were characteristics Allport attributed to his earlier concept of 
intrinsic orientation, but which had been lost in R.O.S. operationalisations of the 
concept, specifically:
(a) Existential complexity, a willingness to face life-and-death issues in all their 
complexity in reflective dialogue;
(b) A tendency to view religious doubts as positive;
(c) A willingness to see one's religious views as an ongoing, fluid process of 
change, not rigid unchanging beliefs.
The concept of quest religious orientation has proven controversial 
(Donahue, 1985; Kojetin, Macintosh, Bridges & Spilka, 1987), but this three-
fold taxonomy of religion-as-end, religion-as-means and religion-as quest at 
least provides a basic working model that helps to understand reasons for 
inconsistencies in the published literature on personality and religion. 
Construction of the R.O.S. by Allport and Ross (1967), on which separate sub-
scales are used to assess intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation, indicates 
commitment to the view that intrinsic and extrinsic orientation may be 
orthogonal, not negatively correlated.
Orthogonality of intrinsic, extrinsic and quest orientations was explicitly 
defended by Batson et al. (1993). Their Religious Life Inventory (Batson et al., 
1993) uses separate sub-scales to assess each dimension. Batson prefers to see 
these three separate orientations as continuous dimensions rather than types 
(personal communication), and in his later work at least, has declined to declare 
that any of these three orientations should be seen as more advanced than the
103
others (Batson & Vends, 1985), implicitly denying that any of these orientations 
can be equated with religious maturity. Batson’s model can therefore be 
differentiated from any models based upon concepts of spiritual development, 
such as Genia's (1997) model of spiritual openness and spiritual support, which 
portrays high levels of both as being a more advanced stage than a high level on 
only one of these two variables. Genia's model has been influential in general 
social science research into religion, but has yet to have substantive impact on 
either theoretical debate or empirical research into transpersonal experience.
Francis, Psychoticism and Religious Attitudes and Behaviour
Francis' (1992a) position implies that statistically significant negative 
correlations should be found between psychoticism and religiosity. The 
theoretical background for this position, postulating that individuals low in 
psychoticism, through reduced impulsivity and therefore heightened 
conditionability, are more likely to learn socially prescribed values than are 
individuals high in psychoticism, was sketched in Chapter Two. This portrayal 
of psychoticism stems from a shift in Eysenckian theory, with impulsivity being 
treated as a facet of psychoticism rather than extraversion. Thus, Francis’ 
theoretical position may be regarded as a qualification of an earlier theoretical 
proposal that introversion in Eysenck's model should correlate positively with 
religious beliefs and behaviour. This supposed link between introversion and 
religiousness has not been supported. Apparent relationships between religion 
and both introversion and neuroticism observed in early studies were reduced to 
non-significance after controlling for sex of participant (Eysenck, 1998).
The most sustained research effort that has pursued empirical testing of
the prediction that psychoticism will correlate negatively with degree of 
religious commitment has been that involving the Francis Scale of Attitudes 
towards Christianity, in both its junior (Francis, 1978) and adult (Francis & 
Stubbs, 1987; Francis, Lewis, Brown, Phillipchalk & Lester, 1995) forms. A 
full version of the 24-item junior version of this scale is available in the 
appendix to Francis (1992a). A reasonably consistent finding from studies using 
this scale is that religiosity is orthogonal with both introversion and neuroticism 
but is negatively correlated with psychoticism, a finding made in studies of both 
school-age students (Francis, 1992a) and university-age students (Francis et al., 
1995).
This negative relationship between psychoticism and religious attitudes 
has been observed in non-Christian samples. Using the Moslem Attitude to 
Religion Scale (M.A.R.S.), Wilde and Joseph (1997) found a negative 
correlation between psychoticism and religious attitudes among Moslem 
university students in the United Kingdom. Studies by Francis and Katz (1992) 
and Katz and Francis (1995), using a specially constructed scale to assess 
allegiance to Jewish orthopraxy, the Katz-Schmida Scale (cited in Francis & 
Katz, 1992) have found a similar negative correlation between psychoticism and 
positive attitudes towards Judaism among female Jewish teacher trainees in 
Israel. As with the studies of Christian respondents, these studies also found 
religious commitment to be orthogonal with extraversion and neuroticism.
An observation of the Francis Scale of Attitudes to Christianity reveals 
its heavy bias towards the doctrinal and ritual dimensions of religion as 
sketched in Chapter One. Examples of items from the 24-item version of the 
junior version of this scale include Item 4 ("The church is very important to
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me"), Item 7 ("I think church is a waste of my time"), Item 12 ("I believe the 
Bible is out of date"), Item 13 ("I believe that Jesus still helps people") and Item 
15 ("I find it hard to believe in God"). Such examples can be construed as 
measurements of either the ritual (Items 4 and 7) or doctrinal (Items 12, 13 and 
15) dimensions of religion. Other items include those pertinent to prayer and 
therefore devotional religiosity ("I think praying is a good thing"), to the ethical- 
consequential dimension of religion ("God helps me to lead a better life") and a 
final item ("I like to learn about God very much") that is relevant to the 
knowledge-based dimension of religiosity. Unless questions on prayer are 
considered relevant to the religious experience of such prayers being answered, 
only two questions on this scale, and these somewhat ambiguously, relate to 
religious experience rather than religious ritual or doctrine. These are Item 17 
("God is very real to me") and Item 20 ("I know that Jesus is very close to me"), 
although Item 17 arguably relates to doctrine rather than experience. Studies 
finding negative correlations between this questionnaire-based measure of 
religiosity and psychoticism also leave open the question of whether such an 
inverse relationship is found when behavioural, rather than questionnaire-based, 
measurements of religiosity are employed. A similar bias towards the doctrinal 
and ritual dimensions of religion can be observed in the adult version of the 
Francis Attitudes to Christianity Scale, of which the items appear in Francis, 
Lewis, Brown, Phillipchalk and Lester (1995).
Behavioural measurements, such as asking respondents directly about 
their frequency of church attendance or prayer, have been used in some studies, 
such as Francis and Bolger (1997) and Maltby (1995). Statistically significant 
correlations between psychoticism and behavioural measures of religiosity were
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found by both Francis and Bolger (1997) and Maltby (1995). Although a 
review of literature on religion in connection with the Eysenckian P-E-N model 
offers some preliminary corroboration of the position that religiosity and 
psychoticism are inversely related, leading Eysenck (1998) to take a negative 
correlation between religiosity and psychoticism as a consistent finding, some 
rather subtle ambiguities in the research literature demand that the literature 
should be reviewed in greater depth.
Studies Assessing Different Religious Orientations
Those studies that have treated religion as a broad variable (Francis, 
1992a, 1992b; Francis & Kay, 1992; Francis, Lankshear & Pearson, 1989; 
Francis & Pearson, 1985, 1988; Francis, Pearson, Carter & Kay, 1981; Wilde & 
Joseph, 1997) have reasonably consistently found religion and psychoticism to 
be inversely related. Qualifications to this broad statement, however, emerge 
from studies which have assessed participants on the separate orientations of 
intrinsic, extrinsic (Johnson et al., 1989; Robinson, 1990) and quest (Watson et 
al., 1986) orientations.
A positive correlation between quest and psychoticism was found in a 
study reported by Watson et al. (1986). While the magnitude of this correlation 
was not great, if statistically significant, this finding suggests that the precise 
relationship that personality bears to religiosity depends upon the form of 
religiousness being assessed. The possibility that unconventional social 
attitudes, as explained in Chapter Two, may be a facet of psychoticism helps to 
explain why psychoticism may relate to the quest orientation.
Robinson (1990), assessing respondents on the R.O.S., found that for
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certain respondent groups, extrinsic religious orientation correlated positively 
with psychoticism. This could be because certain items on the R.O.S. extrinsic 
sub-scale indicate willingness to sacrifice ethical standards (e.g. endorsement of 
an item asking whether one is willing to compromise one's religious ideals for 
economic gain is taken as indicative of greater extrinsic religiosity), and 
conceptually imply higher, rather than lower, psychoticism. Quest and extrinsic 
religiosity may correlate positively with psychoticism; one may conclude that
the common finding that religiosity and psychoticism share a negative
%
relationship is really a comment on intrinsic religiosity. Indeed, much evidence 
for an inverse relationship between religiosity and psychoticism has come from 
those studies such as Francis (1992a) where the operational measure of 
religiosity has been the Francis Scale of Attitudes to Christianity. Empirical 
evidence exists that scores on this scale correlate positively with intrinsic, 
negatively with extrinsic and quest, orientations (Francis & Orchard, 1999). 
However, a rather intriguing anomalous finding from at least one part of the 
world should be outlined.
Johnson et al. (1989) found a positive correlation between intrinsic 
religious orientation and psychoticism among respondents in Hawaii. These 
authors collected a large pool of data on potential correlates of altruism in 
Hawaii (and also in Missouri, where they found intrinsic religious orientation 
and psychoticism to be orthogonal). Type One errors may have stemmed from 
the large number of correlations reported by Johnson et al. (1989); however, 
positive correlations between intrinsic religious orientation and psychoticism in 
Hawaii were also observed by Chau et al. (1990).
Theoeretical debate has seldom discussed why, in a Pacific U.S. state,
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associations between intrinsic religious orientation and psychoticism were the 
direct opposite of those typically found elsewhere. This may relate to the 
inherent bias, noted by Paloutzian (1996), of the intrinsic scale of the R.O.S. 
towards conservative Christianity. As a measure of religiosity, this scale may 
have most applicability in the Bible belt states in the Deep South of the United 
States, such as Alabama, Tennessee, Louisiana or Georgia, where endorsement 
of conventional religious values may very much correspond to higher scores on 
the R.O.S. intrinsic sub-scale. This association may be less marked for states 
such as Massachusetts, influenced by liberal denominations such as 
Unitarianism. or among the New’ Agers of the West Coast of California.
Hawaii's multi-ethnic approach to faith, combining commitment to the 
Christian faith with an inheritance from Pagan, animistic religions predating 
Christianity (Smart, 1999), may differ sharply from the Bible-based 
fundamentalism typical of the Deep South of the United States. If the theoretical 
position of Francis (1992a), that inverse relationships between psychoticism and 
religiosity emerge through higher religiosity stemming from learning and 
acquisition of socially derived teachings and conventions, is defensible, the 
greatest negative correlations between psychoticism and religiosity should be in 
societies which most value the form of religiosity that is being assessed on both 
the Francis Scale of Attitudes to Christianity and the intrinsic sub-scale of the 
R.O.S. (i.e. a Bible-based form of conservative Christian Protestantism) - at 
least, if religiosity is operationally defined as scores on these two scales. 
Hawaii’s multi-ethnic culture may value a rather different approach to faith. 
Buddhist and animist influences on Hawaiian religious life may have caused 
some religiously-inclined Hawaiians to look with suspicion at some of the forms
of religiosity that such scales are measuring. In Hawaii, religious individuals 
may have had reservations about what they perceived as a form of religion 
imported from the mainland United States; thus, the positive correlation 
between intrinsic religiosity and psychoticism reported by Johnson et al. (1989) 
becomes less surprising than it may appear prima facie.
Cultural Considerations
Findings in Hawaii may be exceptional, for some evidence exists that a 
negative correlation between psychoticism and religiosity does exist in different 
cultures (Francis et al., 1995a). These authors found negative correlations 
between psychoticism and religiosity in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada and Australia. These correlations all remained significant after 
controlling for gender. Only two other correlations observed by Francis et al. 
(1995) remained significant after controlling for sex of participant. These were a 
positive correlation between scores on the E.P.Q. Lie-scale and the Francis 
Scale of Attitudes to Christianity Scale in United Kingdom, and a negative 
correlation between scores for E.P.Q. neuroticism and on the Francis Attitude to 
Christianity Scale in Canada, although neither were of the same level of 
magnitude as the inverse correlations reported by Francis et al. between 
religiosity and psychoticism. Maltby (1995) found an inverse relationship 
between psychoticism and religiosity in a U.S. sample, consistent with the 
findings obtained by Francis (1992a), Francis (1992b) and Francis and Bolger 
(1997) for United Kingdom samples. Assessments of Israeli samples (Francis & 
Katz, 1992; Katz & Francis, 1995) have also found an inverse relationship 
between psychoticism and religiosity.
Although a negative correlation between religion and psychoticism 
may exist in both different creeds and different cultures, it may require different 
measuring instruments for its detection depending upon the sample being 
studied. Use of the Francis Scale of Attitudes towards Christianity, for example, 
would have been wholly inappropriate in the studies of Jews and Muslims of 
Katz and Francis (1995) and Wilde and Joseph (1997). A less truistic example 
relates to the failure of Johnson et al. (1989) to find a negative correlation 
between intrinsic religiosity and psychoticism in Hawaii, which may have been 
less to do with genuine absence of such a relationship than to use of an 
inappropriate scale. A scale asking about "Attitudes to Indigenous Religious 
Faith and Practices as Traditionally Valued in Hawaii" may have yielded quite 
different findings.
Analogies with research into intelligence help to clarify this argument. 
Different perspectives are available in cross-cultural research into intelligence, 
ranging from the strongly universalist viewpoint that intelligence is an identical 
concept in all cultures and can be assessed on the same instruments, to the 
radical cultural relativist view that intelligence means different things in 
different cultures and can only be assessed by use of different measuring tools 
in different cultures (Sternberg, 1990). Between these two extremes, Sternberg 
noted intermediate viewpoints. One is the view that intelligence is an identical 
concept in different cultures, but requires culture-specific instruments for 
appropriate assessment. Similarly, relationships between psychoticism and 
religiosity may be invariant across cultures, but may require culturally variant 
means for appropriate assessment.
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Qualifications to Generalisations on Psychoticism as a Negative Correlate 
of Religiosity
To a greater extent than creed or culture, gender and age of 
respondents being sampled may complicate religiosity's relationship with 
psychoticism. The inverse relationship between psychoticism and religiosity has 
been more regularly reported in studies employing younger respondents, such as 
Francis (1992a) and Francis & Wilcox (1996), than in studies of older 
respondents. Although Francis and Bolger (1997) did find some evidence for a 
negative relationship between psychoticism and religiosity in a study employing 
older respondents, Francis and Astley (1996) found that prayer frequency did 
not correlate with psychoticism among adult church-goers. This latter finding 
may be contrasted with Francis’ (1997) finding of a negative correlation 
between psychoticism and both prayer frequency and church attendance 
frequency in a sample of first-year undergraduate students, of whom 71% were 
under the age of twenty.
A possible reason why intrinsic religiosity and psychoticism may be 
more closely linked in early life stages may relate to social constructivist 
explanations of intrinsic religiosity. Early life may be when people are most 
readily acquiring adherence to the pattern of beliefs and behaviours that reflect 
the norms of their in-group, meaning that it may be these life stages, rather than 
those of later life, in which such adherence is most readily linked with low 
levels of traits which inhibit conditionability.
The inverse correlation between psychoticism and religiosity appears 
to be stronger in male than female respondents. Kay (1981) found that in four 
classes of 11-15 year-old school children, psychoticism and religiosity were
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negatively correlated in all four classes for males, but only correlated negatively 
in the youngest class in females. Kay found psychoticism and religiosity to be 
orthogonal among females in the older classes. Francis (1992b), looking at 
members of the Christian Union at Cambridge University, found that only the 
male members scored lower than their age and gender-matched norms on 
psychoticism, a finding replicated by Francis and Pearson (1993) after assessing 
student church-goers. In these studies, religiously active males but not females 
were found to have lower than average scores on E.; Francis and Pearson 
(1993) found that female student church-goers did not differ significantly from 
their age and gender-matched norms on E, P or N, but did score significantly 
lower on the E.P.Q. Lie-scale.
Even when strong negative relationships between psychoticism and 
religiosity have been reported for both genders, evidence can be observed that 
this correlation is stronger in males. In Francis' (1992a) study, correlations 
between psychoticism scores and religious attitudes as assessed on the Francis 
Attitudes towards Christianity Scale were r = -.17 and r = -.34 for females and 
males respectively. Equivalent correlations for P as assessed on the JEPQ 
(Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire) in this study were r -  -.21 for 
females and r = -.34 for males. A possible explanation is that, as females 
typically score lower on the E.P.Q. psychoticism sub-scale than males, their 
responses are more likely to have been affected by floor effects, suggesting that 
this observation is a methodological problem and should not be considered to 
have substantive theoretical impact. This explanation is supported by the fact 
that negative correlations between psychoticism and religiosity have been 
observed in studies using all-female samples (Francis & Wilcox, 1996; Katz &
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Francis, 1995; Maltby 1995).
Qualifications to statements that religiosity and psychoticism are 
always inversely related have come from studies of the clergy. Mean average 
psychoticism scores for secular parochial clergy in the Roman Catholic church 
appear to be higher than the normative average for male respondents in general 
(Louden & Francis, 1999). This may relate to the considerable authoritarian 
qualities, or high ego strength, demanded by a position that requires one to lead 
others. Such findings therefore help to clarify how the qualities implicit in high 
psychoticism scores need not be perceived as being entirely negative qualities. 
Evidence exists that typical personality profiles of the Anglican clergy are not 
simple replications of those found for the typical religious individual (Francis, 
1991b). Louden and Francis's (1999) more recent study suggests that this also 
applies to Roman Catholic clergy.
Theoretical postulates linking heightened conditionability with greater 
religiosity cannot, it is argued here, be used as an obvious justification for any 
hypotheses that the clergy will have lower psychoticism scores than average, 
insofar as only a minority of one's social group actually do train to become 
clergy and thus, social convention should not be equated with willingness to 
train for the ministry. Thus, while respondents who are lower in psychoticism 
may, by virtue of their greater conditionability, more readily acquire patterns of 
religiosity that genuinely reflect greater social convention and acquisition of the 
mores of their in-group, desire to join the clergy cannot be taken as one of these 
patterns. If initial impetus to join the clergy stems from a personal feeling or 
conviction that one has in some way experienced a "calling" or "vocation", it is 
the experiential dimension of religiosity that needs to be considered when
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looking at religiosity and the clergy, and it is on this dimension where (see 
below) some interesting patterns that clearly diverge from the typical patterns 
on personality and religiosity have been obtained.
Religiosity's negative correlation with psychoticism may be more 
marked for younger rather than older participants, and for males rather than 
females. However, another reason for inconsistencies in the literature on 
psychoticism and religiosity measures must be considered.
Three reasons for such inconsistencies were considered by Francis et 
al. (1995a). The first was that such inconsistency is attributable to cultural 
variations, but as noted above, this negative correlation between psychoticism 
and religiosity may be both invariant across creed and culture, if requiring 
culturally sensitive instruments for its detection. The second was that 
inconsistencies may have stemmed from age-based variations in samples. This 
position is defensible, and is consistent with Francis' theoretical position, but it 
should nevertheless be noted that a negative correlation between psychoticism 
and religiosity has been observed in adults in later stages of life (Francis & 
Bolger, 1997).
The third possibility considered by Francis et al. (1995a) has most 
immediate relevance to the concerns of the current thesis. They suggested that 
inconsistencies in the literature on religion and psychoticism may be 
attributable, in part, to religiosity being multi-dimensional, so that whether 
religiosity correlates negatively with psychoticism may depend on which 
particular dimension of religion is being assessed. It has been noted above how 
intrinsic, extrinsic and quest religious orientations may have different 
relationships with psychoticism. As with different religious orientations, so too
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might different religious dimensions bear different relationships with 
psychoticism, a premise supported by Maltby and Day's (2001) findings that the 
personality traits of Eysenck’s P-E-N model that are associated with spirituality 
do not match entirely those found for religion.
Three types of study have produced evidence that psychoticism and 
religiosity are negatively correlated. These are those which have used 
questionnaire-based measurements (e.g. Francis, 1992a; Francis et al., 1995a; 
Wilde & Joseph, 1997); those which have used behavioural measures of what 
Stark and dock  (1968/ 1969) termed devotional religious dimension (e.g. 
Francis, 1997); and those which have used behavioural measures of public 
religiosity, or what Stark and dock termed ritual religious dimension (e.g. 
Francis & Bolger, 1997; Maltby, 1995). Francis and Astley's (1996) failure to 
find a negative correlation between prayer frequency and psychoticism among 
adult church-goers may be interpreted as evidence that this negative correlation 
between religiosity and psychoticism is weaker for the devotional dimension. 
Evidence that this negative correlation is not always found for the public-ritual 
dimension came from one of the largest studies employing behavioural 
measures of religiosity. This was the so-called "Virginia 30, 000", which 
examined some 14,781 pairs of twins in Virginia, United States. Here, for both 
males (r = 0.106; N = 11, 509) and females (r = 0.111; N  = 17, 064) small but 
significant positive correlations between psychoticism and church attendance 
were observed (D'Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes & Spilka, 1999).
Such data have provided little information on potential negative 
correlations between psychoticism and religiosity's experiential dimension. In 
quite subtle ways, those studies using questionnaire-based measures of
religiosity, such as the Francis Scale of Attitudes towards Christianity, may 
have been orientated towards religiosity's doctrinal and ritual dimensions. In 
themselves, such scales may be relatively uninformative as to whether a 
respondent has ever had a personal spiritual experience, whether one readily 
associated with Christianity, such as a born-again conversion experience, 
charismatic healing experience, glossolalia or a sense of union with Christ, or 
one which is less specifically bound to any faith tradition, such as the more 
generic sense of union assessed on Hood's (1975) M-Scale. Similar absence of 
attention to religiosity's experiential dimension can be observed on the scales 
used to assess attitudes towards Judaism and Islam used respectively by Francis 
and Katz (1992) and Wilde and Joseph (1997). Studies of Eysenck's P-E-N 
traits and religious experience are reviewed below, and it is as well to 
acknowledge here that literature on this topic has yet to be as voluminous as that 
on other dimensions of religion in connection with this model.
This review of literature on the Eysenckian P-E-N model of religion and 
personality can be summarized as follows. Firstly, there is little evidence that 
either extraversion or neuroticism bear any relationship to religiosity levels once 
gender has been controlled. Secondly, psychoticism has regularly been found to 
be negatively correlated with religiosity. This negative correlation appears to be 
stronger in studies of younger rather than older respondents, and for males 
rather than females.
A major qualification to attempts to summarize literature in this area by 
declarations that religiosity is negatively correlated with psychoticism is that 
such a negative correlation has more typically been observed for measures of 
intrinsic than extrinsic or quest religious orientation. Studies of religious
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experience (see below) suggest that variations in religiosity dimension as well 
as religious orientation have contributed to the inconsistent findings on religion 
and Eysenck's P-E-N model.
A key theoretical postulate that has guided research in this area is that 
low psychoticism is associated with conditionability into tender-minded 
attitudes (Beyts, Frcka, Martin & Levy 1983; Rocklin & Revelle, 1981), and 
that, therefore, inverse relationships will be observed between religiosity and 
psychoticism if the former is associated with this form of conditionability. The 
above findings suggest that such conditionability may explain the origins of 
intrinsic rather than quest or extrinsic religiosity. The question of whether such 
conditionability underlies the origin of all religiosity dimensions should now be 
considered.
Katz’s (1978; 1983) social constructivism implies that this is so for 
religious experience. His position therefore implies that negative correlations 
between psychoticism and religious experience will be found, at least in 
samples that value such experiences. However, the heterogeneity of 
psychoticism should be recalled. More cogent evidence that a particular form of 
religious orientation or particular religious dimension is associated with 
increased conditionability into tender-minded attitudes will emerge from data 
that, rather than merely report negative correlations between psychoticism as a 
broad trait and that particular dimension or orientation, suggest negative 
correlations between those facets of psychoticism pertinent to social learning 
and that dimension or orientation. Reviews of literature on personality and 
religion should therefore consider alternative models to those of Eysenck.
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3.1.2 The Five-Factor Model of Personality (FFM) and Religion
Very few studies of religiosity-personality published prior to the late 
1990s had considered respondents' scores on the Five-Factor Model (FFM). A 
special edition of Journal o f Personality published in 1999, devoted solely to 
papers on religion and personality and featuring two papers relevant to the FFM 
(McCrae,1999; Piedmont, 1999), may help to raise awareness of this model's 
value in future research into religion. Goldberg's (1990) study, although only
incidentally concerned with religion, found the three variables of religiosity,
evangelicalism and irreverence to load upon a separate religiosity factor 
(irreverence loading negatively) when six- and seven-factor solutions were 
applied to the data. Each of these variables loaded on conscientiousness in a 
five-factor solution.
Three empirical papers more explicitly linked with religion represent a 
ground-breaking beginning in raising consciousness of the FFM's potential as 
an important heuristic tool in empirical studies of religiosity-personality 
associations (Streyffeler & McNally, 1998; Piedmont, 1999; Taylor & 
MacDonald, 1999). Streyffeler and McNally (1998) found that both liberal and 
fundamentalist Protestants scored higher in extraversion and agreeableness but 
lower on neuroticism than general population norms, but that these two groups 
needed to be differentiated in that the former scored higher, the latter lower, on 
openness to experience than general population norms. Conscientiousness 
scores were not significantly different from general population norms for either 
group.
Streyffeler and McNally collected important cross-denominational 
comparative data; Taylor and McDonald (1999) went further and compared
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different creeds. They assessed respondents from four categories (Roman 
Catholic; Other Christian or O.C.; Other Religion or O.R.; and No Religion or 
N.R.) on each of the five FFM traits. Unlike Streyffeler and McNally, their 
findings suggested that the trait of conscientiousness is relevant to religiosity, 
insofar as post hoc analyses revealed respondents in both the O.C. and O.R. 
categories scored higher on conscientiousness than respondents in the N.R. 
category. O.C. respondents scored significantly higher on agreeableness than 
N.R. respondents, but other between-group comparisons for agreeableness were 
non-significant. No significant between-group differences were found for 
openness to experience.
If conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience each 
represent a distinct facet of P., Taylor and MacDonald's data highlight problems 
with broad assessments of psychoticism in personality-religiosity research. Such 
data suggest distinct facets of P. yield different patterns of between-group 
differences.
Taylor and McDonald (1999) did find intrinsic religiosity to be 
significantly correlated with both agreeableness (r = 0.21; N = 368; p < 0.001) 
and conscientiousness (r = 0.20; N  = 368; p < 0.001). This aspect of their data 
appears to be consistent with the large body of literature suggesting intrinsic 
religiosity correlates negatively with global measures of psychoticism. Gender 
considerations, however, reveal an important difference between the findings of 
these authors and findings using Eysenck's P-E-N model. They found 
conscientiousness to be more strongly correlated with intrinsic religiosity in 
females (r = 0.24; N = 266; p < 0.001) than in males (r = 0.08; N = 102; N.S.). 
This is quite the reverse from the finding typically made in studies using
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Eysenck's model, where, as noted above, inverse relationships between 
psychoticism and religion appear to be stronger for males than females. Taylor 
and McDonald also found that openness to experience correlated negatively 
with extrinsic religiosity, but only in female participants, again suggesting an 
important difference between their work and that using Eysenck's model was 
that greater effect sizes were observed for females.
The most original approach to linking religion with the five-factor 
model has been published by Piedmont (1999). Arguing that a sixth factor, 
spirituality, should be added to the original five, Piedmont assessed both self- 
ratings and peer-ratings on this variable on a newly developed Spiritual 
Transcendence Scale (S.T.S.). Piedmont represented this trait as comprised of 
three sub-facets:
(a) Universality, a sense that one's life is being well orchestrated by the 
harmony of the universe;
(b) Prayer fulfilment, the extent to which personal satisfaction with life is drawn 
from regular practice of devotional exercises such as prayer or meditation;
(c) Connectedness, a sense of unity with Nature or the universe, similar to 
mystical experiences as described by Stace (1960).
These three variables correlated significantly with extraversion in both 
self-ratings and peer-ratings, but as extraversion correlated most strongly with 
self-assessed prayer fulfilment at a level indicative of considerable unshared 
variance (r = +0.27), spirituality still appeared to be distinct from extraversion. 
Of the original five factors, the most similar conceptually to spirituality may 
appear to be openness to experience (cf. McCrae, 1999). Indeed, the highest 
correlation reported by Piedmont between any of the five factors and scores on
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the S.T.S. was that between openness to experience and universality for self- 
ratings (r = +.33; N=  342). Openness to experience, in both self-ratings and 
peer-ratings, correlated significantly positively with universality. For self- 
ratings but not peer ratings, openness to experience correlated significantly 
positively with connectedness. Prayer fulfilment, whether assessed by self- 
ratings or peer-ratings, did not correlate significantly with openness to 
experience.
Piedmont found that conscientiousness and agreeableness correlated 
significantly with facets of spirituality as assessed by self-ratings but not peer- 
ratings. Conscientiousness correlated with prayer fulfilment but not universality 
or connectedness. Agreeableness showed the complementary pattern, being 
significantly positively correlated with universality and connectedness but not 
prayer fulfilment. For neither self-ratings nor peer-ratings were any significant 
correlations observed between spirituality facets and neuroticism.
Compared with the vast literature on the Eysenckian P-E-N model and 
religion, published literature on the five-factor model and religion remains 
slight, but has raised questions about potential challenges to received wisdom 
on how the former model relates to religion. Streyffeler and McNally's (1998) 
findings are inconsistent with numerous studies using Eysenck's model that 
have found doctrinal and ritual dimensions of religion are orthogonal with 
extraversion. Data on conscientiousness presented by Streyfeller and McNally 
are inconsistent with the frequently observed negative relationship between 
psychoticism and religiosity. Taylor and McDonald's (1999) observations of 
significant differences between adherents of non-Christian religions and non-
religious respondents on conscientiousness but not agreeableness suggests that
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researchers into personality and religion who plan to study non-Christian 
religion should be wary of attempts to assess psychoticism as a global trait.
The most complete picture of how religion, construed as a multi-
dimensional construct, may relate to the five-factor model emerged from 
Piedmont's (1999) data. These data suggested that prayer fulfilment 
(exemplifying religion's devotional dimension) and a sense of universality or 
connectedness (exemplifying religion's experiential dimension) may relate 
primarily to distinct facets of psychoticism. The former may relate primarily to 
conscientiousness; the latter to agreeableness. Thus, research that construes 
religion and spirituality as multi-dimensional constructs can benefit from 
bifurcation of psychoticism, as is done in the five-factor model.
3.1.3 MBTI Typology and Spirituality and Religion
Canadian Religious Studies scholar Christopher Ross has published 
important theoretical (Ross, 1992a; 1992b) and empirical (Ross, 1993; Ross, 
Weiss & Jackson., 1996) papers linking MBTI typology to different types of 
spirituality and religion. Indeed, it would be only a slight exaggeration to say 
that what Leslie Francis has achieved in furthering knowledge of how Eysenck's 
P-E-N model relates to religion, Christopher Ross has achieved in furthering 
knowledge of how the MBTI relates to religion. In reviewing this literature, it is 
important to recall how, as clarified in the last chapter, three distinct MBTI 
dimensions, namely MBTI intuitive, judging and feeling preferences, may relate 
to distinguishable facets of psychoticism.
Francis (1992a) explicitly defended the view that a negative correlation 
between religion and psychoticism extends to all facets of psychoticism. In
MBTI terms, this implies links between religion and (a) judging (b) feeling and 
(c) sensate types. In fact, when MBTI literature is reviewed carefully, such 
predictions are challenged, as is apparent from findings contrasting religious 
liberals with religious conservatives.
Religious groups have been to found to consist of predominantly MBTI 
judging types, especially judging and feeling, and of the four Keirsey-Bates 
types, the intuitive-feeling type may be the most common type among
participants of spirituality workshops (Ross, Weiss & Jackson, 1996). Among
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liberal religious groups in Northern America, such as Unitarians or the Anglican 
Church of Canada, intuitive types predominate, whereas among samples of 
fundamentalists and Roman Catholics, sensate types predominate (Ross, 1993). 
If this bias towards MBTI judging characterises religious liberals, it would be an 
over-simplification to claim that literature on psychoticism. when translated into 
MBTI terms, can be summarised by generalised statements that religious 
individuals will tend to be sensate, judging and feeling types. The literature on 
the MBTI suggests that conservative religious individuals will be high in both 
judging and sensate preference, whereas liberal religious individuals will be 
high in judging and intuitive preference. This is consistent with Streyffeler and 
McNally's (1998) findings on FFM openness to experience in fundamentalist 
and liberal Protestant groups. Since Francis and Jones (2000) found the MBTI 
judging and intuitive preferences to be linked respectively with lower and 
higher psychoticism, such findings also imply that religious liberals are high in 
some but low in other facets of psychoticism.
In more theoretical papers, Ross has associated the MBTI feeling 
preference with a form of piety that many today would regard as spirituality
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rather than religion, emphasising harmony in relationships with other people, 
personal devotion and a tendency to view sin as neglect of human concerns 
(Ross, 1992a). Ross has also associated the MBTI intuitive preference with a 
tendency to see God as mystery, rather than as a demonstrable, concrete fact, 
and with a tendency to seek symbolic rather than literal interpretations of sacred 
texts (Ross, 1992b). The tendency for religious individuals to be predominantly 
MBTI judging types has been found to be even greater in samples of rabbis and 
the clergy than in samples of religious laity, as Ross et al. (1996) have noted. 
Although much literature on Eysenck's P-E-N model and religion has generally 
reported only collateral relationships between religiosity and personality, these 
studies of the clergy have led to considerations of directions of causality in 
some MBTI studies. MBTI judging preference could be seen as the effect of 
increased religious instruction; but could also be viewed as the cause of 
increased religiosity (judging types may be attracted to religious institutions 
because of the routine and order that such institutions offer).
Several studies cited in Ross (1993) suggested that judging types 
predominate in samples of candidates for the ministry even prior to their 
commencement of theological training. They are therefore evidence that MBTI 
judging preference should be viewed as a cause, rather than an effect, of 
association with religious institutions. This is consistent with Francis' (1992a) 
theoretical stance, which, by associating low psychoticism and religion through 
linking the former with greater conditionability, implies that greater 
religiousness is the effect, not the cause, of low psychoticism.
Studies using the MBTI have furthered knowledge of the relationships 
between personality and religion, but limitations of this literature should be
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acknowledged. A small body of literature has been published on MBTI type 
distribution among Hare Krishna devotees (Poling & Kenney, 1986) and rabbis 
(cited in Ross, 1993), but most of this literature has focussed on Christian 
samples. Questions therefore remain as to whether a similar bias towards 
judging types is to be found in non-Christian religions. This bias may be 
accented in a religion such as Judaism, with its strong emphasis on orthopraxy 
and ritual over creedal affirmation (cf. Armstrong. 1993), but attenuated or even 
reversed in a religion such as Taoism, with its emphasis on "letting things 
happen". Research into religion and the MBTI may also be criticised for 
frequent failure to ignore base-rate distribution of type. As a bias towards 
judging types has been found for general populations (Cummings, 1995), 
findings of a bias towards judging types in specifically religious samples should 
not be seen as surprising.
Prolific as the literature on the MBTI typology and religion is, it may 
be some time before its impact on academic psychology is quite as strong as the 
literature on Eysenck's P-E-N model and religion, as much of the former 
literature has been in works of Christian apologetics and New Age spirituality 
rather than research journals. This observation is supported by observing how, 
of the eight references cited by Ross et al. (1996) on religion and the MBTI, 
seven were from books and one from the highly specialist journal Practice of 
the Ministry in Canada.
These limitations acknowledged, a considered awareness of research 
into MBTI type and religion is of value in this thesis for two central reasons. 
Firstly, such studies indicate the need to compare individuals who affiliate with 
different forms of spiritual group, rather than, as with much research using
126
Eysenck's model, compare individuals of high and low religiousness as if 
religion were purely unidimensional. Secondly, MBTI studies provide evidence 
that future research should consider different facets of psychoticism and how 
they relate in different ways to different forms of spirituality and religion. Such 
literature has found an association between religious liberalism and MBTI 
intuitive preference - an MBTI preference linked with elevated, not reduced, 
psychoticism (Francis & Jones, 2000). If evidence can be obtained to suggest 
that mystical and transpersonal experiences are more typical among religious 
liberals than religious conservatives, therefore, the case is strengthened for an 
emphasis on distinguishing between different elements of psychoticism in 
research into personality correlates of transpersonal experience, as these may be 
individuals who are high in certain facets of psychoticism (those linked with 
MBTI intuitive preference) but low in other facets of psychoticism (those linked 
with MBTI judging preference).
3.1.4 CattelTs 16 Personality Factor (16 P.F.) Model and Religion
The influence of psychoanalysis on Cattell and the important 
influence that Freudian psychology has had on the psychology of religion make 
it somewhat surprising that relatively few studies have employed Cattell's model 
to assess personality-religiosity correlates. Research for the current review 
discovered only seven published papers (other than those looking specifically at 
personality in the clergy, such as Musson, 1998) that looked at how religiosity 
relates to traits in Cattell's model (Barton, Mogdil & Catell, 1973; Koenig, 
Siegler, Meador & George, 1990; MClain, 1978; Meredith, 1968; Rasmussen & 
Charman, 1995; Wiebe & Fleck, 1980; Watson et al., 1986). Of these, Barton et
al (1973) used the High School Personality Inventory, rather than the Cattell 16 
P.F. itself; Rasmussen & Charman (1995) assessed only two traits in the model; 
and McClain (1978) based final analyses on factors derived from assessments of 
Cattell's traits combined with measurements of variables assessed on Gough's 
California Psychological Inventory and the Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule, rather than on raw measurements of the 16 traits in Cattell's model. 
Thus, only four of these studies (Koenig et al. 1990; Meredith, 1968; Watson et 
al., 1986; Wiebe and Fleck 1980) assessed all 16 traits in the Cattell's model in 
conjunction with religiosity assessments.
A study of high school age students' scores on the High School 
Personality Inventory found that none of the traits assessed on this inventory 
predicted attitudes to religion (Barton et al., 1973). Although the negative 
findings of this study may partially account for relative lack of enthusiasm for 
use of Cattell's model in subsequent research into personality-religiosity 
correlates, it should be recalled, as noted in Chapter Two, that the High School 
Personality Inventory does not assess an identical list of traits to those assessed 
on the Cattell 16 P.F.. Meredith (1968), Wiebe and Fleck (1980) and Watson et 
al. (1986) all obtained more significant findings using this model. The focal 
question to be addressed here is whether such research has found religiosity to 
be associated with all traits on the Cattell 16 P.F. which indicate low 
psychoticism, or has found religiosity to be associated with only some of these 
traits.
Meredith (1968) found that of the Cattell 16 P.F. traits, scores on the 
Thurstone and Chave Attitudes towards the Church Scale (Thurstone & Chave, 
1929; cited in Meredith, 1968) and the Ferguson Religionism Scale (Ferguson,
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1944; cited in Meredith. 1968) were most predicted by Factors G 
(conscientiousness) and Qi (Conservatism). A more widely cited study, in 
which intrinsically religious Catholics, extrinsically religious Catholics, 
intrinsically religious Protestants, extrinsically religious Protestants and non-
religious students drawn from a population of Canadian undergraduates 
completed the Cattell 16 P.F., found intrinsic religiousness to be associated with 
increased tender-mindedness, reduced liberalism and increased 
conscientiousness (Wiebe & Fleck, 1980). Similar findings on which of Cattell's 
traits are linked with intrinsic religiosity were obtained by Watson et al. (1986); 
these authors found extrinsic religiosity to be associated with Cattellian traits 
indicative of elevated sociability, reduced ego strength, and increased 
conventionality. Quest religious orientation was not found by Watson et al. 
(1986) to be linked with any of the Cattell 16 P.F. traits. Rasmussen and 
Charman (1995) only assessed Factors C (ego strength) and G (rule- 
consciousness) from the Cattell model, and found increased intrinsic 
religiousness to be associated with elevated scores on G.
Taken together, the above studies do not appear to challenge 
assumptions that psychoticism can continue to be assessed as a broad, 
homogeneous trait in personality-religiosity research. Distinguishable facets of 
low psychoticism are represented on the Cattell 16 P.F. by conscientiousness, 
tender-mindedness and conservatism, all of which were found to be related to 
religiosity in the above studies. However, it should be emphasised that use of 
student samples in these studies leaves open the question of whether research 
with the Cattell 16 P.F. implies univocality of psychoticism among older
respondents.
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Koenig et al. (1990) assessed patterns of religious coping among adult 
respondents in the Duke Longitudinal Study of Aging, of mean average age
66.8, who had responded to questions on how they coped with stress at three 
difficult stages of their lives. Consistent religious coping was found to be linked
with lower scores on Factor E and higher scores on Factor I, that is, with lower 
dominance and increased tender-mindedness. No significant differences were
found between religious and non-religious copers, or between religious and
occasional religious copers, on the remaining fourteen traits. This suggests that
among older respondents, only one particular facet of reduced psychoticism
(tender-mindedness) is linked with religiousness, although in this study, this
may have been a confound of gender, with women being both more tender-
minded and more likely to use religious coping.
McClain (1978) compared intrinsically religious and non-religious 
students on eight factors derived from assessments of the Cattell 16 P.F. traits
and those measured on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and the
California Psychological Inventory. Only the first five of these eight factors will 
be considered here, as Cattellian traits did not load strongly on the remaining
three factors, none of which accounted for more than 3.5% of variance in
McClain's data. These five factors could be understood as capacity for 
independent and critical thinking; self-control; assertiveness; nurturance; and 
ego strength, the latter corresponding (inversely) to Cattell's global factor of 
anxiety. Of these factors, differences between religious and non-religious 
students were observed for only two - the second factor, representing self- 
control, and the fifth factor, representing ego strength, suggesting that religious 
students are higher in conscientiousness and lower in anxiety than are non-
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religious students. No interaction was found between gender and religion on any 
of these five factors. McClain's data on self-control are consistent with other 
research suggesting associations between Factor G of the Cattell 16 P.F. and 
religiosity, and also with evidence for inverse relationships between intrinsic 
religiosity and psychoticism and with that suggesting associations between 
religiosity and MBTI judging preference.
The studies of Koenig et al. (1990) and McClain (1978) suggest, 
respectively, that only facets of psychoticism related to tender-mindedness may 
relate to religion in older respondents, and that only facets of psychoticism 
associated with superego strength, conscientiousness and impulse control may 
relate to religion in a student-aged population. Such findings therefore challenge 
attempts to assess psychoticism as a broad trait in assessments of personality 
and religion.
3.1.5 Studies of Personality and the Experiential Dimensions of Religion
Fewer studies have assessed personality correlates with the experiential 
dimensions of religion (Caird, 1987; Francis & Kay, 1995; Francis & Louden. 
2000a, 2000b; Francis & Thomas, 1996, 1997; Flood, 1975; Hood, Hall, Watson 
& Biderman. 1979; Louden & Francis, 2001) than have assessed personality 
correlates of other religiosity dimensions. This may be attributed to both 
methodological and theoretical reasons. Doctrinal and ritual elements of religion 
can be assessed by the relatively straightforward means of frequency counts of, 
for example, prayer or church attendance or by well-established questionnaires 
such as the R.O.S. of Allport and Ross (1967). Assessments of the experiential 
dimension of religion have had to wait upon a more recent development, the
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design of self-report questionnaires to assess transpersonal experiences. From a 
theoretical standpoint, the relevance of Katzian social constructivism to similar
statements on how mainstream religion is associated with conditionability into 
tender-minded attitudes may have been underestimated by many psychologists 
of religion.
Research into the personality correlates of religious experience has, as 
with studies of general religiosity, generally been based on Eysenck's P-E-N 
model, ever since Caird's (1987) study. Caird found that psychoticism, 
extraversion and neuroticism were all orthogonal with scores on Hood’s M-
Scale in a student sample. Findings that all three traits in this model are
unrelated to transpersonal experience have not, however, been replicated in 
subsequent studies using clergy-based samples. Studies of charismatic
experience among Catholic and Anglican clergy have reported that such
experiences are orthogonal with P., but correlate positively with E and - at least
among Catholic clergy - negatively with N (Francis & Thomas, 1997; Louden
& Francis, 2001). Mystical experience as assessed on the Francis-Louden
Mystical Orientation Scale has, among Anglican clergy, been found to be 
orthogonal with neuroticism and psychoticism, but positively correlated with
extraversion (Francis & Thomas, 1996).
Relationships between M-Scale scores and personality were assessed 
by Hood (1975) and Hood et al. (1979). Hood (1975) found mystical experience 
to be correlated positively with openness to experience, a term used by Hood to 
refer to a trait other than openness to experience as assessed on the NEO-PI, but 
to a psychoanalytic concept referring to capability to access preconscious and 
unconscious materials, linked with “belief in the supernatural, ecstatic emotions,
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and alterations of consciousness’' (Hood, 1975, p36). Hood et al. (1979) 
examined correlations between the fifteen traits assessed on the Jackson 
Personality Inventory (J.P.I.) and M-Scale scores.. Significant positive 
correlations were observed for complexity for both males and females, social 
adroitness in males and innovation and breadth of interest in females. Factor 
analytic studies of the M-Scale have reasonably consistently found that it is 
actually assessing two different factors, one assessing mystical experience per 
se, and one assessing religious interpretations of such experiences. The former 
was found to correlate significantly negatively with value orthodoxy in females, 
the latter significantly positively with value orthodoxy in males, by Hood et al.
(1979).
Traits assessed on the JPI can be said to represent different facets of 
psychoticism, for example responsibility and value orthodoxy could 
respectively be described as the low poles of conscientiousness and 
conventional social attitudes. As Hood et al.( 1979) did not find variables on the 
Jackson Personality Inventory relevant to the former to correlate with M-Scale 
score, their data suggested that those elements of psychoticism that are most 
relevant to mystical experience relate to increased liberalism and to 
unconventional social attitudes. Their findings on value orthodoxy, for example, 
suggested that at least among female respondents, mysticism is associated with 
liberalism rather than conservatism.
Using the MBTI, and looking at a population consisting of various 
church-goers, mainly Anglican but also with some Roman Catholic and 
Protestant representatives, Francis and Louden (2000b) found feeling and 
intuition, but not extraversion, to be linked with mystical experience. The
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inconsistencies with Francis and Thomas' (1996) findings on extraversion could
relate to sampling issues (potential differences between a more generic religious 
sample and the clergy), to methodological differences (the MBTI versus the
E.P.Q.) or a combination of both.
Notable from these findings is that, unlike the case with doctrinal and 
ritual dimensions of religiosity, the experiential dimension of religiosity (at least
when equated with mystical experience) appears to be orthogonal with
psychoticism. Reasons for this inconsistency between findings on religious
experience and findings on other dimensions of religion need to be addressed
more explicitly in future research.
A potential explanation that is apparently favoured by Louden and
Francis (2001) for this inconsistency is that an experience such as charismatic
experience is unrelated to conditionability, even if other dimensions of religion 
do appear to be relevant to conditionability into tender-minded attitudes. If this 
explanation is defensible, challenges are presented for social constructivism. 
However, considerations of both the heterogeneity of psychoticism and
sampling issues should be addressed before rigid conclusions are drawn from
such findings.
Studies suggesting orthogonality of transpersonal experience and
psychoticism have typically treated psychoticism as a broad dimension.
However, the findings of Hood et al. (1979) suggest that only particular aspects 
of psychoticism (those related to unconventional social attitudes) relate to 
mystical experience. Issues relating to the heterogeneity of psychoticism need to 
be addressed more explicitly in future research into transpersonal experience
and personality.
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A more theoretical issue concerns implications such data have for the 
debate on whether mystical experiences arise through social learning. If a social
constructivist account of mystical experience is defensible, predictions can be
made that it is only those facets of psychoticism germane to conditionability
that will correlate significantly negatively with mystical experience, at least in
samples where such experiences are valued.
Studies in this area have generally used Christian-based samples
(often clergy). If the taxonomy of religions presented in Chapter Two is
defensible, this apparent orthogonality between mystical experience and
psychoticism could stem from mystical experience being less highly valued by 
Christians than, for example, Buddhists. Thus, apparent challenges to social
constructionism implied by data such as that of Francis and Thomas (1996)
could be answered by declarations that psychoticism, through its link with
reduced conditionability, will only correlate negatively with mystical experience
in groups where such experiences are highly valued and perceived as prescribed 
norms. If Christian samples are outside this category, the social constructivist 
would have no difficulties with findings that psychoticism and mystical
experience in such samples appear to be orthogonal. These issues of the 
heterogeneity of psychoticism and of sampling issues both merit more attention
in future research than they have received previously.
3.1.6 Summary and Implications of Section 3.1
A consistent finding from studies using the Eysenckian P-E-N model
in conjunction with assessment of religiosity has been that psychoticism is 
significantly negatively correlated with religion, whereas introversion-
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extraversion and neuroticism are unrelated to degrees of religiosity. However, 
several qualifications are needed to this statement. This inverse relationship 
appears largely confined to intrinsic religious orientation, does not appear to 
apply to extrinsic or quest orientations and does not, apparently, extend to the 
experiential dimension of religion. Francis' (1992a) question, "Is psychoticism 
really a dimension of personality fundamental to religiosity?" may be answered, 
following a summary of the implications of Section 3.1, as "Yes, especially if 
religiosity is equated with a conservative form of Christianity, comparable to 
intrinsic religious orientation as assessed on the R.O.S.". It may also be added 
that it is when such a form of religiosity is most likely to be the prescriptive 
norm of one's membership group that a negative correlation between 
psychoticism and religiosity is most likely. (The fact that similar negative 
relationships between psychoticism and religiosity have been observed in non- 
Christian samples is answered by responding that the form of religiosity being 
assessed in studies of these samples represents prescriptive norms for them). 
Thus, failure of certain studies to find significant relationships between 
psychoticism and religion's experiential dimension could be due to such studies 
using samples representing conservative religious groups, for whom religious 
experiences such as mystical experiences may not be prescriptive norms.
In addressing the question "Is psychoticism really a dimension of 
personality fundamental to religiosity?", Francis (1992a) acknowledged how 
critics of the concept of psychoticism have stressed this trait’s heterogeneity.
His response was to use two distinct measures of psychoticism, the E.P.Q.-R. 
and the J.E.P.Q.-R (Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised). An 
alternative response would be to assess religious individuals on distinguishable
facets of psychoticism, as Francis and his colleagues have done in their 
assessments of potential correlations between sensation-seeking, impulsivity 
and religiosity (Pearson, Francis & Lightbrown, 1986). A more radical approach 
is called for here, however, in which respondents are not only assessed on 
psychoticism, but on models, such as the MBTI, the Cattell 16 P.F. or the FFM, 
in which psychoticism is represented by distinguishable traits.
If all facets of psychoticism relate equally inversely to religion, MBTI 
research should indicate that religious individuals are predominantly sensate, 
feeling and judging types. The literature suggests a qualification to this, in that 
members of more liberal religious groups tend to be predominantly intuitive, 
feeling and judging. While research findings from studies using the Cattell 16 
P.F. have been more consistent with that using Eysenck's P-E-N model, it is the 
emerging literature on the FFM in connection with religion which has offered 
the firmest ground for challenging undifferentiated measures of psychoticism in 
research into personality-religiosity correlates. Data drawn from studies using 
this model are mixed, but do suggest that the patterns of differences between 
different religious groups, or between religious groups and the general 
population, on the three FFM traits which are germane to psychoticism, namely 
conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience, depend, in part, 
on which of these three traits is being assessed.
The FFM challenges the continued use of broad assessments of 
psychoticism in personality-religiosity research on theoretical as well as 
empirical grounds. Theoretical bases for a hypothesised negative correlation 
between psychoticism and religion stem from the former variable’s link to 
heightened conditionability and reduced propensity for learning of norms. If, as
argued in Chapter Two, the FFM trait that is most relevant to level of 
conditionability is conscientiousness, and inverse relationships between 
psychoticism and religion really do come about through the former’s links with 
conditionability, the inverse correlation regularly reported between 
psychoticism and religiosity should be reduced (possibly to non-significance) 
after partialling out for NEO conscientiousness.
A major omission from the literature reviewed in Section 3.1 has been 
that no published study of religiosity-personality correlates has, as yet, assessed 
respondents on both the EPQ and the NEO-PI. The study reported in Chapter 
Six will make an original contribution by its examination of a dimension of 
religiosity (the experiential) and how this dimension relates to both 
psychoticism and to FFM traits.
Studies of religious experience have found this particular 
dimension of religion to be orthogonal with psychoticism. However, in addition 
to the heterogeneity of psychoticism. sampling issues, specifically the strong 
Christian bias of the samples studied, complicate this literature. Understood 
correctly, a meta-theoretical perspective such as social constructivism does lead 
to predictions of inverse relationships between psychoticism and mystical 
experience, and to predictions of significant positive correlations between traits 
linked with increased conditionability and mystical experience, but only in those 
religions taking positive attitudes to mystical experience. If the taxonomy of 
religions presented in Chapter Two, this thesis, is valid, Christianity may be 
outside this category. Empirical data reported in subsequent chapters in this 
thesis will reflect considerations of sampling issues as well as of the 
heterogeneity of psychoticism.
3.2 Studies of Religious Orientation and Transpersonal Experience
Intrinsic religious orientation correlates negatively with psychoticism, 
but extrinsic and quest orientations do not, and are possibly even positively 
correlated with psychoticism (Section 3.1). Early studies of questionnaire-based 
measures of transpersonal experience, which typically examined whether scores 
on such scales correlated with intrinsic and extrinsic orientations, are therefore 
of interest to researchers interested in the personality correlates of such 
experiences. These studies used scales such as the Religious Experience 
Episode Measure, or R.E.E.M. (Hood. 1970) or M-Scale (Hood, 1975). The 
rationale typically given for measurements of intrinsic and extrinsic religious 
orientation in such studies was that this was a means to assess these scales’ 
criterion-related validity. Such assessments can now, however, be 
conceptualised as more than mere scale validation. Knowledge that has 
accumulated in the literature on personality-religiosity correlates implies that 
observations of religious orientations in participants obtaining high and low 
scores on such scales may offer preliminary grounds for predictions about 
where such participants are likely to score on psychoticism and related traits. 
Positive correlations between intrinsic religious orientation and transpersonal 
experience, for example, provide a ground for predicting low psychoticism 
scores in those who report such experiences.
3.2.1 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientations and Transpersonal Experience
The terms intrinsic, extrinsic and quest religious orientation were 
outlined and defined in Section 3.1. A consistent finding from Hood’s 
programmatic research in the 1970s was that intrinsic but not extrinsic
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religiousness was associated with assessed transpersonal experiences, whether 
such experiences were assessed by the R.E.E.M. (Hood, 1970), interviews 
(Hood, 1973) or the M-Scale (Hood, 1975). Treating intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiousness as orthogonal, permitting sub-division of his sample into four 
categories of participants (high on both orientations, high on intrinsic only, high 
on extrinsic only, low on both orientations), Hood found intrinsics to have 
higher R.E.E.M. scores than those high in extrinsic orientation only or low in 
both orientations, but not to have significantly higher R.E.E.M. scores than 
participants scoring high on both orientations (Hood. 1970).
Regarded in their time as psychometric validations of the R.E.E.M. and 
M-Scale, these findings raise several important questions that have been left 
unanswered in subsequent research literature. One is direction of causality. 
Hood's findings do not, in themselves, inform us as to whether intrinsic 
orientation increases likelihood that one will have or report a transpersonal 
experience, or whether initial transpersonal experience is a causal factor leading 
to increased intrinsic religiousness. A third possibility is that intrinsic 
orientation and transpersonal experience both arise from a third variable (or 
class of variables), as is implied by social constructivist accounts of 
transpersonal experiences. A combination of low psychoticism and social 
conditioning could lead to development of both greater intrinsic religious 
orientation and increased likelihood of transpersonal experiences among 
participants who have been raised in groups where both intrinsic religiousness 
and transpersonal experience are appropriate social norms.
As Paloutzian (1996) noted, certain items on the R.O.S. explicitly
140
refer to experience, suggesting that findings of a positive relationship between 
intrinsic orientation and transpersonal experience can now be seen as rather 
truistic. However, to review subsequent developments in work on religious 
orientation reveals some major omissions from the published research literature 
on how this variable relates to transpersonal experience.
3.2.2 Under-researched Areas in Connection with Religious Orientation
One example is that researchers into transpersonal experiences have 
not clearly addressed how extrinsic religious orientation may be more 
heterogeneous than intrinsic religious orientation, as the debate between 
Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990, 1991) and Masters (1991) attested. Kirkpatrick 
and Hood (1990, 1991) argued that items on the R.O.S. extrinsic sub-scale can 
be assigned to one of three categories:
1. Those assessing religion used a means to social ends, such as church 
attendance to make friends (Esocial items);
2. Those assessing religion used as a means to bring personal ends, 
such as prayer for emotional comfort (Epersonal items);
3. Those that genuinely correlate negatively with intrinsic religiousness 
(Eresidual items).
Overly simple attempts to separate religion-as-means from religion-as- 
ends are challenged by such thinking, and also by Pargament’s (1992) claim that 
all spiritual paths use religion as a means to an end, but different forms of 
religious orientation are associated with different ends. Such thinking allows for 
the possibility that some forms of means-orientated religion may actually be
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conducive to the onset of transpersonal experiences. The individual who goes to 
church to sell life insurance policies to other members of the congregation, and 
the individual who engages in regular prayer for spiritual guidance, could both 
be said to be using religion as a means to an end, but to very different types of 
ends. The first exemplifies Esocial; the second, Epersonal. The former seems 
less immediately relevant to transpersonal experience than the latter. This 
highlights how greater attention to revision of earlier thinking on religious 
orientation is vital if this variable is to continue to interest researchers into 
mystical and other transpersonal experiences. Epersonal has been found to 
correlate positively with intrinsic orientation (Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990); 
empirical data are as yet lacking on whether it also correlates with transpersonal 
experience.
One of the most conspicuous omissions from the literature on 
transpersonal experience and religious orientation is an absence of any 
published data on relationships between quest and such experience until the 
publication of Maltby’s (1999b) study. This can be attributed to both the 
ambiguity of the concept of quest orientation (Paloutzian, 1996), and apparent 
absence of theoretical postulates for linking quest with transpersonal 
experience. Several possible ways of interpreting quest were noted by 
Paloutzian (1996); the most relevant to concerns in the current thesis is that 
quest is a form of being religious that applies to religious liberals (effectively 
implying that liberal Christian groups should score higher on quest than more 
conservative groups). Apparent absence of guiding theory for supposing any 
link between quest and transpersonal experience is stated explicitly by Batson et 
al. (1993). Batson has subsequently stated, however, that his caution in linking
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quest with experience stemmed from lack of empirical data and has expressed 
personal convictions that the two concepts are likely to be positively linked 
(personal communication dated July 2001).
It is argued here that good theoretical reasons exist for supposing that 
quest religious orientation, especially if viewed as religious liberalism, will 
correlate positively with transpersonal experience. One possible interpretation 
of quest not considered by Paloutzian (1996) is that this form of religious 
orientation can be understood as the MBTI intuitive preference when applied
9
specifically to the religious domain. Consider the following statements by Ross 
(1992a):
"Intuitives are less disturbed by religious doubts" (Ross, 1992a, p92).
"Personal religious change, sometimes of an abrupt kind, is often 
welcomed and accepted (by intuitive types) as essential for religious vitality" 
(Ross, 1992a, p93).
These statements obviously parallel two of the three facets Batson has 
used to describe quest orientation. This interpretation is in no way incompatible 
with Paloutzian's interpretation of quest as religious liberalism, especially in 
view of findings relating religious liberalism to MBTI intuitive preference. 
Exciting grounds for the possibility of articulation of hypotheses linking quest 
and transpersonal experience arise here. Such experiences may be understood as 
surfacing of previously unconscious archetypal material, as is supported by 
Thalboume and Delin's (1999) findings on transliminality and mystical 
experience. If it seems rather truistic to predict that intuitive rather than sensate 
types access such material more readily, predictions can be made that both quest
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orientation and religious liberalism should correlate positively with 
transpersonal experience.
Other theoretical grounds exist for linking quest to transpersonal 
experience. Models of the stages preceding mystical experience frequently 
include reference to a period of questioning and doubt, as is implicit in the 
Christian concept of The Dark Night of the Soul. The four-stage model of 
religious experience presented by Batson et al. (1993), based upon Wallas’ 
(1926) model of creativity and subsequently reformulated by Edwards and 
Lowis (2001), outlines stages prior to onset of religious experience per se that 
may be equated with the open-ended questioning and dialogue characteristic of 
individuals high in quest.
Maltby’s (1999b) study, based on a slightly different theoretical 
perspective (that quest and range of spiritual experiences both relate to spiritual 
maturity, with implications being that positive correlations between quest and 
range of religious experiences would offer evidence for validity of the quest 
construct) offered the first published data in support of such a positive 
correlation. In a sample of Church of England Christians, Maltby found that 
intrinsic, extrinsic and quest orientations all correlated significantly positively 
with range of religious experience - the highest correlation being for quest (r =
0.44; N=  103). This correlation was significantly higher than that for extrinsic 
orientation and transpersonal experience (but not significantly higher than the 
correlation of 0.35 found by Maltby for intrinsic orientation and religious 
experience). Quest and religious experience therefore appear to share
considerable variance.
Early research into religious experience suggested that self-reported 
religious experience correlated positively with intrinsic but not extrinsic 
religious orientation, although data have yet to clarify whether transpersonal 
experience is orthogonal w'ith all forms of extrinsic orientation. The most 
notable omission from published literature on religious orientation and 
transpersonal experience, however, is a notable lack of both empirical data and 
skilful theoretical debate on quest religious orientation's relationship to such 
experiences. Maltby's (1999b) findings give some preliminary grounds for 
supposing that quest is relevant to religious experience; greater theoretical 
discussion of why quest and transpersonal experience may be linked is clearly 
needed. Throughout this chapter, quest orientation has been linked to several 
variables - psychoticism, MBTI intuitive preference, religious liberalism - that 
suggest that if quest does help us to understand variance in transpersonal 
experience, implications are raised for the likely personality correlates of reports 
of such experiences.
3.3 Transpersonal Experience and Mental Health
The dimensional model of mental illness, representing mental illnesses 
as existing on a continuum with normality (Claridge, 2001), renders it important 
for researchers interested in the personality correlates of transpersonal 
experiences in nonclinical samples to possess at least a rudimentary knowledge 
of the literature on mental health in relation to such experiences. Similarities 
have been noted between psychosis and mystical experience (Clarke, 2001),
suggesting the possibility of a positive correlation between psychoticism (or 
some of its lacets) and scores on scales to assess mystical experience. The 
dimensional model of mental illness implies that if such phenomena can be 
interpreted as mild signs of premorbid illness states, psychoticism is likely to be 
heightened in people who report transpersonal experiences. This area has led to 
a wider body of literature than that on nonclinical traits and transpersonal 
experience. Reviews of this literature should be careful to consider the 
possibility, proposed by some researchers, that those who report transpersonal 
experiences may be of higher than average mental health status.
Studies of the mental health status of recipients on transpersonal 
experiences have assessed a wide range of experiences, including peak 
experiences (Mathes, Jevons, Joerger & Roter, 1982), glossolalia (Smith & 
Fleck, 1981), diabolical experiences (Spanos & Morettii, 1988) and mystical 
unitive experiences (Hood, 1975). It is therefore unsurprising that different 
conclusions have been reached regarding whether such experiences are 
associated with elevated or reduced mental health status. Spatial constraints 
prevent a full review of this wide field here, and the review that follows will be 
limited to three areas:
1. Early psychometric studies (especially those influenced by 
humanistic theory) of mental health status and transpersonal 
experience in nonclinical, typically student, populations;
2. Glossolalia, a form of transpersonal experience which has, in the 
past, been seen as symptomatic of psychosis;
3. Hearing voices.
Defenders of the view that transpersonal experiences are associated 
with higher than average mental health status include Levin (1993), who cited 
Greeley (1975; cited in Levin, 1993) as having declared that no other 
psychological variable correlated as strongly with psychological well-being as 
mystical experience; and Hay (Hay, 1990; Hay & Morisy, 1978; Hay & Nye, 
1998). Theoretical rationale for linking at least some forms of transpersonal 
experience to increased mental health status was offered by Maslow (1954;
1968). His hierarchy-of-needs model of'motivation implied that peak
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experiences should be more common in individuals who have reached the apex 
of this hierarchy, that of self-actualisation. Complications to this theoretical 
position include:
(1) : Maslow's position only implies that those intensely blissful experiences that 
he termed "peak experiences" should be correlated with increased mental health 
status, not that all transpersonal experiences should be so correlated;
(2) : Maslow did not hold that all self-actualisers had "peak experiences", 
suggesting that high mental health status may be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the onset of transpersonal experience;
(3) : Maslow claimed that peak experiences may actually be common, but not 
always recognised as such.
The third point highlights a need to study cognitive frameworks 
attached to transpersonal experiences, as well as raw measures of experiences 
per se. The development of the "Attitudes to Mysticism" scale in Chapter Five 
exemplifies a tool designed to measure such a framework.
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Complications in Literature on Mental Health and Transpersonal 
Experience
One complication in this literature is that mystical experience has been 
related to various disorders, perhaps most commonly schizophrenia and 
epilepsy, but occasionally Graves' disease (Hellpach, 1907; cited in Wulff,
1997) and manic-depressive psychosis (Zaehner, 1957). Associations between 
pathology and transpersonal experiences have had a long history, as many of the 
world's great mystics, including Eckhart and Hildegard of Bingen, were viewed 
as insane even among their contemporaries (Stifler, Greer, Sneck & 
Dovenmuehle, 1993). Questions have been asked as to whether Biblical figures 
such as Ezekiel or St. Paul were epileptic. Attributions of epilepsy were made to 
the medieval Englishwoman Margery Kempe (1373-1430) within her own 
lifetime (Freeman, Bogard & Skolomskas, 1990). Freeman et al. have criticised
the more recent scholarship which has depicted Kempe as a sufferer of 
postpartum psychosis, and argued that if pathology were to be attributed to 
Kempe, manic-depressive psychosis would be a more appropriate diagnosis.
Definitive evidence that figures such as Kempe or Eckhart really were 
suffering from schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis or other psychosis 
would provide obvious theoretical rationale for predicting mystical experience 
to be positively correlated with psychoticism, but evidence that such diagnoses 
were appropriate for such figures remains highly speculative. Similar comments 
must be made in response to claims that key religious visionaries were 
epileptics. Against the view that religious experiences are signs of epilepsy, it
has been noted that frequency counts of reports of religious experiences in the
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general population exceed those for epilepsy (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997). 
More detailed arguments against associating transpersonal experiences with 
epilepsy in general and with left temporal lobe epilepsy in particular have been 
reported by Tucker, Novelly and Walker (1987).
A second complication to this literature is that, as with the term
transpersonal experience, the term mental health itself invites diverse
interpretations. Absence of psychiatric symptoms, freedom from worry and 
guilt, appropriate social behaviour, personal competence and control, open- 
mindedness, personality unification and self-actualisation each represent seven 
distinct ways of defining "mental health” (Batson et al., 1993). Of these, 
absence of psychiatric symptoms and appropriate social behaviour relate
directly to psychoticism and to five-factor conscientiousness. Lower levels of
psychoticism may be expected in individuals for whom records of psychiatric 
symptoms are absent than for schizophrenics, and compliance with appropriate 
social behaviour may be expected to relate positively to five-factor model
conscientiousness, negatively with psychoticism. If creativity, MBTI intuitive 
function or five-factor openness can be taken to be facets of psychoticism, 
specific facets of this trait may correlate positively with one of the definitions of 
mental health listed by Batson et ah, that of open-mindedness.
3.3.1 Early Psychometric Assessments of Mental Health Status of
Respondents Reporting Transpersonal Experiences
Considerable literature exists on the mental health status of people who 
do versus those who do not report transpersonal experiences among non-clinical 
populations (Hood, 1974; Larsen, 1979; Mathes et ah, 1982; Spanos & Moretti,
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1988). Hood (1974) found that higher R.E.E.M. scores were associated with 
reduced ego strength as assessed by the Barron Ego Strength Scale; however, as 
Hood himself noted, certain items on the Barron Ego Strength Scale contain an 
anti-religious bias (this negative correlation was reduced to non-significance 
after Hood re-analysed his data following elimination of such items). Hood also 
found higher R.E.E.M. scores to be associated with greater psychological 
strength as assessed by Stark's Index of Psychological Inadequacy, but the 
brevity of the latter scale, coupled with Hood's rather arbitrary sub-division of 
high and low psychological strength participants according to raw scores rather 
than use of a median split, render this latter finding questionable. These early 
studies, despite their psychometric problems, at least demonstrated how 
psychometric tools may have considerable use in attempting to assess levels of 
mental health among recipients of transpersonal experiences in nonclinical 
populations.
Larsen (1979), basing arguments on both Maslovian theory and dock  
and Stark's (1965) taxonomy of religious experiences as confirming, responsive, 
ecstatic and revelational, collected psychometric data to test the hypotheses that 
(a) among religious individuals, frequency of religious experiences would be 
positively correlated with self-actualisation; (b) range of religious experiences 
would correlate positively with self-actualisation and (c) the progressive pattern 
of religious experiences implied by the d o ck  and Stark taxonomy would be 
more evident among high self-actualisers. Using measures of inner-directedness 
and time-competence on Shostrom's Personal Orientation Inventory as 
operational measures of self-actualisation, Larsen found that inner-directedness 
correlated significantly negatively with frequency of religious experiences, and
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that time-competence correlated significantly positively with range (but not 
frequency) of religious experience. The former finding appears to suggest that 
religious experience is associated with reduced mental health status, but is 
questionable insofar as the scale on Shostrom's Personal Orientation Inventory 
that assesses inner-directedness includes items such as "I don't feel guilty when 
I am selfish" (Ryckman. 1997), suggesting that rejection of the altruistic values 
deemed central in many religions could elevate scores on this sub-scale.
Mathes et al. (1982) designed a new scale, the Peak Experiences Scale 
(P.E.S.) to research peak experiences, and examined relationships between 
scores on the P.E.S. and on Shostrom's Personal Orientation Inventory (unlike 
Larsen, they used all sub-scales from the latter scale). P.E.S. scores correlated 
significantly positively with inner-directedness, self-actualising value and self-
acceptance in women and with self-regard and constructive nature of man in 
men.
While similarities have been noted between psychosis and 
transpersonal experience by authors such as Clarke (2001), such studies have 
examined a different possibility, namely that a variable indicative of high 
mental health status (self-actualisation) may relate to transpersonal experience. 
Evident from these studies is that self-actualisation appears to be multi-faceted. 
That similar complications may exist in the case of a trait linked with 
vulnerability to disorder, psychoticism, justifies using additional personality 
measures to psychoticism in assessments of this trait’s relationship to 
transpersonal experience.
3.3.2 Glossolalia and Psychoticism
More direct assessments of the relationship between psychoticism and 
transpersonal experience relationships are evident in studies of glossolalia, 
which has been defined as “the supposed divinely inspired ability of an 
individual to express linguistic ability unknown to that person” (Smith & Fleck, 
1981, p209). Francis and Kay (1995) listed four different possible theoretical 
perspectives on glossolalia:
(a) It is symptomatic of psycho-pathology such as psychosis or dissociation;
(b) . It indicates good psychological health and ego integration;
(c) It is a learnt phenomenon (this may be understood as the social constructivist 
perspective when applied to this particular form of transpersonal experience);
(d) It is a form of regression to infantile states.
These divergent theoretical perspectives have been tested in numerous 
empirical studies (Francis & Kay, 1995; Holm. 1987, 1991; Lovekin & Malony, 
1977; Smith & Fleck, 1981; Spanos, Cross, Lepage & Coristine, 1986).
Different theoretical orientations, as Francis and Kay (1995) observed, have 
different implications as to whether glossolalia should be associated with 
increased or reduced levels of psychoticism. Most obviously, (a) and (b) 
contrast in predicting higher and lower levels of psychoticism in glossolalics 
respectively, but (c) also predicts that inverse relationships should be observed 
between experience of glossolalia and psychoticism (at least among samples 
where glossolalia is highly valued). Francis and Kay (1995) argued that the 
fourth of the above theoretical positions relates specifically to scores on the Lie- 
scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (if the Lie-scale is a measure of 
psychological immaturity, then claims that glossolalia is regressive imply
respondents who have had experience of glossolalia should produce higher Lie- 
scale scores); such arguments can also be extended to the psychoticism 
dimension of the E.P.Q. if psychosis is to be understood as a form of regression.
Little evidence exists to support the view that glossolalia is associated 
with increased psychoticism. Indeed, the evidence that male Pentecostal 
ministry candidates may score lower than average on psychoticism (Francis & 
Kay, 1995) is ground for supposing that clergy candidates sympathetic to such 
experience may actually be of better than average mental health. Relationships 
between mental health and glossolalia were explicitly addressed in Lovekin and 
Malony's (1977) longitudinal study. These authors assessed participants 
attending a seven-week Life in Spirits Seminars in California and in New 
Mexico, in which Christian-based experiences such as glossolalia were highly 
encouraged. Participants who had experienced glossolalia prior to the seminar 
were found to be higher in ego strength than those who had not. Respondents 
who never experienced glossolalia , either prior to or during the seminar, scored 
higher on a composite measure of anxiety, depression and hostility than did 
those who, after the conclusion of the seminar, reported glossolalic experiences. 
Such data suggest that glossolalia is associated with increased, not decreased, 
mental health status, giving grounds for predicting inverse relationships 
between psychoticism and spiritual experiences in the case of this particular 
experience. Such an inverse correlation would also support the third of the 
above theoretical positions presented by Francis and Kay (1995), for which 
empirical support exists (Flolm, 1987, 1991; Spanos et al ., 1986).
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3.3.3 Hearing Voices and Psychoticism
Famous cases of religious experiences, including those of St. Paul, St. 
Peter, St. Joan of Arc, St. Francis of Assissi, Baha'ullah and Malcolm X, have 
featured hearing voices. The positive symptoms of schizophrenia can take the 
form of auditory hallucinations, and thus research into hearing voices provides 
an obvious literature for explorations of potential links between transpersonal 
experiences and mental health status. This phenomenon is certainly not confined 
to schizophrenics, nor to psychiatric in-patients generally (Chadwick & 
Birchwood, 1996; Fenwick, 2001). World Health Organization data from the 
1970s suggested that 73% of patients diagnosed with acute schizophrenic 
episodes reported hearing voices, but similar experiences continue to be 
reported by those who have never been diagnosed with any psycho-pathology 
(Haddock & Slade, 1996; Romme & Escher, 1996).
Literature on hearing voices has not, as yet. been tied quite as 
systematically to the Eysenckian P-E-N model as has the literature on 
glossolalia. One possibility, consistent with the quasi-dimensional model of 
psychoticism as outlined by Claridge (2001), is that the phenomenon of hearing 
voices in apparently healthy participants may actually be a very subtle form of 
premorbid schizophrenic states; this would imply that higher psychoticism 
scores may be expected in any respondents who report hearing voices.
However, if the theoretical premises about glossolalia outlined by Francis and 
Kay (1995) can all, by analogy, be extended to the study of hearing voices, the 
possibility is raised that people who hear voices, if raised in religions where 
reports of such experiences are valued and common place, may actually show 
reduced psychoticism scores (heightened conditionabilily will be linked with
increased tendency to experience this phenomenon).
Good theoretical and empirical grounds exist for challenging the 
position that hearing voices is inevitably symptomatic of pathology. Chadwick 
and Birchwood (1996), using a specially constructed Beliefs about Voices 
Questionnaire (B.A.V.Q), found that depression was more closely associated 
with post hoc beliefs people had about voices heard during apparently 
hallucinatory experiences than it was with the content of such messages. 
McDonald and Luckett (1983) found schizophrenia to be a more common 
diagnosis among patients with no religious affiliation, suggesting that hearing 
voices in schizophrenic episodes and during religious experiences are quite 
separate phenomena. Jaynes (1990) has even proposed an intriguing, if 
admittedly highly speculative, theory, relating to brain bilaterality, that hearing 
voices may have characterised normal states of functioning in early human 
evolutionary history.
Summarizing literature in this area, there is currently little empirical 
evidence to suggest that hearing voices represents either heightened or reduced 
mental health status. Chadwick and Birchwood's (1996) work suggests that 
what does correlate with mental health status is how people respond to such 
experiences. Most literature in this field has studied participants who have all 
had the experience of hearing voices, and compared those who have and have 
not coped well with this phenomenon (Romme & Escher, 1996). A detailed 
comprehensive literature comparing participants who have and have not heard 
voices on subclinical traits such as psychoticism, or indeed variables associated 
with elevated mental health status such as self-actualisation, is needed to correct 
a major limitation of research in this field. However, the conclusions that may
be drawn from those studies that have addressed this phenomenon are 
informative insofar as they suggest that mental health may be more closely 
associated with post hoc interpretation of an experience than experience per se 
(cf. Spanos & Moretti, 1988).
3.3.4 Summary and Implications of Section 3.3
Early psychometric data suggested that transpersonal experiences 
correlate positively with some, but not all, facets of self-actualisation. A specific 
form of transpersonal experience, glossolalia, has been found to be linked with 
elevated rather than reduced mental health status. However, the literature on 
hearing voices offers an important qualification to inferences that may be drawn 
from research in this broad field. Both respondents high and low' in mental 
health status may have experiences w'hich are phenomenologically very similar; 
w'hat may differentiate such respondents is the cognitive framework they attach 
to their experiences. Applied to the study of mystical experience, this implies 
that well-planned research studies should assess research variables such as
attitudes to mysticism as well as experiences per se.
3.4 Summary and Implications of Chanter Three
A review has been given in this chapter of previously published 
literature on transpersonal experience in relation to personality, religious 
orientation and mental health status. Doctrinal and ritual dimensions of religion 
have consistently been found to correlate negatively with psychoticism, but this 
finding has not been replicated for the experiential dimension of religion 
(Section 3.1). Problems with treating psychoticism as a broad concept,
however, are particularly sharp in efforts to assess psychoticism’s relationship 
to self-reported mystical experience, as different facets of this trait may bear 
diametrically opposed relationships to mystical experience. Those facets 
indicative of socially unconventional and liberal views may be positively 
correlated with mystical experience, whereas those indicative of reduced 
impulse control and heightened conditionability may be predicted to be 
negatively correlated with mystical experience (at least in groups that value such 
experiences) if a meta-theoretical perspective based on social constructivism is 
endorsed. These divergent relationships between different facets of 
psychoticism and mystical experience may explain the apparent orthogonality of 
psychoticism and mystical experience found in published literature.
Literature on religious orientation has consistently found intrinsic 
rather than extrinsic orientation to be associated with transpersonal experience, 
but Maltby's (1999b) findings suggest that quest may also be of relevance to 
transpersonal experiences. Maltby's data have provided preliminary evidence 
religious experiences may be more common among religious liberals than 
religious conservatives.
Good reasons exist for researchers interested in how' psychoticism 
relates to transpersonal experiences to learn from the literature on mental health 
and transpersonal experience. Research reported in the literature on hearing 
voices has suggested that levels of mental health may have less to do with 
experience per se than with the cognitive frameworks individuals attach to such 
experiences. A question can be asked as to whether a subclinical trait such as 
psychoticism correlates with the cognitive framework attached to an experience 
rather than to transpersonal experience per se.
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From this summary of the literature, it becomes evident that certain 
questions have not received the attention in previously published literature that 
they deserve. These include:
(a) Does research into the personality correlates of transpersonal experience 
need to consider distinguishable facets of psychoticism. not just psychoticism as 
a global trait?
(b) Are quest religious orientation and transpersonal experiences both more 
common among religious liberals than religious conservatives, and if so, does 
this help us to understand the positive associations between quest and 
transpersonal experience found by Maltby (1999b)? Furthermore, if the 
observed correlation between quest and psychoticism reported by Watson et al. 
(1986) arose through both variables being related to openness to experience, 
does this challenge any efforts researchers may make to assess psychoticism as 
a global trait in studies of personality's relationship to transpersonal experience?
(c) Even if psychoticism is found to bear little relationship to transpersonal 
experience per se, could it still relate to cognitive frameworks attached to 
experiences, such as the attitudes people adopt towards mysticism?
(d) Have sampling issues been inadequately considered in this field? The 
corollary question that may be asked here is whether the precise pattern of 
personality correlates found for both mystical experience and attitudes towards 
such experiences may differ for religious groups taking positive versus negative 
attitudes towards mysticism.
These questions form the foundation for the empirical studies reported 
in Chapters 4-6 inclusive. Chapter 4 will present an empirical study assessing 
whether mystical experiences are indeed more common among religious
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liberals, while Chapter 5 introduces a new psychometric tool to assess attitudes 
to mystical experience as distinct from mystical experience per se.
The major empirical study reported in this thesis is in Chapter 6. Here, 
assessments of attitudes to mysticism, mystical experience, psychoticism and 
FFM traits will enable testing of whether measurements of the latter improve 
upon an understanding of the correlates of mystical experience obtainable when 
psychoticism is merely assessed as a global trait. Assessments of attitudes to 
mysticism, and the sampling of creeds predicted to be both high and low on this 
variable, will address the third and fourth of the above questions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A PILOT INVESTIGATION OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
IN LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE WINGS OF THE
JUDEAQ-CHRIST1AN TRADITION
One of the questions presented at the close to Chapter Three was that of 
whether religious liberalism, which may be associated with being high in some
A
but low in other facets of psychoticism, is associated with mystical experience. 
Any data suggesting that mystical experience is more prevalent among religious 
liberals than religious conservatives would therefore offer strong grounds for 
questioning the value of overly broad assessments of psychoticism in studies of 
the personality correlates of such experiences.
The purpose of this chapter is to report on an empirical investigation into 
whether mystical experience (in the Stacean sense) is more common among 
liberal rather than conserv ative members of the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
(Hypothesis 4.1). The question of whether self-reported mystical experience 
correlates significantly positively with quest religious orientation as described 
by Batson (1976) will also be considered (Hypothesis 4.3). This study will also 
assess whether this can be replicated for a more generic measure of religious 
experience (Hypotheses 4.2 and 4.4.) The fifth and final aim of the empirical 
study reported in this chapter is to assess whether, as Paloutzian's (1996) 
interpretation of quest implies, quest scores will be higher for members of 
liberal wings of the Judeao-Christian tradition than for a more evangelical- 
fundamentalist wing (Hypothesis 4.5).
14.1 Hypotheses
The purpose of the empirical study reported here was to test the following 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4.1: Religious liberals will score significantly higher on a measure 
of mystical-unitive experience as described by Stace (1960) than will religious
conservatives;
Hypothesis 4.2: Religious liberals will score significantly higher on a generic
measure of religious experience than will religious conservatives;
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Hypothesis 4.3: There will be a statistically significant and positive correlation 
between quest religious orientation and mystical-unitive experience as described 
by Stace (1960) in a population that combines religious liberals and religious
conservatives;
Hypothesis 4.4: Quest religious orientation will correlate significantly and
positively with a generic measure of religious experience in a population that 
combines religious liberals and religious conservatives;
Hypothesis 4.5: Religious liberals will score significantly higher on measures of 
quest religious orientation than will religious conservatives;
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Design
This study took the form of a survey. A between-groups design was
employed, with one independent variable at three levels (religious group: 
Quakers vs. Unitarians vs. Evangelicals) and three dependent variables (quest 
religious orientation, mystical experience and general religious experience).
1 1
Data were also analysed using correlational statistics to test Hypotheses 4.3 and 
4.4.
4.2.2 Participants
Thirty-eight people participated in this study, of whom four had to be 
excluded due to insufficient completion of questionnaires, leaving 34 
participants who had completed enough items on administered scales to produce 
scores that could be used for the final data analyses. Of these 34 participants,
16, comprising seven Quakers and nine Unitarians, represented liberal 
movements within the Judaeo-Christian tradition. (The term "liberal movements 
within the Judeao-Christian tradition" is preferred here to "liberal Christians", 
for. as informal conversations with Unitarian participants indicated, not all 
Unitarians would see themselves as Christians; Chryssides (1998) has also 
noted diversity among Unitarians as to whether their religion should be labelled 
"Christian"). Eighteen represented the evangelical wing of Christianity, being 
members of an evangelical Christian Fellowship group that met in a locality 
known to the researcher, and which had regular weekly meetings as well as 
Sunday services based upon evangelical doctrinal teachings.
Of the nine Quakers whose responses were analysed in the study, all 
were aged over 60, two were male, six were female and one respondent did not 
record gender. Of the seven Unitarians, two respondents were in the age-range 
21-40, one respondent was in the age range 51-60 and four respondents were 
over 60; the Unitarian sample consisted of two females, four males and one 
respondent for whom gender was not given. Of the 18 evangelicals, nine 
respondents were aged 21-40, six respondents were aged 41-50, one respondent
1was aged 51 -60 and two respondents were over 60; the evangelical sample
consisted of ten females, seven males and one respondent for whom gender was 
not given.
Convenience sampling was employed, and volunteers from each of 
these three groups acted as participants. Responses from participants from the 
initial sample of 38 who had failed to complete more than two items on any of 
the questionnaires were excluded from the data analysis. Responses from one of 
the evangelicals, two of the Quakers and one of the Unitarians could not be 
included for this reason. This left a final sample of 34 respondents who had 
satisfactorily completed the materials distributed to them, and whose responses 
were used in the final data analyses.
4.2.3 Materials
Three questionnaires, presented to respondents stapled together in a 
single A4-sized four-page booklet, were used to measure the dependent 
variables being assessed in the study. The front sheet of the booklet was headed 
"Doctoral Research Survey" and assured participants of anonymity and their 
right to withdraw from the study at any time. The introductory instruction sheet 
is presented in Appendix A. Each questionnaire used in this study is also 
presented in this appendix.
Respondents were asked to indicate their gender by circling either 
"Male" or "Female", and to indicate their age-group by circling one of six age- 
ranges ("Under 20", "21 -30", "31 -40", "41 -50", "51 -60", "Over 60"). The 
researcher's name, address and contact telephone numbers (home and work) 
appeared on the front sheet so that participants could contact the researcher for
163
more information on the findings of the study following analyses of the data. At 
no stage was it possible for the researcher to learn identifiable details about any 
respondent, thus upholding British Psychological Society ethical guidelines on 
confidentiality and anonymity. Respect for the ethical principles of informed 
consent, of allowing participants to withdraw from the study at any time, and of 
providing respondents with the opportunity to receive information regarding the 
rationale and findings of a study following data analysis were therefore evident 
from details supplied to respondents on the initial instruction sheet.
Mystical experience, quest religious orientation and general religious 
experience were the three dependent variables assessed in this study. Each was 
assessed in a different section of the booklet presented to respondents as 
follows:
i. Mystical experience was assessed by Hood’s (1975) M-Scale, 
which appeared in the first section of the booklet, headed 
Section A. This is a 32-item scale that has been used to assess 
mystical experience as described by Stace (1960). The 32 items 
on the M-Scale corresponded to the eight criteria of mystical 
experience, based on Stace (1960) - unitive quality, 
ineffability, noetic quality, sacred quality, space-time 
transcendence, objectivity (a sense of living things coming 
alive), ego loss and positive affect. Each of these dimensions of 
mystical experience is assessed by four questions on the M- 
Scale. Factor analysis of this scale, reported in Hood's first 
paper on the M-Scale (Hood, 1975), indicated that the scale is 
assessing two factors - mystical experience and religious
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interpretation. The religious interpretation factor appears to be 
connected with those items designed by Hood to assess the 
dimensions of sacred quality, positive affect and noetic quality, 
while other items load on the mystical experience factor. More 
recent factor analytic study (Hood, Morris & Watson, 1993) 
has suggested that, at least when subject to oblique factor 
analysis, the scale may be assessing religious interpretation and 
the two distinct forms of mystical experience outlined by Stace 
(1960), introvertive and extrovertive mystical experience. 
Cronbach's alpha coefficients reported by Hood et al. (1993) 
for each factor were .69 for introvertive mysticism and .76 for 
both extrovertive mysticism and religious interpretation.
ii. Quest religious orientation was assessed by the quest sub-scale 
of the Religious Life Inventory (R.L.I.) of Batson et al. (1993). 
This appeared in the second section of the booklet, headed 
Section B. This sub-scale is a twelve-item questionnaire which 
assesses quest religious orientation as described by Batson and 
which has improved validity and reliability over earlier 
measurements of quest (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; 1991b). 
Each of the three dimensions of quest religious orientation - 
existential crisis, willingness to see religion as changing and 
appreciation of religious doubt - described by Batson is 
assessed by four items on the scale.
iii. Religious experience was assessed by the questions presented 
to respondents in the third section of the booklet, headed
1Section C. This series of questions was constructed for the 
purpose of the current study and was based upon the findings of 
Hay and Heald (1987), following their study using Gallup 
omnibus survey questions to assess the incidence of a variety of 
religious experiences within a general population. These 
authors, following careful analyses of over 5, 000 written 
reports of religious experiences sent in to the Alister Hardy 
Research Centre, concluded that eight types of religious 
experience were most commonly reported in response to open- 
ended survey questions asking about religious experiences. Six 
of these were used as a basis for questions used in Section C. 
Two of these experiences were omitted from this section. A 
sense of oneness with all things was omitted because this was 
already being assessed by the M-Scale, while a sense of a 
guiding presence not called God was omitted because of the 
explicitly religious nature of the populations being sampled. As 
this measure of religious experience was not to be regarded as a 
questionnaire, but rather as an ad hoc list of survey-type 
questions replicating those used by Hay and Heald (1987), data 
were not available on its reliability or validity.
4.2.4 Procedure
Contacts were made with someone in authority, either by telephone 
or in person, representing each of the three religious groups, to gain permission 
for the study. The minister of the evangelical group collected questionnaires
from the researcher in person, and subsequently distributed them to the 
evangelicals at one of their weekday evening meetings, later collecting them for 
return to the researcher. The Quakers were given the questionnaires by a Quaker 
with whom the researcher was personally acquainted, who later returned them 
to the researcher by post. (Although this Quaker was a personal acquaintance of 
the researcher, at no time did the Quaker disclose any identifiable details about 
Quaker respondents). The researcher distributed questionnaires to Unitarians at 
one of their sendees, after attending a sendee at their church, and collected 
completed questionnaires (all collected anonymously) after attending two 
further sendees there. Prior to the study, the researcher had not attended any 
sendees at this church. All participants were blind to the hypotheses being 
tested in the study.
Scoring was by five-point Likert-type scales on each of the three scales. 
Thus, scores on the M-Scale could range from 32 (least mystical) to 160 (most 
mystical), scores for quest could range from 12 (lowest quest) to 60 (highest 
quest), and scores for the general measure of religious experience could range 
from 6 (lowest religious experience) to 30 (highest religious experience), with 
96, 36 and 18 being the theoretical mid-range scores for each scale.
4,3. Results
For respondents who had failed to enter an item on a questionnaire 
but whose total number of missed items on a questionnaire did not exceed 2, a 
method of correcting for missing data was employed whereby "3" (the 
theoretical mid-range response for an individual item) was entered for missing 
items. This method of data correction was utilised for three of the Unitarians
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and two of the evangelicals, and thus for comparable numbers of participants 
drawn from the liberal and conservative populations.
Rationale for L se of Parametric Statistics
In the data analyses that follow, a reasonably conventional practice of 
treating scores on Likert-type scales as interval data was adopted, contributing 
to the justification for the use of parametric tests. Scores on the M-Scale have
reasonably consistently been treated as interval data in studies such as Hood
*
(1975), Hood. Morris and Watson (1993) and Hood et al. (2001), while scores 
on the quest sub-scale of the R.L.I. have frequently been treated as interval data 
in studies such as Batson and Schoenrade (1991a; 1991b). The relatively small 
size of the sample also meant that it was considered especially important to 
adopt a powerful statistical test to detect for possible effects. As indicated in 
Table 4.1, skewness and kurtosis fell within boundaries which, according to 
received statistical convention, justify analysis by parametric statistical tests 
(between -1 and +1 for skewness and between -3 and +3 for kurtosis). Skewness 
and kurtosis are not displayed for three groups separately but for each individual 
group, fell within the boundaries of -1/+1 for skewmess and -3/+3 for kurtosis on 
each dependent variable. It was therefore considered appropriate to analyse data 
using parametric tests.
Table 4.1. Kurtosis and skewness for M-Scale score. Quest and Religious
Experience Score
M-Scale Quest Religious
Experience
Skewness .462 . i n -.225
Kurtosis -.249
---------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------
-.730 .606
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The means and standard deviations for each of the three groups on 
each of the three assessed dependent variables are displayed in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2 Means. Standard Deviations and Ranges of Scores on
M-Scale, Quest and Religious Experience for Evangelicals, Quakers and 
Unitarians
Variable: M-Scale Quest Religious Experience
Group: Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range
Evangelicals 
(N= 18)
89.89 15.61 62-
116
32.16 6.72 21-46 21.89 3.36 15-29
Quakers
(N=9)
112.89 15.89 91-
137
46.11 6.85 ” 39-60 19.00 3.34 14-26
Unitarians
(N= 7)
114.71 34.86 69-
156
48.43 4.23 44-55 21.43 6.27 10-30
Total 
(N= 34)
101.09 23.53 62-
156
39.20 9.80 21-60 21.03 4.17 10-30
These figures indicate how data were in the predicted direction for at 
least two of the dependent variables, M-Scale score and quest. Those groups 
that had been taken as representing liberera 1 wings of the Judeao-Christian 
(Quakers and the Unitarians) obtained higher mean scores on both quest and 
mystical experience than did the Evangelicals. However, the data did not 
support the hypothesis that liberal religious groups would score higher on a
measure o 1 general religious experience, as the means for the measure of 
religious experience were similar for each group.
4.3.2 Inferential Statistics
Hypotheses 4.1,4.2 and 4.5 were tested using a 
between-groups MANOVA, with one independent variable at three levels 
(Religious Group: Evangelical vs. Quaker vs. Unitarian) and three dependent 
variables (M-Scale score, Quest score and general religious experience score). 
Statistically significant main effects were found for quest (F= 15.93: p < 0.001) 
and M-Scale (F = 4.90; p < 0.02) but not tor general religious experience score 
(F= 1.44; n.s.). Comparisons between groups using independent samples t-tests 
indicated that these differences occurred because of the higher Quest and M- 
Scale scores of the two liberal religious groups than the Evangelicals. The 
Quakers and Unitarians did not differ significantly from each on either Quest 
score (t = 1.02; d.f = 13; n.s.) or M-Scale score (t < 1; n.s.). However Quakers 
were significantly higher than Evangelicals on both quest (t = 4.92; d.f. = 22; 
p < 0.001) and M-Scale score (/ = 3.59; d.f. = 22; p < 0.001). Unitarians also 
scored significantly higher than evangelicals on quest (/ = 5.87; d.f  = 21;/? < 
0.001) and M-Scale score (t = 2.47; d. f. = 21; p < 0.03). Checks that these 
findings really did reflect elevated scores on both quest and M-Scale on the part 
of the religious liberals were taken by re-assigning all the Quakers and all the 
Unitarians to one group, Religious Liberals (N = 16), and comparing them with 
the Evangelicals (N = 18). Independent samples t-tests revealed that, as a group 
combined, these two groups obtained significantly different scores on both quest 
(t = 6.97; d.f. = 32;/? < .001) and M-Scale score (/ = 3.29; d.f. = 32; p < .004),
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and the mean scores for the Religious Liberals on both the M-Scale (113) and 
Quest (47) was higher than those lor the Evangelicals' respective mean scores 
of 89.89 and 32.16. T-test comparisons between the liberals combined and the 
evangelicals for the scores on the general religious experience scale were non-
significant (/ <1; n.s.).
Such analyses indicated how the data collected during this study 
supported Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.5, which had predicted that religious liberals 
would score higher on measures of mystical experience than will religious 
conservatives, but did not support Hypothesis 4.2, which had predicted that 
religious liberals will score higher on a more generic measure of religious 
experience.
Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.4 were assessed by analysis of data from the 
combined sample (N= 34) using Pearson's Product moment. (Due to the small 
number of participants in each group, it w^ as not considered appropriate to 
calculate correlation coefficients between dependent variables for the groups 
independently). Quest correlated significantly with M-Scale score (N = 34; r = 
+.549; p  <0.01) but not with the measure of general religious experience (N = 
34; r = -.152; n.s.). Hence, Hypothesis 4.3 was supported but Hypothesis 4.4 
was not. A low correlation was observed between M-Scale score and the generic 
measure of religious experience (N = 34; r = .106; n.s.). Although this could be 
interpreted as grounds for questioning the criterion-related validity of this 
measure of religious experience, it should be recalled that it had been designed 
as a general measure of religious experience rather than as a measure of 
specifically unitive-mystical experiences. The most parsimonious interpretation 
of this would be an assertion that findings regarding general measures of
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transpersonal experience may not replicate entirely those for measures of 
specific types of transpersonal experience, such as mystical-unitive experience. 
Data from this study, for example, were evidence that liberal and conservative 
members of the Judaeo-Christian tradition differ in their experiences of mystical 
union but not in their experiences ol transpersonal experiences in general.
Since the scale used to assess general religious experience was an ad 
hoc measure for which validity data were not available, ambiguity of certain 
possible scores on this scale invites comment. Scores close to the possible mid-
range of 18 were ambiguous as to whether they were better interpreted as 
measures of confidence that one had had certain experiences, or as measures of 
the range of experiences one felt one had had. A score of eighteen, for example, 
could have meant strong confidence in having had three of the experiences, 
accompanied by strong disagreement that one had the remaining three 
experiences, but, equally possibly, ambiguity about each of the six experiences. 
Although similar ambiguity exists with mid-range scores on the M-Scale, this 
point is seldom appreciated in published research papers that have employed 
this scale.
Scrutiny of responses to the ad hoc measure revealed that mid-range 
to higher scores were better interpreted as measures of confidence than as 
measures of range, for the same narrow range of experiences tended to be 
acknowledged by those respondents who did express agreement to having had at 
least some of the listed experiences. It was more typical, for example, to see 
agreement or strong agreement ticked by any of the first three experiences 
listed than to see acknowledgement of experience of the dead being present 
(most respondents expressed either disagreement or strong disagreement to
ha\ ing had this particular experience, and those who did acknowledge this 
experience tended to obtain higher scores overall). Scores were never below 
fourteen in both one of the liberal religious groups (the Quakers) and in the 
Evangelicals (see Table 4.2), indicating how, in these two groups, no respondent 
had disagreed or strongly disagreed to having had all six experiences. The wide 
range ol scores on this scale lor the Unitarians, and the high standard deviations 
achieved by Unitarians on both the M-Scale and the general measure of
religious experience (see Table 4.2), could be taken as evidence of the diversity 
of the Unitarian-Universalist movement.
4.4 Discussion
The strong between-groups differences observed for quest and M-Scale 
scores suggested that the highly statistically significant and positive correlation 
between quest and M-Scale in this study occurred due to between-group 
differences. Although this may seem consistent with Maltby's (1999b) findings 
on quest, it should be remembered that Maltby found quest to correlate with a 
wider variety of transpersonal experiences. The data in the study reported here 
also differ from Maltby's in coming from a cross-denominational population, in 
which quest and mystical experience appeared to share around 25% variance. 
This is slightly greater than the correlation reported by Maltby (r = 0.44) 
between quest and transpersonal experience; Maltby used a sample drawn from 
a single denomination (Anglicans), and the greater heterogeneity of the sample 
in the current study is likely to have elevated this correlation.
Given the higher scores of the groups designated as Religious Liberals 
than the Evangelicals, the current study provided evidence that mystical
experience may be higher among the former than the latter. Grounds have been 
sketched in Chapter Three for associating religious liberalism with a particular 
personality pattern indicative of being high in some facets but low in other 
facets of psychoticism; thus, an initial tentative conclusion may be acceptance 
oi the \alue ol separating components of psychoticism in researching attributes 
associated with transpersonal experiences. A number of criticisms, however,
may be applied to the current study before it is too readily followed with such a 
conclusion.
The study may be criticised because no measurements of psychoticism 
were given to the three groups sampled. The only indication that the Religious 
Liberals would score higher on a certain element of psychoticism was their 
higher scores on quest, a religious orientation found by Watson et al. (1986) to 
be positively correlated with psychoticism, but this religious orientation could 
be said to relate to only one aspect of psychoticism, namely unconventional 
social views. The study may also be criticised for only offering evidence for 
greater likelihood of mystical experience among liberals in the Judeao-Christian 
tradition. Such criticisms are addressed in the study reported in Chapter Six, in 
which not only Jews and Christians, but also two creeds that can be considered 
as religious liberals insofar as they are unconventional creeds somewhat distinct 
from mainstream religion in the United Kingdom, are assessed on a measure of 
mystical experience, on psychoticism as described by Eysenck, Eysenck and 
Barrett (1985) and on the five-factor model, enabling investigation of how these 
groups score on distinguishable facets of psychoticism.
A further criticism of the study reported above is that no pilot study had 
been done to assess how clear respondents would find the M-Scale. During the
process of data collection, informal communications with the Evangelicals
revealed that ordinary lay people may have difficulty understanding certain
items on this scale. In subsequent studies to be reported in this thesis, a clearer,
more accessible measure of mystical experience, the Francis-Louden Mystical
Orientation Scale (Francis & Louden, 2000a) will be used as the preferred 
measure of mystical experience.
A final criticism that may be levelled against this study, and one which 
means that one should look with caution at any attempt to interpret the findings 
from the stud\ as evidence that mystical experience is a prescriptive norm for 
liberals but not conservatives within the Judeao-Christian tradition, is that the 
M-Scale is a measure of mystical experience, and not of attitudes to mysticism. 
As argued in earlier chapters, conceptual distinctions are possible between these 
two variables. As the M-Scale is a measure of mystical experience and not a 
measure of attitudes to mysticism, the data from this study were only really 
evidence that mystical experience is more common among liberal than 
conservative adherents of the Judeao-Christian tradition, and did not actually 
suggest that mystical experience is more likely to be regarded as a prescriptive 
norm among the former.
Assessments of conventional and unconventional religious adherents in 
efforts to discover whether mystical experience is more likely to be a 
prescriptive norm for the latter clearly need to assess such respondents on 
attitudes to mysticism as well as well as mystical experience per se. To test such 
a proposition requires construction of a new scale to assess this concept. A 
study based upon construction of such a scale will be presented in Chapter Five.
5. 1 Introduction
Arguments presented thus tar in this thesis, challenging assessments of 
psychoticism as a broad trait when psychometric research is conducted into the 
personality correlates of transpersonal experience, can now be said to be 
supported by both a review presented of published literature and the data, 
original with the current thesis, which were presented in Chapter Four. Reviews 
of past literature, empirical as well as theoretical, in Chapter Two made it 
explicit that good grounds exist for viewing psychoticism as heterogeneous. In 
Chapter Four, empirical data were offered as evidence that increased liberalism, 
which, following the findings of Heath and Martin (1990), may be viewed as 
one, but only one particular facet of psychoticism, is associated with mystical 
experience. However, it is argued here that, in addition to personality and 
mystical experience, research into transpersonal experience should assess the 
attitudes people hold towards mysticism.
Reasons will be given in due course as to why, on both conceptual and 
empirical grounds, this can be declared a distinct construct from mystical 
experience. Here, it will be explained why research into the personality 
correlates of mystical experience will benefit from consideration of this as a 
distinct variable in its own right.
Research into potential correlation between mystical experience and 
personality traits is of more than purely descriptive interest. Knowledge of such
correlations may contribute to skilled debate on important theoretical issues,
such as whether mystical experience is socially constructed or whether such
experiences are pathological. A fully considered response to these issues
demands that the cognitive frameworks attached to these experiences, as well as 
such experiences per se, are studied.
The first of these two issues relates to Forman’s (1998) distinction 
between his own perennial psychology and earlier versions of perennial 
philosophy. Forman s position implies that mystical experience is not related to 
traits connected with readiness to learn social norms, but does not imply quite 
the same lack of an association for the attitudes people hold towards mysticism. 
The second issue is germane to how research into attitudes to mysticism may 
help to clarify whether pathology is more heavily associated with beliefs and 
attitudes than with experience. Since psychoticism may be associated with 
adaptive traits such as creativity, assessments of the cognitive frameworks 
people attach to mystical experiences, such as their attitudes to mysticism, 
enables one to determine whether such adaptive traits relate more closely to the 
attitudes, beliefs and styles of thinking people adopt in connection with mystical 
experience than they do to experience per se.
Sampling issues present further grounds for considerations of attitudes to 
mysticism. Whether psychoticism or other traits indicative of learning potential 
will correlate negatively or positively with mystical experience may depend 
upon whether the sample being assessed does or does not regard the experience 
of mystical union as a prescriptive norm. This may be decided by measurements 
of the attitudes to mysticism held by a particular religious group.
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In this chapter, a report will be presented based upon construction of, 
new scale to assess attitudes to mysticism as a distinct construct from mystical 
experience. Such a scale has the potential to make original contributions to 
know ledge in the psychology ot religion. The compendium of religiosity 
measures of Hill and Hood (1999) does not include any reference to a scale to 
assess this variable, which indicates how previous psychometric scale 
de\elopment in transpersonal psychology has not been based explicitly upon 
attempts to assess this construct. The theoretical background to this scale was 
outlined in the concluding sections ot Chapter Two, in w'hich (a) Pagans and 
Buddhists and (b) Christians and Jews were presented as religious groups
which, respectively, may be predicted to take positive and negative attitudes 
towards mysticism.
5.2 Aims and Hypotheses
The aims of this study were to assess the internal consistency, 
criterion-related validity and construct validity of a new scale. To understand 
how criterion-related validity and construct validity were assessed, it is helpful 
to present these aims in the form of testable hypotheses. Construct validity of 
the new scale was assessed by examination of how strongly this new scale
correlated with scores on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale of
Francis and Louden (2000a), as indicated by Hypothesis 5.1. Criterion-related 
validity was assessed by observations of whether groups predicted to take pro- 
mystical attitudes would score significantly more highly on the new scale than 
would a convenience sample of students, as indicated by Hypotheses 5.2 and 
5.3. A further hypothesis being tested in the study was that two groups
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influenced by Buddhism would score higher on a measure of mystical 
experience than would a convenience sample of students (Hypothesis 5.4)
Hypothesis 5.1: Scores on an "Attitudes to Mysticism" scale will correlate 
significantly positively with scores on a measure of mystical experience; 
Hypothesis 5.2: Reichi healers and Nichiren Daishonen Buddhists will both 
score significantly higher on an "Attitudes to Mysticism" scale than will a 
convenience sample of students;
Hypothesis 5.3: Members of Mensa Paranormal will score significantly higher 
on an "Attitudes to Mysticism" scale than will a sample of students; 
Hypothesis 5.4: Reichi healers and Nichiren Daishonen Buddhists will both 
score significantly higher on a measure of mystical experience than will 
students.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 Design
The study was conducted as a between-groups design with the one 
independent variable of group at four levels (Student vs. Reichi vs. Buddhist vs 
Mensa Paranormal) and the two dependent variables of Attitudes to Mysticism 
and mystical experience. As Hypothesis 5.1 was correlational and efforts were 
being made to assess the validity of the new scale, correlations between the 
variable of attitudes to mysticism and that of mystical experience were also
assessed.
5.3.2 Participants
An initial pool of ninety-three participants completed questionnaires for 
Study Two. Forty-one were students who were given questionnaires during 
lectures at a college in the East Midlands, where they were all enrolled as 
students in Higher Education. All students were doing at least one module in 
Psychology as part ol their degree programme and were handed questionnaires 
during Psychology lectures. I wenty-four ol the participants were members of a 
Reichi healing group; 12 were members of a local Buddhist group, specifically 
Nichiren Daishonen Buddhists; and 16 were members of Mensa Paranormal. 
Two of these participants had to be eliminated because they had completed only 
one of the two scales administered for this study, and a further participant was 
eliminated for not having completed a sufficient proportion of the Attitudes to 
Mysticism Scale to allow for data collection (one Buddhist and two Reichi 
healers), leaving an A of 90 for data analysis.
The student sample consisted of 33 females and eight males. 24 
respondents aged 19-21, 11 respondents aged 21-30, two respondents aged 31- 
40 and four respondents aged over 40 (mean average age = 24.36; standard 
deviation = 9.14; range = 19.5-56.90). Ten indicated religious affiliation as 
atheist or as having no religion, seven as agnostic, four as Roman Catholic, six 
as Anglican, six as adhering to some other Christian denomination, two as 
Hindu, one as Sikh, one as Islamic, one as the Korean religion Chun Do So Bop 
and three as personal religion.
The Reichi sample consisted of sixteen females, six males and two 
respondents who did not record gender; two were aged 21-30, three aged 31-40, 
four aged 41-50, seven aged 51 -60, three were over 60 and five did not record
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age (mean average age, where given (N= 19) was 48.63; s.d. = 12.65; range =
22-69). Religious affiliations indicated by the Reichi group were Anglican (six
respondents), Roman Catholic (three respondents), "Other Christian" (three
respondents), Buddhist (two respondents), spiritualist (one respondent), agnostic
(two respondents) and multi-faith (five respondents); two respondents did not 
record religious affiliation.
The Nichiren Daishonen Buddhists consisted of eight females, three 
males and one respondent who did not record gender; two were aged 31 -40. 
seven aged 41-50, two aged 51-60 and one respondent did not record age (mean 
average age, where given (N= 11) was 46.51, s.d. = 6.24; range = 35-55). The 
specific form of Buddhism sampled, the Nichiren Daishonen, can, along with 
Zen. be regarded a particularly pro-mystical form of Buddhism (Chapter Two, 
this thesis).
The Mensa Paranormal group comprised eight males and eight females, 
of whom one was aged 21 -30, one aged 31 -40. two aged 41 -50, five aged 51 -60, 
one aged 61-70, three were over 70 and three did not record age (mean average, 
where given (N= 13) was 54.69; standard deviation = 14.19; range = 29-78).
All 16 members of the Mensa Paranormal group answered a question asking 
about their personal religious affiliation, but their replies were often highly 
idiosyncratic. The responses that Mensa Paranormal participants gave to a 
question asking them to name their religious affiliation were Anglican (three 
participants), Roman Catholic (two participants), Quaker (one participant), 
lapsed Anglican (one participant), Buddhist (one participant), agnostic (one 
participant), atheist (one participant), animist (one participant), "New Age" (one
participant), Pagan (one participant), Druidic-pantheistic-"The Tao" (one 
participant), monotheist (one participant) and "God within" (one participant).
Rationale for Sampling of Populations
Buddhism, as explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.3, can be viewed as a 
religion that supports pro-mystical attitudes. Criterion-related validity of an 
Attitudes to Mysticism Scale would therefore be supported if Buddhists were 
found to obtain significantly higher scores on the scale than a student sample. 
Reichi healing, a broadly "New Age" approach to healing, is frequently related 
to New Age preoccupations such as spiritual energy, crystals, chakras and Zen 
Buddhism (Shuffrey, 1998; Parkes & Parkes, 1998). Zen Buddhism was a major 
influence on Reichi’s founding father, the Japanese healer Mikao Usui, who 
spent part of his time in a Zen monastery in Japan (Parkes & Parkes, 1998). 
These two groups were expected to obtain significantly higher scores on both 
the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale and the Attitudes to Mysticism 
Scale than the sample of students.
Mensa Paranormal, a sub-group within the high-intelligence society 
Mensa, can be regarded as a group whose members share intellectual interests 
rather than discussions of personal experiences. Respondents from this 
population were therefore expected to obtain significantly higher scores on the 
Attitudes to Mysticism Scale than students, but not necessarily higher scores on 
the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale. Presentation of hypotheses in 
this way emphasises conceptual distinctions between attitudes to mysticism and 
mystical experience, and helps to clarify how construction of the new scale
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should not be regarded as construction of a redundant scale, but of a scale with 
potential to make an original contribution to knowledge.
5.3.3 Materials
The two major dependent variables being assessed in this study were:
1) Mystical Experience. This was assessed by the Francis-Louden Mystical 
Orientation Scale (Francis & Louden, 2000a). As informal conversations 
with participants in Study One had indicated that some respondents had 
had difficulty with the more obscure questions of the M-Scale, the 
Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale was chosen in preference to 
Hood's (1975) M-Scale due to its greater clarity. This is a 21-item scale 
to assess mystical experience based on Happold (1963), and has been 
observed to have good internal reliability with a Cronbach's alpha 
reliability coefficient of +0.94 (Francis & Louden, 2000a; Bourke, 
Francis & Robbins, 2004). This scale is presented in Appendix B.
2) Attitudes to Mysticism. This was assessed by the newly constructed 
Attitudes to Mysticism Scale in its initial, 32-item version. This scale is 
also presented in Appendix B.
Construction of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
The initial version of the "Attitudes to Mysticism" scale consisted of 
32 items. These items were devised by the researcher, and were used to assess 
each of eight content categories, with four items in each category. This was 
done to ensure that the new scale was measuring an adequate range of attitudes
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and opinions that could be deemed “pro-mystical”. These eight themes, and the 
sources which inspired them, are displayed in Table 5.1.
Igfalc.?.l_C-atcgories of Items in the Initial Version of the Attitudes to 
Mysticism Scale
ITEM CATEGORY SOURCE AND BACKGROUND
1. Items assessing whether religious 
experience is valued over religious 
ritual
Glock and Stark (1965); Smart 
(1989)
2. Interest in mystical literature Keller (1978)
3. Items assessing whether religious 
experience is valued over intellectual 
dimension of religion
Clock and Stark (1965)
4. Valuing mysticism as opposed to 
Lutheran theology of solafidianism
Various
5. Perceptions of mysticism as non- 
pathological experiences
Various
6. Valuing perennialism in mysticism Forman (1998); Huxley (1946)
7. Valuing mysticism over social 
dimensions of religion
Smart (1989)
8. Valuing mystical experience over 
doctrinal dimensions of religion
Glock and Stark (1965); Smart 
(1989)
The first category of items included four items assessing whether
respondents valued the experiential dimension of religion more highly than the 
ritual. These were:
Item 1. If I were to think of a prototypical religious person, I would think of a 
mystic or some one who reports religious experiences, rather than some one 
who attends religious services regularly.
Item 20. The practices of the mystic are a more true path to God than regular 
attendances at religious services.
Item 26. To have had a religious or mystical experience indicates more 
commitment to one's faith than whether one goes to one's place of worship 
regularly.
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Item 32. If I were a religious person, I would see regular attendance at a church,
mosque, synagogue or other place ot worship as being more central to my faith
than whether I had ever had a "mystical" or "religious" experience. (Negatively 
loaded).
1 he second item category assessed respondents' attitudes to mystical 
literature. The central place given to discussion of mystical literature in the 
volume of essays edited by Katz (1978), discussed in detail in Keller's (1978) 
chapter, provided a foundation for supposing this to be an important and 
worthwhile category. Furthermore, as one may read mystical literature and feel 
drawn towards or moved by it without feeling that one has had oneself had a 
mystical experience, inclusion of this category further clarified how this scale 
was a measure of attitudes to mysticism and not of self-reported mystical 
experience. The scale could therefore be seen to be serving a different function 
to scales such as Hood's (1975) M-Scale. The four items in this category were: 
Item 2. Some of the most moving literature ever written has been the work of 
world's great mystics.
Item 12. I find that people who write about their so-called mystical experiences 
contradict themselves - they claim to have received revelations, but to me, their 
experiences hardly reveal anything at all. (Negatively loaded).
Item 17. 1 get excited when I read accounts of mystical, religious or spiritual 
experiences.
Item 24. I would get rather annoyed if I had to read mystical literature, as most 
of it would be quite incomprehensible to me. (Negatively loaded).
Item 12 above was based upon a quote by Luther. Luther disliked the 
Biblical text of "The Revelation of St. John the Divine", holding that a
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revelation should be revealing, not couched in the rather esoteric language in 
which the final book of the Biblical canon is written.
1 he third item category was based upon Glock and Stark's (1965)
inclusion of an intellectual dimension of religiosity in their scheme. Items in this
category were designed to assess whether respondents valued the intellectual
dimension of religion more highly than the experiential. Items in this category 
were:
Item 3. Possession of a great deal of factual knowledge about one's faith (e.g. 
about its history, literature or ritual) is really a very poor shadow of the great 
insights that can be obtained during mystical experience.
Item 9. If one wants to know about one's faith, one should apply lots of 
academic study to its history, texts and theology, rather than engage in practices 
that may or may not bring about mystical experiences. (Negatively loaded).
Item 13. Theologians are more important figures in the world religions than are 
mystics. (Negatively loaded).
Item 21. One can learn at least as much about God from those who report 
religious or mystical experiences as one can from theologians.
Inspiration for the fourth category came from the observation that 
different religions, and indeed, different denominations within the same 
religion, have taken different attitudes towards mysticism due to different 
doctrinal foundations relating to the power of the individual's efforts to obtain 
Divine grace. More specifically, items in this category had been designed to 
assess similarity between respondent's beliefs and Luther's doctrine of 
solafidianism, which today continues to be espoused by some forms of Christian 
fundamentalist Protestantism. This doctrine teaches that we are justified by faith
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in God alone and that, therefore, our own self-initiated attempts at the spiritual 
quest are to be proscribed - thus, clashing head-on with the implications of 
certain mystical teachings that a self-initiated, on-going quest can help one to 
bear spiritual fruit. The former position was taken to be one that would offer 
doctrinal foundations for being suspicious of mystics; the latter position one 
likely to lead to more sympathetic attitudes towards mysticism. Items in this 
category were included to assess the extent to which respondents leaned towards 
the former or latter viewpoint. The tour items in this category were:
Item 4. Our sins are justified through faith, that is, through belief that God alone 
can save us from our sins - we are not likely to get very far by constant reliance 
on our own efforts at the spiritual quest. (Negatively loaded).
Item 6. God alone is the fountainhead of all religious revelations, so mystics 
deceive themselves to think that they can obtain union with God by their own 
efforts. (Negatively loaded).
Item 8. The mystical quest for union with the Divine is one which - partly 
thanks to the mystic’s own efforts - is often likely to prove extremely fruitful. 
Item 11. The mystical viewpoint that life is like a ladder, and that by appropriate 
spiritual journey, one may ascend this ladder to reach the realms of God, is one 
which deserves a lot of respect.
The fifth item category was based upon the conservative premise that 
another reason why some respondents may have negative attitudes towards 
mysticism may be less to do with lay theology than with lay psychology, 
specifically, the possibility that mysticism may be perceived as psycho-
pathology by some people. The four items in this category were designed to
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assess the extent to which respondents equated the experiences reported by
mystics with psychiatric illnesses or conditions. They were:
Item 5. I can really understand why many people (including religious leaders
such as the clergy or rabbis) have perceived mystics as mad. (Negatively 
loaded).
Item 14. Major and important differences exist between the hallucinations of 
psychotics and the experiences of mystics.
Item 19. It would not surprise me if it turned out that the vast majority of those
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who claim to have had mystical experiences turn out to be suffering from some 
type of psychiatric illness. (Negatively loaded).
Item 23. Established religious authorities - such as the Christian church - are
wrong if they think that the experiences reported by mystics should be seen as 
pathological.
The sixth category of item statement was based upon the likely 
possibility that those who take a positive attitude towards mysticism may be 
more sympathetic to the perennialism that has characterised some of those, such 
as Huxley (1946), who have written favourably about mysticism. It was 
assumed that respondents scoring high on these items would be those with 
beliefs in a ‘^ perennial philosophy” of mystics of many different spiritual 
traditions; whereas respondents who scored low would be more likely to take 
the viewpoint that only specific theologies are defensible, and - by implication 
- that doctrine should be given more respect than experience. The four items in 
this category were:
Item 7. Mystics of all faiths, creeds and indeed, of no traditional religion are all 
involved in the same spiritual journey.
Item 18. There are cases in many different religions where earnest seekers have 
had an experience ol union with the Divine, or at least, glimpses of God.
Item 22. One should never trust any one who claims to follow a religion, but 
who takes a deep interest in the mystical teachings of religions or creeds other 
than the one he or she claims to profess. (Negatively loaded).
Item 30. I am rather suspicious ol those who would have us believe that
mystical experiences in all ol the world religions are more or less the same. 
(Negatively loaded).
The seventh item category was based upon a dimension of religion 
from Smart’s (1989) scheme, rather than Glock and Stark’s (1965), namely the 
social dimension. Items in this category assessed whether respondents valued 
the mystical and experiential element in religion more highly than the formal, 
institutional or social. High scorers were expected to be those who valued 
private and personal mystical experience; low' scorers those with more interest 
in formal, administrative bodies associated with religious denominations and 
who offered more respect to public figures occupying formal positions in the 
world's religions than they did to mystics. The four items in this category were: 
Item 10. Religious authorities, such as church leaders, the Pope or rabbis, have 
every right to be suspicious of mystics. (Negatively loaded).
Item 15. Religious people should put more trust in formally designated religious 
authorities (e.g. vicars in Christianity, rabbis in Judaism) than in mystics or 
those who claim to have had religious or mystical experiences. (Negatively 
loaded).
Item 25. The mystic is some one often far closer to God than are those with 
formally designated religious authority (e.g. bishops, rabbis).
Item 28. The mystical path is a more sure path to God than that taken by 
hierarchically organized structures in the world religions.
The eighth and final category of belief statement was based upon 
contrast between the experiential dimension oi religion and the doctrinal 
dimension, as described in models such as those of Glock and Stark (1965) and 
Smart (1989). It was assumed that high scorers on this category would value a 
heart-felt, personal experience of Divine union more highly than creedal assent, 
whereas the opposite would be true for low scorers. Items in this category were: 
Item 16. To agree with the doctrines of a particular creed does not really matter 
in the long run - what really matters is to have had, in one's heart, experience of 
the Divine.
Item 2 7. The revelation awarded to one during a mystical experience is an 
important experience for any one, regardless of whatever he or she believes. 
Item 29. Divine providence and the sovereignty of God imply that mystics 
cannot achieve true union with God. (Negatively loaded).
Item 31. One should pay special scrutiny to what those reporting religious or 
mystical experiences really believe in, especially if they come from a religious 
background different to one's own. (Negatively loaded).
The separation of the items into the above categories was done to 
ensure that the scale would assess an adequate range of opinions and beliefs 
related to mysticism. These eight classes of belief statement are not totally 
discrete. In particular, the final category shares considerable thematic overlap 
with those in the fourth and sixth categories. Such overlap is, however, to be 
expected, for the scale is intended as a measure of a homogeneous construct.
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Attitudes to mysticism is a construct distinct to mystical experience, but as a
self-contained construct, can be expected to be reasonably homogeneous. The
presentation ol all 32 items in the scale in numerical order can be found in
Appendix B. Scoring tor both scales was done by Likert-type five point scales.
respondents expressing their level ot agreement or disagreement with each item
by circling a number ranging from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly 
Agree”).
5.3.4 Procedure
Participants were presented with a booklet in two parts - one, the 
Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, measuring mystical experience, the 
other, the 32-item scale that had been designed to assess attitudes to mysticism. 
To control for order effects, half of the participants received the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale as the first scale in the booklet and the other half 
received the scale to assess attitudes to mysticism as the first scale.
The students were given questionnaires during a lecture presented by 
the researcher, who lectured at the college where the students studied. They 
were asked to return completed questionnaires to a box outside the researcher's 
office. The Reichi healers were given the questionnaires by a Reichi healing 
instructor, who later collected the questionnaires and returned them to the 
researcher by post. The Buddhists were given the questionnaires by a member 
of a local Buddhist group, who subsequently returned completed questionnaires 
to the researcher in person at the college where the researcher worked. The 
Mensa Paranormal members received questionnaires, via post, at a hotel where 
they were staging one of their conventions. They completed them at the
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convention, where the convenor collected them in person and returned them to 
the researcher via post.
Ethics
Attached to the front ol the booklet was a sheet assuring respondents 
of anonymity, and advising respondents that if they felt that the questions were 
getting either too difficult or too personal, they could return questionnaires 
uncompleted, thus allowing participants the chance to withdraw from the study 
at any time. The frontisheet also included the researcher's contact details, so that 
participants could contact the researcher for further information and to receive a 
breakdown of the study's rationale and findings following analysis of the data.
Analysis of Data. Analyses of kurtosis and skewness for all 90 participants 
revealed that, for the combined participant pool of N  = 90, kurtosis and 
skewness for both attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience fell within the 
limits generally accepted as statistically acceptable for analyses by parametric 
statistical tests (for attitudes to mysticism, skewness = 0.173 and kurtosis = - 
.309, and for mystical experience, skewness = -.111 and kurtosis = -.926). 
Figures for both kurtosis and skewness, for both dependent variables, were 
therefore within the bounds of + 1 to -1 and +3 to -3 judged by conventional 
statistical fiat to be within the boundaries of skewness and kurtosis respectively 
to suppose homogeneous distribution of data. Thus, analysis of the data by a 
parametric inferential test was considered defensible. Although the Likert-type 
scales used meant that data were ordinal in the strict sense, a common practice 
of treating scores on Likert-type scales as interval was adopted for the purpose
of analysis. Statistical analyses revealed that there were no significant 
differences between the scores of respondents who had been presented with the 
Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale first, and respondents who had been 
presented with the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale first. Consequently, order of 
presentation of scales was not entered into the final data analyses.
5.4 Results
Note: A means of correcting for missing data was employed if a 
respondent had omitted two items or less on a scale. A mid-range response of 3 
was entered in such cases. This method of correcting for missing data was 
employed for five respondents from the Reichi group and three respondents 
from the Buddhist group. Respondents who had omitted responses to more than 
two items on a scale were eliminated for purpose of analysis, ensuring that only 
respondents who had completed at least 90% of both scales were used for the 
final data analyses. Since one Buddhist respondent and two Reichi healers had 
omitted more than two items from the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale, their scores 
were not entered into the final data analyses, leaving an N  of 90 for this purpose.
5.4.1 Internal Consistency of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
The Cronbach's Alpha of the new scale was satisfactory at .847. The 
loadings of individual items on the whole scale are displayed in Table 5.2. All 
items had a loading of at least .2 on the scale except:
Item 5: I can really understand why many people (including religious leaders 
such as the clergy or rabbis) have perceived mystics as mad.
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Item 14. Major and important differences exist between the hallucinations of 
psychotics and the experiences of the mystics.
Item 29. Divine providence and the sovereignty of God imply that mystics 
cannot achieve true union with God.
Item 31: One should pay special scrutiny to what those reporting mystical or 
religious experiences really believe in, especially if they come from a religious 
background different to one’s own.
5.4.2 Items Distinguishing High and Low Scorers on the Attitudes to 
Mysticism Scale
Item analysis was also performed on the new scale by a MANOVA, 
with one independent variable at two levels (range of score: above median 
versus below median) and treating the 32 items on the scale as dependent 
variables (see Table 5.3). This largely corroborated the results of the Cronbach’s 
alpha statistics. As with the Cronbach’s alpha, this method suggested 
elimination of Items 5, 14, 29 and 31. This method also suggested elimination 
of Item 6 (“God alone is the fountainhead of all religious revelations, so mystics 
deceive themselves if they think that that they can obtain union with God by 
their own efforts”).
Construction of a 24-item version of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
Following item analyses, 24 items from the Attitudes to Mysticism 
scale were selected to produce a revised version, from which unreliable items 
had been discarded but which still included at least two items from each item 
content category. This maintained a high Cronbach's Alpha of .854. All
1indi\ idual items had loadings ol at least .29 on this version of the scale except 
Item 2, Some of the most moving literature ever written has been the work of 
the world s great mystics , which had a loading of .18 on the 24-item version of 
the scale, and Item 30, I am rather suspicious of those who would have us 
believe that mystical experiences in all the world religions are more or less the 
same”, which had a loading of .19 on the 24-item version. No items had 
negative item-to-scale loadings. Items 5, 6, 14, 29 and 31, all of which either had 
low item-to-scale correlations or low discrimination between high and low 
scorers on the scale, as indicated in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, were discarded from this 
version of the scale. However, in the interest of shortening and sharpening the 
questionnaire to make it more accessible to respondents, three other items were 
also eliminated. These were Item 1 ("If I were to think of a prototypical 
religious person, I would think of a mystic or some one who reports religious 
experiences, rather than some one who attends religious sendees regularly"), 
which was eliminated due to its rather long-winded wording that may have 
reduced the accessibility of the questionnaire for some respondents; Item 4 
"Our sins are justified through faith, that is, through belief that God alone can 
save us from our sins - we are not very likely to get very far by constant reliance 
at our own efforts attempts at the spiritual quest"), which was found to have a 
low item-to-scale correlation (below .2) on a 28-item version of the scale; and 
Item 26 (“To have had a religious or mystical experience indicates more 
commitment to one’s faith than whether one goes to one's place of worship 
regularly”). It can be observed from Tables 5.2 and 5.3 that, with the exception 
of Item 26, none of the items eliminated had a loading on the initial 
version of the scale that exceeded .3 or produced significant differences
1Table 5.2. Loadings of Items on the Initial 32-itcm version of the Attitudes 
to Mysticism Scale
Note: All items in right-hand column are positive loadings.
Item S ca le  L o a d in g  |
1 .26
2
.20
3 .48
4 .23
5
1 2
6 .27
7
.39
8
' 4 2
9 .36
1 0 3 9
n .40
1 2 • 4 3
1 3
.50
1 4
.15
1 5 ' 4 2
1 6 3 9
17
.40
18
.52
19 3 4
20
3 3
1 21 ' 4 7
22 .28 ;
23 .35
2 4
.63
2 5 3 2
26 .33
f  27 .53
r  28 .29
r  29 .17
r  30
• 2 4
3 1
.07
32 .43
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rab|e 5.3. Items on 32-item version of Attitudes to Mysticism Scale 
is mguishing High and Low Scorers According to Results of MANOVA
1 Item F-ratio 1
i 6.08*
2
3.99*
3 20.81**
4 8.71*
5 0.71
6 2.33
7
11.36** |
8
6.05*
9 14.72**
10 15.74**
1 1
8.38*
1 12 20.23**
1 3
14.42**
14 0.56
1 5
6.82*
1 6
[ 14.25**
1 7
20.28**
1 8
21.06**
1 9
16.18**
20 29.86**
21 14.16**
22 6.49*
23 6.59*
2 4
33.72**
1 25 15.32**
2 6
8.82**
27 19.94**
28 14.90**
29 2.42
30 6.30*
31 0.75
| 32 14.59** 1
* = p  < 0.05 **=p<0.01
between high and low scorers. However, Item 26 was eliminated as it was
considered to overlap in meaning with Item 32. Reduction of the scale to 24 
items was considered a means of increasing the scale's accessibility, and
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therefore improving chances of good return rates from future empirical work 
with the scale.
Of the eliminated items, two were from the category asking about whether 
the ritual dimension of religiosity was more highly valued than the experiential; 
two were from the category asking about attitudes to solafidianism; two were 
from the category asking whether the doctrinal dimension of religion is valued 
more highly than the experiential; and two items were from the category asking 
whether participants equated pathology with mysticism. This meant that an even 
spread of items had been discarded from four of the scale’s eight item 
categories. Elimination of these eight items was therefore considered to leave a 
scale which still assessed a good range of opinions and beliefs about mysticism. 
It was assumed that this would not create substantial problems for assessments 
of its construct validity.
5.4.3 Comparisons of Students, Reichi Healers, Nichiren Buddhists and 
Mensa Paranormal Members on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation 
Scale and Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
Mean scores on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale and the 
24-item version of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale are displayed in Table 5.4.
As the Attitudes to Mysticism used a 24-item scale on which respondents placed 
Likert-type 1-5 responses, scores on this scale could range from 24 (most 
negative attitudes to mysticism) to 120 (most positive attitudes to mysticism), 
with a theoretical mid-range of 72. As the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation 
Scale is a 21-item questionnaire and 1-5 Likert responses had been employed
for this scale, scores could range from 21 (least mystical) to 105 (most mystical) 
with a theoretical mid-range of 63.
Table 5.4 Mean Scores of Students, Reichi Healers, Nichiren Buddhists and 
Mensa Paranormal Members on Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation 
Scale and 24-item version of Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
Scale: Francis-Louden Mystical  
Orientat ion Scale
24-i tem version o f  Att i tudes to 
Mysticism Scale
Group: Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range
Students (A^  = 4 1 ) 54.17 15.31 23-88 77.41 15.31 55-118
Reichi Healers (N= 22) 75.45 17.57 28-103 89.00 13.17 64-108
Nichiren Buddhists  (N = 11) 72.09 19.70 41-99 91.27 12.34 72-109
Mensa Paranormal (N = 16) 66.88 22.20 26-100 84.31 12.66 51-103
Total (N = 90) 63.82 20.80 23-1103 83.17 14.90 51-118
It can be observed from Table 5.4 how differences in means were in 
the predicted direction on both the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale 
and the new scale to assess attitudes to mysticism. Reichi healers and Nichiren 
Daishonen Buddhists, as predicted, scored higher on average than students on 
both scales. Members of Mensa Paranormal also scored higher on average than 
did students, although the differences here were not as great as were those 
between Buddhists and students or between Reichi healers and students.
5.4.4 Inferential Statistics to Test Formal Hypotheses
Although the central aims of this study were to assess the psychometric 
properties of the new scale, means of assessments of this new scale’s construct 
validity and criterion-related validity had been presented in the form of testable 
hypotheses (Hypothesis 5.1 to test construct validity and 5.2 and 5.3 to assess
criterion-related validity). As explained below, these hypotheses were tested 
using parametric inferential tests.
5.4.5 Assessment of Construct Validity of Attitudes to Mysticism Scale: 
Testing of Hypothesis 5.1
Hypothesis 5.1 was tested by analysis of the magnitude of correlation 
between the Attitudes to Mysticism scale and the Francis Louden Mystical 
Orientation Scale, using Pearson's Product Moment Correlation. Correlations 
between the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale and both the Francis-Louden Mystical 
Orientation Scale and its seven sub-scales are presented in the Table 5.5. All 
these correlations reached significance at the level of/? < 0.001. Of the seven 
sub-scales on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, the 24-item 
version of the new scale correlated most strongly with that assessing unitive 
nature of experience. As the correlation between scores on the new scale and 
scores on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale was highly significant 
(r = 0.538; N  = 90; p < 0.001), data for the combined sample of 90 participants 
supported Hypothesis 5.1, indicating high construct validity for the new scale. 
The highest of these correlations was that between attitudes to mysticism and 
the unitive sub-scale of the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale. This 
indicated how confidence in the construct validity of the new scale could be 
strengthened if mystical experience were taken specifically to mean unitive
experience.
200
Table..5,^ Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism and Francis-Louden 
MystjcaLOrientation Scale and its Seven Sub-Scales (N =  90
ME I N T P U TI TE
.523 .327 .452 .394' .355' '.518 .454 .483
Note: All o f above coefficients significant at p < .001.
M.E. =  mystical experience (total score on Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale);
1 =  ineffability (items from this scale assessing ineffability of experience); N = noetic quality 
(items from this scale assessing noetic quality o f experience); T = transiency (items from this 
scale assessing transiency o f experience); P = passivity (items from this scale assessing 
passivity of experience); U = unitive experience (items from this scale assessing whether 
experience is unitive); Tl =  time transcendence (items from this scale assessing whether 
experience is perceived as transcending ordinary time); TE = true ego (items from this scale 
assessing ego loss).
5.4.6 Comparisons of Scores of Reichi Healers, Buddhists, Mensa
Paranormal and Students on Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale 
and Attitudes to Mysticism Scale: Testing of Hypotheses 5.2 to 5.4.
Assessments of criterion-related validity of the new scale were achieved 
by comparing the responses of students, the Buddhists, the Reichi healers and 
the Mensa Paranormal members on the new scale. Statistical tests were applied 
to the data to test Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.3. As the fourth hypothesis, 5.4. had 
predicted that the Reichi healers and Buddhists would score more highly on the 
Francis-Louden Orientation Scale than would the students, the scores of these
four groups on this scale were also compared. Data were analyzed by a 
between-groups MANOVA with the one independent variable of group at four 
levels (Students vs. Reichi vs. Buddhist vs. Mensa Paranormal) and the two 
dependent variables of attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. The
resulting F-ratios are displayed in Table 5.6.
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Table_5.6 F-ratios for Attitudes to Mysticism and Mystical Experience For
MANOVA comparing responses of Students, Reichi Healers, Buddhists 
and Mensa Paranormal Members
Scale Degrees of Freedom F-ratio
Attitudes to mysticism 3 4.392 
p < 0.007
Mystical experience 3 7.162
p <0.001
1 ukey’s Honest Test of Statistically Significant Differences was selected 
as an appropriate post hoc test, as it was not considered that the number of 
pairings being tested was sufficiently high to demand use of Bonferroni’s post 
hoc test. Results of these post hoc comparisons are presented in Table 5.6.1.
Nichiren Buddhists and Reichi healers both scored significantly higher 
than did the students on both the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale and 
the scale to assess attitudes to mysticism. Mensa Paranormal respondents did 
not, however, score significantly differently from any of the other three groups 
on either scale, occupying an intermediate level between the means of the
students and those of the Buddhists and Reichi healers. The Buddhists and
Reichi healers did not differ significantly from each other on either scale.
In support of the new scale's criterion-related validity were the strong between- 
group differences observed between the students and the Reichi healers and 
Buddhists, offering support to Hypothesis 5.2. However, Hypothesis 5.3 was 
not supported. Although the difference in means between Mensa Paranormal
members and students on the new scale to assess attitudes to mysticism was in
the predicted direction, it was not strong enough to reach statistical significance.
Finally, Hypothesis 5.4 was supported, as both the Reichi healers and the 
Buddhists, as predicted, scored significantly higher on the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale than did the students.
Note: Negative numbers indicate higher mean score of second group listed
Scale Difference in Group Means
Attitudes to Mysticism Students versus Reichis 
-11.3415*-.
Students versus Buddhists 
-13.6142*
Students versus Mensa 
6.900
Reichis versus Buddhists 
2.273
Reichis versus Mensa 
-4.688
Mensa versus Buddhists 
-6.960
Mystical Experience Students versus Reichis 
-17.921*
Students versus Buddhists 
-21.284*
Students versus Mensa 
12.704
Reichis versus Buddhists 
3.364
Reichis versus Mensa 
8.580
Mensa versus Buddhists 
-5.216
* =p< 0.05.
5.5 Discussion
The data collected for the study reported in this chapter provided 
evidence that the newly devised Attitudes to Mysticism Scale is: (i) high in
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internal consistency; (ii) high in construct validity; and (iii) high in criterion- 
related validity. Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 were each supported by the data. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 5.1, statistically significant correlations were 
obser\ ed between scores on the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale and scores on the 
Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, indicating the construct validity of 
the new scale. As predicted by Hypothesis 5.2, Reichi healers and Buddhists 
scored significantly higher than did the students on the Attitudes to Mysticism 
Scale, indicating that the new scale had good criterion-related validity. 
Hypothesis 5.4, predicting that Nichiren Buddhists and Reichi healers would
score significantly higher on a measure of mystical experience than would 
students, was also supported.
The only hypothesis that was not supported was Hypothesis 5.3, which 
had predicted higher scores for members of Mensa Paranormal than for students 
on the new scale to assess attitudes to mysticism. However, the difference 
between this group and students, while not statistically significant, w'as in the 
predicted direction. The Mensa Paranormal group, on both variables, occupied a 
mid-range position between the students and the Reichis and the Buddhists.
That these latter two groups should have scored higher than Mensa Paranormal 
on both scales is unsurprising if Buddhism is considered a pro-mystical religion, 
Reichi healing itself being a largely Zen-influenced therapy. This aspect of the 
results therefore poses no substantial challenges to the criterion-related validity 
of the new scale.
Attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience appeared to share about 
25% variance, suggesting enough unshared variance to be treated as separate 
concepts. This meant that, although correlations between this new scale and the
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Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale were high enough to judge the new 
scale as ha\ ing adequate construct validity, they were not so high as to lead to 
decisions that the new scale was redundant. Thus, the new scale could be 
declared to be capable ol contributing new information in the psychology of 
religion, assessing a construct related to but nevertheless distinct from those
assessed by scales, such as the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, that 
assess personal mystical experience.
5.6 Summary and Implications of Chanter Five
This chapter has reported on the design and evaluation of a new scale for 
use in research into transpersonal psychometrics, to assess attitudes to 
mysticism. After elimination of certain items from the scale, the scale 
maintained high internal consistency in its revised, 24-item version. Between- 
groups comparisons suggested that, as predicted, two groups for whom taking 
positive attitudes to mysticism is likely to be a prescriptive norm scored 
significantly more highly on this scale than did a convenience sample of 
students. Attitudes to mysticism can therefore be seen as a variable that may 
meaningfully be assessed by psychometric scaling.
The size of the correlation between attitudes to mysticism and mystical 
experience provided evidence that these two variables are related, but not 
identical. Attitudes to mysticism can therefore be considered to be both a 
variable that can be meaningfully assessed using psychometric scaling, and a 
worthwhile new concept to explore in transpersonal psychometrics. Use of a 
scale to assess this concept could prove to have importance in establishing, for
example, precise patterns of correlations between personality traits and 
variables more immediately related to mystical experience.
In Chapter Six, application of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale to four 
groups distinguished by the taxonomy outlined in Chapter Two will be a focal 
concern, to assess the extent to which empirical data support this taxonomy. 
Continuing with the theme that psychoticism may be too broad a trait to meet 
adequate assessments of correlations between transpersonal experience and 
personality, as argued throughout Chapters Two to Four inclusive, Chapter Six 
will also provide information on how transpersonal experience relates to both 
psychoticism and more narrow-band personality traits. The study reported in 
Chapter Six aims to assess potential relationships between personality and 
mystical experience, but also potential relationships between personality and 
attitudes to mysticism. Questions about the heterogeneity of psychoticism and 
whether this complicates research in transpersonal psychometrics can be applied 
to assessments of attitudes to mysticism just as much as attitudes to mysticism.
CHAPTER SIX
EMPR1CAL ASSESSMENTS OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
PSYCHOT1 ClSM AND RELATED TRAITS IN CROUPS 
DIFFERING IN ATTITUDES TO MYSTICISM
6.1 Introduction
This chapter will present the results of a study which assessed the extent 
to which psychoticism correlates with mystical experience. However, in 
addition to assessments of psychoticism on the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire, measurements of the FFM (five-factor model) traits were taken 
in this study. This enabled assessments of the extent to which apparent links 
between psychoticism and mystical experience related to mediated links that 
both variables may have with traits which represent distinguishable facets of 
psychoticism.
In Chapter Four, evidence was presented for linking mystical experience 
to one particular facet of psychoticism. namely liberalism. That 
unconventionality represents a particular facet of psychoticism has been well- 
argued in papers such as Heath and Martin (1990) and Thalboume et al. (1997). 
It is therefore clear that if mystical experience is linked with psychoticism 
through a link with this particular facet of this broad trait, the FFM trait with 
which mystical experience should share a particularly strong relationship is 
openness to experience.
Another important aim of the study reported in this chapter concerns 
sampling issues. Positions such as those of Francis (1992a), representing 
psychoticism as a variable that is associated with reduced levels of
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conditionability, imply that if mystical experience is a learnt construct, negative 
correlations between mystical experience and psychoticism will be more 
prominent in those groups where this particular form of religious experience is 
valued. An assessment of respondents from both pro-mystical and anti-mystical 
religious groups has an advantage over assessments of respondents from only 
one such population in such research. It offers a more adequate psychometric 
assessment of the social constructivism of authors such as Katz (1978).
A further important aim of the study to be reported in this chapter
concerns the variable of attitudes to mysticism. In Chapter Five, development of 
a new scale to assess this construct was outlined, and it was observed that a 24- 
item version ot this scale had high internal consistency as well as good construct 
validity and good criterion-related validity. For the study to be reported in the 
current chapter, predictions were made that Pagans and Buddhists would score 
higher on this variable than would Christians or Jews. The study reported in 
Chapter Four provided evidence that liberal members of the Judeao-Christian 
tradition may score higher on measures of mystical experience than 
conservative adherents of this tradition, but did not assess either group on 
attitudes to mysticism. The study to be reported in this chapter will go further, 
comparing the responses of two groups that may be said to reflect a rather 
unconventional form of spirituality (Buddhists and Pagans) with two religious 
groups exemplifying more conventional forms of religion in the United 
Kingdom (Christians and Jews) on both mystical experience and attitudes to 
mysticism.
The Buddhists assessed in this chapter are Buddhists from a Western 
population, raised in the United Kingdom, but for such people Buddhism is still
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popularly perceived as an example of teachings, philosophy and religion 
imported from the East that has inspired many Americans and Europeans. Mere 
comparisons ol Buddhists with Christians and Jews would therefore be open to 
charges that any observed differences between pro-mystical and anti-mystical 
groups on attitudes to mysticism may relate to differences between Eastern and 
Western modes of thinking, rather than to attitudes to mysticism. Use of a 
group supposedly equally pro-mystical but whose traditions and language are 
thoroughly W estem" (Pagans) defends the study reported here against such 
charges.
As with attempts to examine the correlates of mystical experience, use 
of the FFM as a model which represents distinguishable facets of psychoticism 
was considered important in examination of the personality correlates of 
attitudes to mysticism. An important reason for assessment of how the FFM 
traits (and the Fittle Thirty facets of these traits) relate to attitudes to mysticism 
is that to do so provides information on whether empirical data support 
conceptual distinctions between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. 
Data indicating that FFM correlates of mystical experience and attitudes to 
mysticism differ would provide reasonably solid evidence for treating these 
variables as distinct constructs. Important information on how the precise 
personality correlates of these two variables may differ could be lost if only 
global assessments of psychoticism were taken.
Forman's (1998) perennial psychology, in associating cultural learning 
with belief rather than experience, implies that significant statistical 
relationships may be observed between traits such as psychoticism and attitudes 
to mysticism rather than, as the social constructivism of Katz (1978; 1983)
implies, between mystical experience and psychoticism. It is important to 
highlight how this means that the nature of the sample studied needs to be 
considered in making predictions about the likely correlates of attitudes to 
mysticism. Both the social constructivism of Katz (1978; 1983) and the 
particular form of perennialism espoused by Forman (1998) imply that 
significant positive and significant negative correlations will be found between 
traits indicating heightened conditionability and attitudes to mysticism
respectively in groups that value mysticism and those that are suspicious of 
mysticism.
Additional Data to Test Whether Mystical Experience is a Learnt 
Construct
Francis (1992a) has made a clear case that inverse correlations between 
religiosity and psychoticism are evidence that religiosity is associated with how 
readily people are conditioned to hold tender-minded attitudes. Implicit in such 
an assertion is the view that assessment of psychoticism can help to assess 
whether a variable’s ontogenetic development relates to social learning, and 
indeed, Francis* position has helped to signify how assessment of psychoticism 
may be one means of doing this. However, as noted in earlier chapters, other 
possible ways to assess whether a variable such as mystical experience has an 
ontogenesis arising through learning are possible. In the psychology of religion, 
assessments of age and of length of time with which one has been a member of 
one’s religious group may be an additional important means to achieve this end.
In the empirical study reported in this chapter, the ages of participants, 
and the length of time with which they had been affiliated with their religious
1group, were assessed. If religious experience is a learnt construct, theoretical 
foundations exist lor predicting that longer periods of exposure to the teachings 
ol in-groups that value particular forms of transpersonal experience will 
increase the probability that members of such groups will report experiences 
valued by such groups. This means that, for groups which value mystical 
experience, age and length of affiliation with such groups should be 
significantly positively correlated with mystical experience, providing 
theoretical rationale for Hypotheses 6.11 and 6.12.
6.2 Hypotheses
As a large number of hypotheses were being tested in this study, it is of 
some help to introduce this section by noting how these hypotheses fall into 
three basic categories. The first four hypotheses tested in this study related to 
predictions about the personality correlates of mystical experience, and how 
these were likely to vary in accordance with whether a pro-mystical or anti- 
mystical group were being assessed (Hypotheses 6.1 to 6.4). Hypotheses 6.5 to 
6.10 were connected with the attitudes people take towards mysticism. Finally, 
Hypotheses 6.11 and 6.12 were connected with age and the length of time with 
which one has affiliated with one’s current religion.
Hypotheses on Mystical Experience and Personality
The study to be reported in this chapter tested the following hypotheses about 
the relationships between mystical experience and personality:
6.1 Mystical experience will be significantly negatively correlated with 
psychoticism, and with the impulsivity facet of NEO neuroticism;
6.2 There will be a statistically significant and positive correlation between 
NEO conscientiousness and mystical experience;
6.3 There will be a statistically significant and positive correlation between 
NEO openness to experience and mystical experience;
6.4 Negative correlations between psychoticism and mystical experience, and 
positive correlations between FFM conscientiousness and mystical experience, 
will be stronger in two pro-mystical religions (Pagans and Buddhists) than in
two groups likely to hold less positive attitudes towards mysticism (Christians 
and Jews).
Hypotheses Related to Attitudes to Mysticism
Flypotheses related to attitudes to mysticism may be considered 
exploratory insofar as the scale being tested in the study reported here 
represents a new scale. The hypotheses related to this variable may be stated 
formally as:
6.5 Pagans and Buddhists will score significantly higher on a measure of 
attitudes to mysticism than will Christians or Jews;
6.6 In all religious groups, mystical experience will be significantly positively 
correlated with attitudes to mysticism;
6.7 Psychoticism will be significantly negatively correlated with attitudes to 
mysticism in Buddhists and Pagans;
6.8 Psychoticism will be significantly positively correlated with attitudes to 
mysticism in Christians and Jews;
6.9 FFM conscientiousness will be significantly positively correlated with 
attitudes to mysticism in pro-mystical Pagans and Buddhists;
16.10 FFM conscientiousness will be significantly negatively correlated with 
attitudes to mysticism in non-mystical Christians and Jews.
Additional Hypotheses to Test for a Possible Learnt Basis to Mystical 
Experience
The final hypotheses being tested were based upon the position that 
assessments ol age and length of affiliation with religious group provide an
additional means to assess the extent to which mystical experience arises 
through social learning:
6.11 Age will be significantly positively correlated with mystical experience in 
pro-mystical, but not in anti-mystical, religions.
6.12 Length of affiliation with one's current religion will be significantly 
positively correlated with mystical experience in pro-mystical, but not anti- 
mystical, religions.
6.3 Method
6.3.1 Design
This study took the form of a psychometric survey. As certain 
hypotheses were predictions about relationships between variables, this study 
was, in part, a correlational design. The study also employed a between-groups 
design, with one between groups variable at four levels (Religious Group: 
Buddhist vs. Christian vs. Pagan vs. Jew) and eight dependent variables - 
mystical experience, attitudes to mysticism, and the six personality traits of 
psychoticism, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, conscientiousness and
openness to experience.
6.3.2 Respondents
The sample comprised 214 respondents, selected via convenience 
sampling. These were recruited either by contacts with the churches, 
synagogues or other religious organisations with which these people affiliated,
or through putting advertisements in journals. The participants comprised four 
groups as follows:
(a) Christian Protestant respondents (N = 66).
The Christian respondents in the sample comprised 42 females, 23 males 
and one participant who did not record gender. The ages of Christian 
respondents ranged from 17 to 82 (mean = 54.67, s.d. = 14.69).
These respondents were mainly United Reformed Church, 
Congregationalist and Salvation Army respondents recruited from the East 
Midlands. The majority were approached after the researcher had written to 
United Reformed Churches listed in the East Midlands Synod o f the United 
Reformed Church Yearbook for 2000-2001. Five churches listed in this 
handbook for the Derbyshire region, four churches from the Leicestershire 
region and four from the Nottinghamshire region were contacted by post and 
asked whether they would be willing to participate in the study. This enabled 
contacts to be made with the churches in the East Midlands likely to have the 
larger congregations, as indicated by the number of members quoted in the 
Yearbook for each individual church.
People at one church from Derbyshire, one church from Leicestershire 
and two churches from Nottinghamshire contacted the researcher and consented 
to take part. The researcher also contacted one church from the Milton Keynes
region and six churches Irom the Northamptonshire region listed in the 
yearbook by post, in person or telephone. People from five of these churches 
consented to take part. Thus, respondents from a total often United Reformed 
Churches from the East Midlands agreed to participate in the study, representing 
fifty per cent of the twenty churches contacted and six per cent of the total 156 
churches listed in the East Midlands Synod of the United Reformed Church 
yearbook for 2000-2001. A Congregationalist Church in Leicestershire and a
Salvation Army church in Northamptonshire provided additional respondents
for this sample. To increase the total number of Christian Protestant 
participants, a small number of respondents (Methodist, Anglican and 
evangelical Christian) were collected either via snowball sampling, or as a 
convenience sample from a population of students from the college where the 
researcher worked. This gave a total of 66 for the whole body of Christian 
Protestants in the sample.
Thirteen of the Christian Protestants were drawn from Salvation Army 
population, and 53 were United Reformed, Congregationalist, Methodist or 
Anglican. The Christians comprised approximately 30% of the total sample 
assessed.
(b) Jewish respondents (N = 32).
The Jewish respondents in the sample comprised 16 females, 14 
males and two respondents for whom gender was not given. Age had been given 
by 27 of these respondents, and where given, ages ranged from 17 to 78 (mean 
age of respondents indicating age (N = 27) = 54.85; s.d. = 16.18). Efforts to 
recruit Jewish respondents initially involved placing an advertisement in a 
Jewish publication, but this method of recruiting respondents resulted in a very
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low response rate. Snowball sampling and recruiting through a local radio 
station and a student population known to include Jewish students were 
theretore employed to obtain an initial set of Jewish respondents. The researcher 
subsequently wrote to 53 synagogues in the United Kingdom. Seven gave 
consent to participation in the study, stating that several people at their 
synagogues would be willing to complete questionnaires. Questionnaires were 
subsequently sent to these synagogues by the researcher for return following 
completion. One of these synagogues later returned all questionnaires 
uncompleted due to time constraints. Thus, the number of contacted synagogues 
who successfully responded to request to participate in the research study by 
post represented 11.3% of the synagogues contacted in this way. The 
researcher also contacted a number of Masorti Synagogues through use of the 
Masorti Synagogue web-site via e-mail, representing all of the Masorti 
Synagogues listing e-mail addresses on this web-site. Staff at one of these 
Masorti Synagogues responded to the researcher's request by giving consent to 
take part in the study. The synagogues contacted were in geographical areas 
ranging from the South-East (London and Essex) through East Anglia and the 
Cotswolds up as far north as Cheshire. The Jews comprised approximately 15% 
of the total sample assessed.
(c) Pagan and New Age respondents (N= 63).
The Pagans in the sample comprised 36 females and 27 males. Age was 
not given by one respondent; for the 62 respondents who had indicated age, 
ages ranged from 17 to 68, mean average age = 41.92; s.d. = 11.83. Pagan 
respondents were recruited largely from advertisements in journals circulated in 
Pagan circles - Silver Wheel, Third Stone, The Little Red Book and
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Destiny!Sphere. Advertisements in 7ouchstone, and on the Cornish Pagans' 
web-site were also used to recruit participants. Further Pagan participants were 
recruited after contacts were made with five Pagan organizations. These were 
Pagan Elders, an organization devoted to practitioners of contemporary 
Paganism over fifty; the London Earth Mysteries Society; the Pagan Federation 
of the United Kingdom; and two local groups (one in Nottinghamshire and one 
in Northamptonshire) known to be regular meeting venues of Pagan adherents. 
Questionnaires were distributed to participants from these organizations after 
contacts via e-mail or telephone had confirmed that at least some members of 
these groups would be willing to participate in the study. Contacts with these 
organizations brought the total number of Pagans and New Agers in the sample 
up to 63. Responses from Pagan organizations and magazines were generally 
positive; only tw^ o of the Pagan journals contacted refused to advertise for 
participants for the study.
Of the Pagan participants, 21 indicated their particular form of 
Paganism as "Druid", although three of these participants qualified this by self-
descriptions such as "Wiccan Druid" or "Druidic knight". Of the remaining 
forty-two Pagan participants, seven left their description of their religious 
affiliation as generally "Pagan" and did not specify affiliation to any particular 
form of Paganism; eight specified their particular form of affiliation of 
Paganism as Wiccan (qualified in one instance as "Dianic Wiccan"); three 
indicated "New Age" or healing forms of Paganism; five indicated affiliation 
with a form of witchcraft (qualified in one instance by assertions of influence of 
both Native American traditions and Cornish myths); five indicated Pagan 
affiliation as being to do with kinship with nature and two to do with pantheistic
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beliefs, and four indicated Pagan affiliation as being "hedgewitch" or "solitary". 
No other responses were frequent enough to justify their own category; other 
self-identifications were those given by one respondent only, including "Celtic", 
"Western Mystery Tradition", "Norse Tradition", "magickian" (sic. - such 
spelling was used by one respondent intentionally to draw a sharp distinction 
between Pagan magic (="magick") and stage conjuring) and shamanism. These 
categorisations, based upon Pagan participants' responses to an open-ended 
question on religious affiliation set to all respondents (see "Procedure") were 
problematic in the case of Pagan participants, who would frequently describe 
themselves in ways suggesting an eclectic mix of Pagan influences. For 
example, one self-identification was as "Wiccan - mostly solitary" - indicating 
influences of both Wiccan and Hedgewitch forms of Paganism. One participant 
indicated a blend of Wiccan and Quaker beliefs, and at least two of the 
participants who indicated affiliation with a form of witchcraft linked this with 
Celtic spirituality, in one case describing this as influence from the Welsh 
pantheon. The most extreme form of this "multiple self-identification" was the 
case of one participant who described form of religious affiliation as "Nature/ 
Ancestors/ Hindu/ Pagan/ Person-centred - you don't have to be one thing" in 
response to the open-ended question set to all participants on religious 
affiliation. The Pagans represented approximately 30% of the total sample 
assessed.
(d) Buddhist respondents (N = 53).
The Buddhist respondents comprised 26 male and 23 female 
respondents, and four respondents for whom age and gender were not given.
Ages of Buddhist respondents who had indicated age (N = 50) ranged from 21
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to 7o, mean 42.4, s.d. 12.16. Buddhist respondents were recruited from the 
following populations:
Zen Buddhists. International Zen Association U.K., an organization based in 
Britain largely orientated around Zen Buddhism from the Soto Zen tradition, 
and the Western Ch'an Fellowship, were the organizations approached by the 
researcher via e-mail, post or telephone. Western Ch'an Fellowship and several 
branches of International Zen Association U.K. consented to take part in the 
study, and the researcher mailed questionnaires to them. A total of 27 of the 
Buddhist participants, representing approximately 50% of the Buddhists in the 
total sample, were representatives of the Zen or Ch'an tradition. (In this 
particular sample, Zen can be understood as equivalent to Soto Zen rather than 
Rinzai Zen, as International Zen Association U.K. is a Soto Association, and 
those participants who had specified the particular form of Zen/ Ch'an 
Buddhism to which they adhered referred only to Soto Zen).
Nagarjuna Buddhists. These Buddhists were contacted after contact with the 
Nagarjuna Buddhist Centre which, at the time of data collection, was situated in 
Leicestershire; permission was sought from a representative leader of the centre, 
who consented to the centre's participation in the study. Three of the Buddhists 
used in the sample were recruited from this centre.
Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (F.W.B.O.). The researcher contacted 
the Birmingham branch of the F.W.B.O., which consented to participation in the 
study, and a member of the F.W.B.O. based in Essex known to a personal 
contact of the researcher also took part in the study. Six of the Buddhists in the 
sample were members of F.W.B.O.
Tibetan Buddhists. Several organizations representing Tibetan Buddhism were
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contacted, two in London, one on a retreat in the North-West of England, and 
ga\ e their consent to have questionnaires mailed to them and to return them to 
the researcher via post upon completion. Seventeen of the Buddhists in the 
sample were Tibetan Buddhists recruited from one of these centres. The Tibetan 
Buddhists on a retreat in the North-West were especially associated with the 
New Kadampa Tradition (N.K.T.).
In recruiting participants for the study, two additional Buddhists were
contacted from membership of the Scientific and Medical Network, an
%
organization devoted to complementary and alternative health issues, to bring 
the total number of Buddhists in the sample up to 53, representing 
approximately 25% of the sample. These respondents were contacted after the 
researcher had checked the membership list of the Scientific and Medical 
Network in its electronic form, and done a search for all such respondents who 
had listed their religious affiliation as being "Buddhist". The electronic 
presentation of the S.M.N. membership list, which is open to S.M.N. members, 
permitted easy access to such a search procedure, after typing in the appropriate 
keyword "Buddhist". Care was taken not to write to individuals who the 
researcher knew were being contacted in other ways; access to e-mail or address 
of potential respondents in this way allowed the researcher to e-mail or to write 
to such respondents. These respondents were assured that their names and 
contact details would not be passed on to any one - a point that needed to be 
stressed especially sensitively in making contact with respondents this way, as 
the S.M.N. membership list is only accessible by S.M.N. members. Although 
the researcher was himself a member of S.M.N., the participants contacted by 
the researcher using this method did not include any individuals formerly
personally known to the researcher.
Respondents contacted by use of the S.M.N. list who agreed to consent 
to take part in the study were sent the appropriate questionnaires. Responses to 
the demographic questions at the end ol the questionnaires listed by such 
participants indicated that such respondents were either affiliated with F.W.B.O. 
or were practitioners ol the Zen/Ch'an tradition ol Buddhism. Thus, rather than 
assign these respondents to a separate category, such respondents were assigned 
to either the Zen/ Ch'an group or the F.W.B.O. group as appropriate in making
a
the numerical assessments of each type of respondent in the above breakdown 
of the four types of Buddhist membership sampled in the study. The Buddhists 
comprised approximately 25% of the total sample assessed.
6.3.3 Materials
Dependent variables of mystical experience, attitudes to mysticism, 
psychoticism and the five FFM traits were assessed in the study. Respondents 
completed one scale to assess whether they themselves had had a mystical 
experience; one scale to assess their attitudes to mysticism; one scale to assess 
psychoticism; and one scale to assess the five traits of extraversion, neuroticism, 
openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness. The longer, 240- 
item version of the NEO-PI-R was used to ensure that comparisons could be 
made involving individual facets of the broad traits (see Chapter Three). The 
dependent variables of age and length of affiliation with religious group were 
also assessed.
The questionnaires used in the study were as follows:
1) Mystical experience was assessed by the Francis-Louden Mystical
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Orientation Scale (Francis & Louden, 2000a). This 21-item scale 
assesses mystical experience using the seven criteria of mystical 
experience as specified by Happold (1963), consisting of seven three- 
item sub-scales to assess ineffability, noetic quality o f experience, 
transiency, passivity, unitive nature o f experience, time-transcendence 
and loss of lalse ego as true ego is uncovered. Research has suggested 
that this scale has a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha of 0.94 (Francis & 
Louden, 2000a). Factor analyses of the scale have revealed a first basic 
factor accounting for 45.1% of variance in the scale, whereas a second 
factor accounts for a mere 7.3% (Francis & Louden, 2000a). This scale 
could therefore, in spite of its use of seven distinct sub-scales, be viewed 
as assessing mystical experience as a homogeneous construct. Rationale 
for choice of this scale rather than Hood's (1975) M-Scale was partly 
founded on informal observations during data collection for the study 
reported in Chapter Four, which indicated that respondents may have 
difficulty understanding the wording on the latter scale (cf. Thalboume 
& Delin, 1999). The Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale has 
been observed to have a high Cronbach's alpha of 0.94 (Bourke, Francis 
& Robbins, 2004; Francis & Louden, 2000a). This is higher than than 
the Cronbach’s alpha typically reported for the M-Scale, and so the 
Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale can therefore legitimately be 
judged as having better internal consistency and to be assessing a more 
homogeneous construct.
2) Attitudes to Mysticism was assessed by the 24-item version of the 
Attitudes to Mysticism Scale presented in Chapter Five, for which the
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Cronbach’s alpha had been found to be .854;
3) Psychoticism was assessed by the 32-item version of the Psychoticism
sub-scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, or E.P.Q. (Eysenck, 
Eysenck & Barrett, 1985).
4) The FFM traits were assessed by the NEO- PI, Form S (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992a). The 240-item version of this scale was used in the 
current study, enabling valid and reliable assessment of both the five 
traits in the five factor-model of personality and specific facets of each 
trait. High criterion-related validity and good Cronbach's alpha ' 
coefficients, ranging from .89 (for agreeableness) to .92 (for 
neuroticism), have been reported for this scale (Costa & McCrae,
1992a). Use of re-usable booklets, administered to participants who were 
also sent separate hand-scoring answer-sheets to record their responses, 
were also sent out to participants. Mean norms for the five traits of the 
NEO questionnaire, in both student and general adult populations, are 
available in Costa and McCrae (1992a).
After the four scales, a final sheet of A4 paper headed "Some final questions" 
asked the respondents the following questions:
Demographic information on age and gender;
With which religion they affiliated;
Whether they had always been adherents of this religion, and if not, how 
long they had adhered to it;
Whether they considered that any types of spiritual, religious or mystical
experience were central to their creed;
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The Alister Hardy question: "Have you ever felt as if you were 
influenced by a Power or Presence, whether you call it "God" or not, that was 
different to your everyday self? (Hardy, 1979);
The David Wuthnow question: "Have you ever felt as if you were in 
close contact with something sacred or holy?" (Wuthnow, 1976; cited in Hay, 
1982).
Respondents indicated their answers to the Alister Hardy and David
W
Wuthnow questions by marking one of three possible options. Yes, No or Don 7 
Know. In asking for questions on religious affiliation, participants were invited 
to write a little more about their religious affiliation, such as, for example, the 
particular type of Judaism or particular Christian denomination to which they 
subscribed. All questions on demographic details were worded in a way that 
enabled respondents to write their answers without supplying any identifiable 
details. It was also made clear to respondents that responses to the above 
questions on demographic information were optional. Following the questions 
on demographic details, participants were left with space for them to write, in 
their own words, qualitative comments about any personal religious or spiritual 
experiences they believed they had had if they wished to do so. Information in 
response to these demographic questions enabled assessments of the dependent 
variables of age and length of affiliation with religious group, as well as 
offering respondents the chance to add open-ended comments about their creed 
and spiritual experiences.
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6.3.4 Procedure
Following initial contacts with the churches, synagogues, organizations 
or individuals who had consented to take part in this study, the researcher 
posted envelopes containing the questionnaires as specified in the section on 
Materials . All respondents were sent four questionnaires; however, only 188 
of these respondents completed all four scales. Listwise comparisons involving 
all variables assessed on these scales therefore involve an N of 188.Respondents 
were sent stamped addressed envelopes for return of scales to the researcher. 
Each envelope contained an instruction sheet, headed "Religious Experience/ 
Spirituality Survey". This explained how the purpose of the survey was to 
research spiritual experiences. It also emphasised that all questionnaires could 
be completed anonymously, that participants could stop questionnaire 
completion at any stage, and provided the researcher's name, address, e-mail 
and telephone number contact details, so that participants could contact the 
researcher for a debriefing on findings. The instruction sheet explained to 
respondents that they did not have to do all four questionnaires at one sitting, 
and also included a note to encourage respondents to respond within a fortnight 
of receipt of the scales. The instruction sheet therefore complied with British 
Psychological Society Ethical guidelines on confidentiality, right to withdraw 
from a study at any time and the right of participants in a study to be debriefed. 
Presentation of materials distributed is given in Appendix C.
The tester's presence is required in some NEO studies, but Costa and 
McCrae (1992a) have pointed out that the test has frequently been administered 
in studies in which the participants have undertaken the project at home in the 
absence of a tester (as was the case with the current study). Hand-written
answer sheets, on which respondents could record their responses, were sent out 
with the booklet in the current study. This meant that respondents could 
complete their answers on the answer-sheet and return the original NEO 
question booklet when returning their responses to the researcher.
Answer-sheets provided with NEO re-usable booklets include a space on 
which respondents are asked to record their names, but Costa and McCrae 
(1992a) allow for modification of this standard procedure in situations where 
anonymity of respondents is needed. In the current study, comments were 
written in the space for name to indicate that respondents could complete 
answer-sheets anonymously.
The psychoticism sub-scale of the E.P.Q. employs 32 items and, for 
each item, respondents could answer "Yes", "No" or "Don't Know". Scores for 
this scale could therefore range from 32 (lowest in psychoticism) to 96 (highest 
in psychoticism), with 64 as the theoretical mid-range. Likert-type five-point 
scales were used on the other questionnaires. Scores on the 21-item Francis- 
Louden Mystical Orientation Scale could therefore range from 21 (least 
mystical) to 105 (most mystical) with a theoretical mid-range of 63. Scores on 
the 24-item Attitudes to Mysticism Scale could range from 24 (most negative in 
attitudes to mysticism) to 120 (most positive in attitudes to mysticism) with a 
theoretical mid-range of 72. NEO scores could range from 48 (lowest on trait 
assessed) to 240 (highest on trait assessed) with a theoretical mid-range of 144.
6.3.5 Analysis
Results were analysed using Multivariate Analysis of Variance (see 
"Results" section). Kurtosis and skewedness were checked for the sample as a
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whole and lor each ol the four specific creedal groups. In only two cases did 
these exceed +1 to -1 for skewedness and +3 to -3 for kurtosis, i.e. data could be 
considered normally distributed according to conventional fiat. Skewedness for 
Pagans and Christians for psychoticism was 1.248 and 1.289 respectively, 
slightly over 1 but near enough to this figure to justify treating the data as 
fulfilling the assumptions behind parametric tests. Skewedness of both groups 
revealed greater distribution of scores at the lower end of the psychoticism 
scale. Although this is typical ol the skewed nature of psychoticism commonly 
found in research, many published research papers on religiosity-personality 
correlates have used parametric statistics to observe correlations between 
psychoticism and religiosity-related variables.
Parametric tests have typically been described as more powerful than 
nonparametric tests (Siegel & Castellan, 1988), and the small number of 
participants for one of the groups being studied (the Jews, for whom N = 32) 
made it especially important that powerful tests were applied to the data. Use of 
parametric tests also permitted a greater choice of post hoc comparisons, 
whereas nonparametric tests would have limited the choice of post hoc 
comparison to Bonferroni's test as adapted for application to nonparametric 
data. Increased power of parametric tests may invite accusations of increased 
risk of Type One error, but application of parametric tests to interval data that 
violate one or more assumptions of such tests is unlikely to lead to major 
deviations from results obtained using non-parametric tests (Sheskin, 2000).
Qualitative Interview Data
In addition to collection of quantitative data for the study, a
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representative of each creed studied was interviewed on the topic of religious
experience, either in person or by telephone. This enabled a more in-depth
analysis ol how the lour religions studied were likely to respond to concepts
such as "mystical experience". Reference to observations made during these
interviews will be given in the discussion of the findings presented in the next 
chapter.
6. 4 Results
Results of the study are presented in three sections. Descriptive data on 
mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism are presented in 6.4.1. Inferential 
statistical tests to test Hypothesis 6.1 to 6.12 are presented in 6.4.2. Cross- 
creedal comparisons on each of the assessed personality traits are presented in 
Section 6.4.3.
6.4.1. Descriptive Data on Attitudes to Mysticism and Mystical Experience
The psychoticism sub-scale of the E.P.Q. employs 32 items and, for 
each item, respondents could answer "Yes", "No" or "Don't Know". Scores for 
this scale could therefore range from 32 (lowest in psychoticism) to 96 (highest 
in psychoticism), with 64 as the theoretical mid-range. Likert-type five-point 
scales were used on the other questionnaires. Scores on the 21-item Francis- 
Louden Mystical Orientation Scale could therefore range from 21 (least 
mystical) to 105 (most mystical) with a theoretical mid-range of 63. Scores on 
the 24-item Attitudes to Mysticism Scale could range from 24 (most negative in 
attitudes to mysticism) to 120 (most positive in attitudes to mysticism) with a 
theoretical mid-range of 72. NEO scores could range from 48 (lowest on trait
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assessed) to 240 (highest on trait assessed) with a theoretical mid-range of 144.
Mean scores and standard deviations for each group on attitudes to 
mysticism, mystical experience and each of the personality traits assessed are 
displayed in Table 6.1, while ranges of scores for each group on mystical 
experience and attitudes to mysticism are displayed in Table 6.2. Buddhists and 
Pagans both obtained, on average, higher scores than the Christians or the Jews,
Table 6.1 Mean Scores of Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Pagans on Mystical 
Experience (M.E.) and Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.)
Group: Christians Jews Buddhists Pagans Total:
Variable:
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. \ Mean S.D.
M.E.
7V = 210 
for Total
61.67 17.72 47.35 18.41 70.15 18.40 82.64 14.97 67.54 20.61
A.M.
N =206 
for Total
68.87 13.24 69.52 20.41 89.89 12.60 97.75 9.74 82.40 18.64
Note: Values o f N for mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism in the above table differ 
because the figures are based on pairwise data. N values for specific groups are displayed in Table 
6.2.
Table 6.2 Ranges of Scores for Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Pagans on
Mystical Experience (M.E.) and Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.)
Group: Christians Jews Buddhists Pagans Total:
Variable:
M.E. 23-99 
{N = 66)
21-87 
(TV =31)
25-105
(TV =52)
42-105
(N= 61)
21-105
(N = 210)
A.M 41-105
(TV =65)
31-108
(TV =31)
60-116 
(TV = 49)
80-119
(TV =61)
31-119
(N = 206)
corresponding exactly with theoretical predictions. The scores on the Francis- 
Louden Mystical Orientation Scale followed a similar pattern, with the 
Buddhists and Pagans scoring higher than either the Christians or the Jews.
6.4.2 Inferential Statistical Tests
Hypotheses 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 were tested by the calculation of correlation 
coefficients, using Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. The 
correlation coefficients between mystical experience and each of the assessed 
personality traits were calculated for the whole sample to test these hypotheses; 
equivalent correlation coefficients were calculated for each religious group to 
test Hypothesis 6.4. However, before testing for statistically significant 
correlations, an important preliminary' assessment of data was considered 
necessary, as each group comprised people coming from different wings or 
forms of each creed. Preliminary checks to determine whether data were 
complicated by in-group heterogeneity were therefore deemed necessary.
Statistical Checks of Groups for In-Group Homogeneity
Christian Protestants had been drawn from two main populations, the 
Salvation Army and the United Reformed Church (the latter group also included 
some Methodist participants, as at least one of the churches in the sample had 
been a mixed Methodist and United Reformed congregation). Data from these 
respondents were assessed by a between-groups MANOVA employing one 
independent variable at two levels (Denomination: U.R.C. vs. Salvation Army) 
and the eight dependent variables of mystical experience, attitudes to mysticism, 
psychoticism and the five traits assessed on the NEO-PI. Only for agreeableness 
did the F-ratio reach statistical significance (F = 8.66, d.f = 1,62;/? < 0.01).
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U.R.C. respondents (A 51) had a higher mean score for agreeableness 
(187.35, s.d. — 12.89) than did Salvation Army respondents (N = 13; X  =
173.76; s.d. = 16.30).
The Pagan participants were divided into two basic categories, "Druid" 
(A -  21) and other" (A = 38), for the 59 of the Pagan participants who had 
completed all four scales. Such a grouping represented respectively the 
"Establishment" and "radical" wings of contemporary Paganism. This binary 
split of the Pagan sample was considered to be an acceptable means to classify 
the Pagans in the sample. (Non-Druidic Pagans gave various self-identifications 
in response to the open-ended question asking about particular form of religious 
affiliation of a respondent, but none were given frequently enough to merit its 
own category). A between-groups MANOVA employing two levels of one 
independent variable (Pagan group: Druid versus Other) and the eight 
dependent variables of scores for mystical experience, attitudes to mysticism, 
psychoticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience, 
neuroticism and extraversion was used to assess potential differences within the 
Pagans in the sample. No statistically significant between-group differences 
were found for any of these dependent variables. The F-ratio for agreeableness 
approached statistical significance (F= 3.70; p < 0.07) with the Druids scoring 
slightly higher, on average, than non-Druidic Pagans (Druid mean = 171.95; 
non-Druid mean = 160.79). More fine-toothed analyses for agreeableness 
revealed the Druids to be significantly higher than the non-Druidic Pagans on 
two of the six agreeableness sub-facets - trust and tender-mindedness. Apart 
from a slightly higher Druidic mean (86.57) than non-Druidic mean (80.60) 
score on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, which only marginally
approached significance (F= 3.14;/? < 0.09), these two groups of Pagans 
obtained similar scores on each ol the remaining variables. Treatment of all 
Pagan participants in the sample as a homogeneous group was therefore 
considered defensible.
Analysis of the Buddhist respondents was conducted by a between- 
groups MANOVA with one independent variable at four levels (type of 
Buddhism: Tibetan vs. Zen/ Ch'an vs. Nagarjuna vs. F.W.B.O.) and the 
dependent variables of mystical experience, attitudes to mysticism, 
psychoticism and the five traits assessed on the NEO-PI. No statistically 
significant differences were found across membership group on any of the eight 
dependent variables.
From these MANOVAs, it was considered appropriate to treat the 
Buddhists, Christians and Pagans in the sample as three reasonably 
homogeneous groups, and not to perform more detailed statistical analyses of 
break-down of data according to sub-group within each creed. The small 
number of Jews in the sample made attempts of statistical checks of in-group 
homogeneity impractical for the Jews.
Inferential Statistical Tests of Hypotheses
A statistically significant negative correlation between psychoticism and 
mystical experience had been predicted by Ftypothesis 6.1. This was tested 
using Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. Correlations between 
mystical experience and each of the six assessed personality traits appear in the 
intercorrelation matrix presented in Table 6.3. It was considered instructive to a 
display a full intercorrelation matrix for both mystical experience and all of the
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six assessed personality traits, so that relationships between psychoticism and 
the five FFM traits could be identified.
It can be seen Irom 1 able 6.3 that data supported neither Hypothesis 6.1, 
which had predicted a statistically significant and negative correlation between 
psychoticism and mystical experience, nor 6.2, which had predicted a 
statistically significant and positive correlation between FFM conscientiousness 
and mystical experience. In tact, for the sample taken as a whole, psychoticism 
correlated positively with mystical experience. However, the predicted link 
between openness to experience and mystical experience, predicted by 
Hypothesis 6.3, was found.
As Hypothesis 6.1 had predicted that mystical experience would not 
only be significantly negatively correlated with psychoticism but with the 
impulsivity facet of NEO neuroticism, the correlations between each of the 
"‘Little Thirty" facets of the FFM traits and mystical experience were calculated 
using Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient. As Powell, Shahabi 
and Thoresen (2003) have noted, risk of Type One error increases when making 
statistical inferences from sub-scales after whole scales, due to increase in 
number of comparisons. A protocol was therefore followed where a 
conventional significance level of p is divided by number of comparisons made. 
Thus, the new significance value became 0.05 divided by 30 (the number of 
correlation coefficients), that is, 0.00167, or, to three decimal places, 0.002.
It can be seen from Table 6.4 that neither Hypothesis 6.1 nor 6.2 were 
supported by the calculations of correlations between the Little Thirty FFM 
facets and mystical experience. Against Hypothesis 6.1, a significant negative 
correlation between the impulsivity facet of neuroticism and mystical
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Table 6.3 Intercorrelation Matrix for Mystical Experience (M.E.) and the
Personality Traits of Psvchoticism (P.)„ Neuroticism (N.), Extraversion (E.
Openness to Experience (O.), Agreeahleness (A.) and Conscientiousness 
(C.)
P.
N
E.
M.E.
.334** 
N=  207 
pc.OOOl
P.
-.127
N=  198 
p = .063
.110
TV = 198
p=  .112
.024 
N=  198 
p = .738
-.054 
jV= 198 
p = A5\
N.
**-.365 
TV = 201
p < .  001
E. O. A
O
A
C
0.419** 
N=  198
n <  .001
* *.505 
N=  198 
d  < .001
-.022 
TV = 201 
p = .761
**.255 
TV = 201 
pc.OOl
-.122
TV = 198
p = .08
**-.49
1V= 198 
v < .001
-.159*
TV = 201 
p = .024
-.025 
N=  198 
p = .724
-.386 
N =  198
p <001
* *-.279 
N =  201
n< .001
.089 
TV = 201 
p = . 277
.077 
N =  201 
p= .277
-.268 
TV = 201
p <.001
-.197
TV= 201 
p = .003
**.179
TV = 201
p =.006
♦ p < .05 * * —= p < .01
experience was not observed. Against the implications of Hypothesis 6.2, 
correlations between mystical experience and the six facets of FFM 
conscientiousness were not strong enough to reach significance. However, in 
support of Hypothesis 6.3, four of the six facets of FFM openness to experience 
correlated significantly with mystical experience. Although the liberal values 
facet of openness correlated with mystical experience at a level which would 
have been judged significant by conventional fiat (r = .167; N = 198 ;p = .019),
this did not reach statistical significance with the new/? value. This suggested
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Table 6.4 Correlations between Mystical Experience and Little Thir
Facets of Five-Factor Model 17V = 19K)
Fantasy .324*
r  M  A  *  *  A  V  A  A  1  T  A  f  JL .  J  •
p<. 001
Aesthetics .375* p <.001
Feelings .409* /jc.001
1 Ideas .259* pc.OOl
Actions .207 p =.003
1 Values .167 P = .  019
Competence .138 p =  .052
_____ Order______________ -.096 p =.177
_____ Dutifulness_________ -.082 p = .  250
Achievement-striving .043 p =  .544
J_____ Discipline__________ .015 ^3 II oo 4^
Deliberation -.100 p = .159
1 Anxiety -.155 p =  .029
1 Angry Hostility -.091 p = .201
1 Depression -.086 p =  .049
_____ Self-consciousness -.140 p = .049
Impulsivity -.099 p =  .167
1 Vulnerability -.050 p = .485
i Trust -.050 p = .485
Straightforwardness -.131 p  =  .066
' Altruism -.119 p =  .095
Pliability -.053 p=  .468
Modesty -.191 p = .007
1 Tender-mindedness .019 p =  .790
Warmth .061 p =  .393
Gregariousness -.077
OO(NII
Assertiveness .096 p =  .177
Activity .045
m>/n
•
II
Excitement-seeking .042
T3-•
II
Positive Emotions .333* p<  .001
* = p < 0.002, used as significance level to control for risk of Type One error.
Note: Fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, ideas, actions and values are facets of NEO openness to 
experience; competence, order, dutifulness, achievement-striving, deliberation and discipline of 
NEO conscientiousness; anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsivity 
and vulnerability of NEO neuroticism; trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty 
and tender-mindedness of NEO agreeableness; warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, 
excitement-seeking and positive emotions of NEO extraversion.
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that mystical experience s link to psychoticism and to openness to experience is 
mediated by shared links with creativity rather than with social liberalism.
To test Hypothesis 6.4, the correlations between mystical experience and 
each of the six assessed personality traits were calculated for each separate 
religious group. The results are displayed in Table 6.5.
Data did not support Hypothesis 6.4. Neither conscientiousness nor 
psychoticism correlated significantly with mystical experience in either the 
Buddhists or Pagans. A significant positive correlation between mystical 
experience and psychoticism was observed for one of the two anti-mystical 
groups, the Jews; however, this appeared to be a function of both relating to 
openness to experience for Jewish respondents. Indeed, this correlation was 
reduced to non-significance after partialling for NEO openness to experience 
(r = .104; N= 23;p = .311).
For each of the four religious groups, correlation coefficients were 
calculated using Pearson's Product Moment Correlation between mystical 
experience and each of the FFM "Little Thirty" facets, again adopting 0.002 as 
the significance level of p. Thus, a number of correlation coefficients that 
initially looked large, such as that between mystical experience and the altruism 
facet of agreeableness for Jewish respondents, were reduced to non-significance 
adopting the newp value. Results are displayed in Tables 6.6.1 to 6.6.4.
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Table_6.5 Correlations between Mystical Experience and Psvchoticism
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience. Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness for Christians. Jews. Buddhists and Pa ans
Group:
Trait:
Christians Jews Buddhists Pagans
Psychoticism -.155
(TV = 65; 
p = .219)
.449 
(N= 29; 
p  = .014)*
-.107
(TV =52; 
p = .450)
.218 
(TV =61; 
p = .092)
Neuroticism -.128
(TV =64;
= .075)
-.158
(TV = 28; 
p = .421)
-.133
(TV = 48; 
p  = .366)
-.183
(TV =58; 
p  = .169)
Extraversion .157 
(TV =64; 
Z7 = -217)
.281
(TV =28; 
p=  .147)
.138
(TV =48; 
p  = .349)
.075
(TV =58; 
p = .516)
Openness to Experience .078
(TV = 64; 
p = .542)
.453
(TV =28;
p = .016)*
.168
(TV =48; 
p = .254)
.260 
(TV =58; 
p = .048)*
Agreeableness .288
(TV = 64;
p = .021)*
-.402
(TV =28; 
p = .034)*
.105 
(TV = 48; 
p = .477)
.018
(TV= 58; 
p = .895)
Conscientiousness .295 
(TV = 64;
p = .018)*
-.168
(TV= 28; 
p = .393)
.224 
(TV =48; 
P = -477)
.169
(TV =58;
p = .206)
p  < .05
It can be seen from Tables 6.6.1 to 6.6.4 that for Pagans, the correlation 
between the positive emotions facet of extraversion and mystical experience,
and for Buddhists, the correlation between the competence facet of
conscientiousness and mystical experience, were close to statistical significance 
at p < 0.003. This correlation for Buddhists may have appeared to support 
Hypothesis 6.3 in the case of Buddhist respondents, but other facets of 
conscientiousness were not significantly correlated with mystical experience for 
Buddhist respondents. Relevance of agreeableness to mystical experience was
lost through adoption of these highly specific measurements, as in none of the
lour groups did any lacets ol this trait correlate significantly with mystical
experience.
6.6.1 Correlations between Mystical Experience (M.E.) and FFM “Little
Thirty” Facets for Jewish Respondents  (N = 28
Little Thirty Facet Correlation with M.E.
Fantasy .345 p  = .072
Aesthetics .462 p  = . 013
Feelings .560* p  = .002
Ideas .239 p = .220
Actions -.045 p  = .841
Values -.067 p = .733
Competence .006 p = .976
Order -.261 p=  .118
Dutifulness -.137 p=  .487 H
Achievement-striving -.056 p =  .111
Discipline -.122 p = .295 1
Deliberation .205 p  = .295
Anxiety -.362 p = .059
Angry Hostility -.141 p = .475
Depression -.125 p=  .527
Self-consciousness -.140 p=  .049
Impulsivity -.243 p = .167
Vulnerability -.011 p=  .955
Trust -.218 p = .265
Straightforwardness -.381 p = .045
Altruism -.460 p = .014
Pliability -.124 p = . 529
Modesty -.367 II • o
Tender-mindedness .299 P = -122
Warmth .319 p = .099
Gregariousness .047 p = .813
Assertiveness .454 p = .021
Activity .019 p = .975
Excitement-seeking .208 p = .288
Positive Emotions .137 p = .486
* = p < 0.002, used as significance level to control for risk of Type One error.
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6.6.2 Correlations between Mystical Experience (M.E.) and FFM “Little 
Thirty” Facets for Christian ResnnnrtPnR (N=  64)
1 Little Thirty Facet Correlation with M.E.
| Fantasy -.064 p = .613
Aesthetics .225 p = .074
| Feelings .267 p = . 033
1 Ideas______________ .023 p  = .860
Actions .100 p = A3\
Values -.204 p = . 105
1 Competence .257 p = .040
j Order .080 p = .530
Dutifulness_________ .282 p  = .024
1 Achievement-striving .376* p = .002
Discipline .243 p  = .053
1 Deliberation .067 p  = .602
Anxiety -.016 p = . 899
1 Angry Hostility -.090 p -  ..479
1 Depression -.063 p = .621
Self-consciousness .032 p = .804
Impulsivity .268 p = .032
1 Vulnerability .102 p = .422
Trust .176 p  = . 164
Straightforwardness .279 p = .026
Altruism .179 3^ II • -J
Pliability .247 p = .049
1 Modesty .121 p = .339
Tender-mindedness .210 p = .096
Warmth .242 p = .054
Gregariousness -.005 p = .969
Assertiveness .100 p = .432
1 Activity .240 p  = .056
Excitement-seeking -.233 p = .076
Positive Emotions .255 p = .042
* = p < 0.002, used as significance level to control for risk of Type One error.
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6_»6«3 Correlations between Mystical Experience (M.ET and FFM “Little 
Thirty’ Facets for Buddhist Respondents ( 7V= 48)
| Little Thirty Facet Correlation with M.E. ]
Fantasy .031 p = .837
1 Aesthetics .148 p = .314
| Feelings .345 p  = .016
Ideas .082 p = . 580
1 Actions .027 p  = .857
Values -.167 p  = .257
Competence .416 p  = .003
Order .013 p  = .929
Dutifulness_________ .057 p  = .698
| Achievement-striving .188 p  = .202
| Discipline .148 p = .315
Deliberation .166 p  = .259
1 Anxiety -.042 p  = .776
Angry Hostility -.133 p  = 366
Depression .018 p = .905
Self-consciousness -.105 p = .479
Impulsivity -.383 p = .007
1 Vulnerability -.118 p = .426
Trust .081
'Tfoo•II
1 Straightforwardness -.061 p = .679
Altruism .327 p=  .024
Pliability -.002 p = .991
1 Modesty -.127 p = .391
Tender-mindedness .251 p = .085
Warmth .211 p = .151
Gregariousness .118 p = .425
Assertiveness .265 p = .069
1 Activity -.059 p = .692
Excitement-seeking -.195 p =  .185
Positive Emotions .239 p =  .103
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6.6.4 Correlations between Mystical Experience (M.E.) and FFM “Little
Thirty” Facets for Pa Respondents (N =
Little Thirty Facet Correlation with M.E. I
Fantasy . i n p  = .407
Aesthetics .315 p = .016
Feelings .221 p = .095
Ideas .179 p = .179
Actions .165 p = .216
Values .099 p = .458
Competence .159 p  = .233
Order .257 p = .052
Dutifulness .086 p = . 519
1 Achievement-striving .114 P = ,396
Discipline .195 p = .142
1 Deliberation -.125 p = .350
Anxiety -.164 p = .218
Angry Hostility -.083 p = .538
Depression 1 • OO p  = . 160
1 Self-consciousness -.222 p  = .094
Impulsivity -.009 p  = .948
1 Vulnerability -.195 p = .142
Trust -.003 p = .980
Straightforwardness .084 p = .531
1 Altruism -.029 p = .827
Pliability -.048 p = .722
Modesty -.068 p = .612
1 Tender-mindedness .145 P = -278
Warmth .075 p  = .574 |
Gregariousness -.173 ^3 II •
1 Assertiveness .103 p = .440
1 Activity -.021 p = . 877
Excitement-seeking -.037 p = . 783
Positive Emotions .382 p = .003
Inferential test of Hypotheses 6.5: Comparing Creeds on Attitudes to
Mysticism
The four groups were compared on both scores on the Attitudes to
Mysticism Scale and the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, using a 
between-groups MANOVA with one independent variable at four levels 
(Religious Group: Jews vs. Pagans vs. Buddhists vs. Christians) and the two
dependent variables of attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. Main
effects for religion were found on both mystical experience (F= 31.602; p  <
.0001) and attitudes to mysticism ( F=64.639; p  < .0001). Results of post hoc 
tests are displayed in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 Between Group Comparisons on Mystical Experience (M.E.) and 
Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.): Mean Differences as Assessed by Tukev's 
Honest Test of Significant Differences
Variable
Pairing M.E. A.M.
Buddhists versus Christians 5.89 20.39*
Buddhists versus Jews 19.99* 23.43*
Buddhists versus Pagans -15.85* -8.17*
Christians versus Jews 14.11* 3.04
Christians versus Pagans -21.74* -28.57*
Pagans versus Jews 35.84* 31.61*
* = /?<  0.01.
Note: Negative figures indicate higher mean for second group listed in pairing.
Pagans and Buddhists, exactly as predicted, scored significantly 
higher on the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale than did Christians or Jews, who did 
not differ significantly from each other in mean scores on this scale. However, 
an unpredicted finding was that the Pagans scored significantly more highly on 
this scale than did the Buddhists. Although the Pagans scored significantly more 
highly than all the three other groups on mystical experience, and the Jews 
scored significantly less high on this variable, the Buddhists and Christians did 
not differ significantly from each other on this scale. The significant F-ratio 
found for Attitudes to Mysticism was in support of Hypothesis 6.5.
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Inferential Tests of Hypotheses 6.6 to 6.10
A I earson s Product Moment Coefficient was calculated to predict 
the correlation between Attitudes to Mysticism, as measured on the Attitudes to 
Mysticism Scale, and mystical experience, as measured on the Francis-Louden 
Orientation Scale, to test Hypothesis 6.6. Statistically significant positive 
correlations between these two variables were observed for both the whole 
sample for each specific religious group (see Table 6.8).
Religious Group Correlation between Attitudes to 
Mysticism and Mystical Experience
Jews (N= 30) .668 ( p <.01 )**
Christians ( N =  65) .341 (p <01)**
Buddhists (N= 48) .359 (p < .05)*
Pagans (N = 60) .368 (p <01)**
Total Sample (N=203) .606 (p < .0001)**
* = p < 0.05 ** = p < 0.01
These statistically significant correlations left some ambiguity about 
whether mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism should be seen as 
distinct constructs. For each specific religious group except the Jews, these two 
variables shared less than 16% of variance, suggesting enough variance for 
conceptual distinctions, but for the sample as a whole, the correlation between 
these two constructs was over .5, allowing for a case that the two concepts were 
closely enough related to be considered near-equivalent if considerable 
unshared variance were to be attributed to error variance. A systematic effort
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was therefore made to examine how closely the personality correlates of 
attitudes to mysticism replicated those that had been found for mystical 
experience. This enabled assessments of whether any case for making a 
conceptual distinction between two variables sharing 36% variance could be 
strengthened by observations of non-identical correlates. The correlations 
between attitudes to mysticism and the six assessed personality traits, for both 
the total sample and for each religious group, are displayed in Table 6.9.
Calculations of these correlation coefficients also tested Hypotheses 6.7 to 6.10,
%
which had made predictions about the relationships which attitudes to 
mysticism would bear to psychoticism and FFM conscientiousness in pro- 
mystical and anti-mystical religious groups. These hypotheses were not 
supported, as among neither the anti-mystical Christians nor the pro-mystical 
Buddhists were any statistically significant correlations observed between 
attitudes to mysticism and any of the assessed personality traits. However, it 
was of some note that attitudes to mysticism correlated significantly with 
personality traits in two religious groups, the Jews and the Pagans. In the 
former, attitudes to mysticism correlated significantly negatively with 
conscientiousness and significantly positively with psychoticism and with 
openness to experience. In the latter, attitudes to mysticism correlated 
significantly positively with FFM conscientiousness and significantly 
negatively with FFM extraversion.
It can be seen from Table 6.9 that, both for the whole sample and for 
each religious group, correlates of attitudes to mysticism did not replicate those 
found for mystical experience. In neither Pagans nor Jews, for example, did
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Table 6.9 Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism and Personality Traits of
Psychoticism (P), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), Extraversion tE
Neuroticism (N) and Openness to Fxnpripiw-A (Q
Group: Jews Christians 1 Buddhists Pagans Total
Trait:
----- ------V3
p .481** .218 .131 -.003 .525**
(TV = 29 ; (N = 64; (TV = 49; (TV =61; (TV =203;
/?=.008) p  =.083) p  = .371) p =  .981) /? < .001)
N .210 -.115 .218 .005 .012
{ N -  28; (TV =63; II 4-* L/i Vi • (TV = 58; (TV= 194;
P=-282) p  =.371 p  =.-083) p  =.967) p  = 083)
E -.004 .057 -.091 -.266* .007
(TV = 28; (TV= 63; (TV =45; II OC
V
#
 
• (TV= 194;
p  =.983 p  =.656) p  = .552)
■
p  =.044) p  =.464)
0 .581** .229 .229 .188 .591**
(TV = 28: (TV = 63; (TV =45; (A'=58; (TV= 194;
p=.00l) p=.  092) p  =.188) p  =. 158) p< .001)
A -.147 -.001 .022 -.002 -.267**
(TV = 28; (TV= 63; (TV = 45; (Ar =58: (TV = 194;
II
• O') p  =.993 p  =.888) p =.988) 77 < .001)
c -.394* .183 -.016 .345** -.199**
(TV =28; • rxII (TV = 45; (TV =58 (TV= 194;
/?=.038) p  =.152 p  =.916) p  =.008) p  =.003)
* —= p  <.05 *  *  p < .01
conscientiousness correlate significantly with mystical experience.
As with mystical experience, correlations, using Pearson's Product 
Moment Correlation, were conducted between the “Little Thirty" facets of the 
FFM and attitudes to mysticism. To control for making a Type One error in 
making multiple comparisons,/? < .002 was chosen as the level for a correlation 
to be judged to have reached statistical significance. Results are displayed in
Tables 6.10, and in Tables 6.10.1 to 6.10.4 for each religious group.
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Correlations between Mystical Experience and Psychoticism After 
Controlling for Openness to Experience and Religion
Mvstical experience, while significantly positively correlated with 
psychoticism, correlated significantly with only one of the three FFM traits 
representing distinguishable lacets of this trait, namely openness to experience. 
Thus, the correlation between mystical experience and psychoticism was 
explored further by calculating the correlation between psychoticism and 
mystical experience after controlling for openness to experience. Partialling for 
openness to experience reduced the magnitude of the correlation between these 
two variables (r = . 156; N  = 195; p  < 0.05) to a level where the correlation was 
only significant at a liberal p  value of 0.05. This was clearly different to the 
case with the correlation between psychoticism and attitudes to mysticism, 
which remained significantly correlated after partialling for NEO openness to 
experience (r = .292; N  = 188; p < .001).
Correlations between mystical experience and psychoticism after 
controlling for religion were also calculated. Religions were arranged so that 
Jews were given 1, Christians 2, Buddhists 3 and Pagans 4, reflecting ascending 
order of means on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale. The
correlation between psychoticism and mystical experience, re-analysed after 
controlling for religion, was then reduced to non-significance (r = 0.046; N = 
204; n.s.). However, the correlation between attitudes to mysticism and 
psychoticism was not reduced to non-significance after controlling for religion 
in this way (r = .282; N = 200; p < 0.01).
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Table 6.10 Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.) and FFM 
“Little Thirty” Facets CV = 194)
Little Thirty Facet Correlation with A.M.
Fantasy .518 p = .001*
Aesthetics .383 p = .001 *
Feelings .386 p = . 001*
( Ideas .348 p = .001 *
Actions .267 p=.001*
[ Values .505 = .001 *
Competence -.056 £> = .437
Order -.164 £> = .022
! Dutifulness -.230 p  = .001*
| Achievement-striving -.103 p = .153
I______Discipline__________ -.156 p  = .030
, Deliberation .-.164 p = .023
1_____ Anxiety____________ -.073 p = .312
1 Angry Hostility -.008 p = .912
1 Depression .042 p = .557
Self-consciousness -.027 p = .710
1 Impulsivity .138 p = .055
1 Vulnerability -.002 p = .977
Trust -.190 p = .008
1 Straightforwardness -.262 p = .001*
Altruism -.256 p = .001*
Pliability -.143 p = .046
Modesty -.256 p  = .001 *
Tender-mindedness -.023 p = .724
Warmth .-.074 p = .308
Gregariousness .-.153 p = .033
1 Assertiveness -.048 p = .510
Activity .002 p = .973
Excitement-seeking .160 p = .026
Positive Emotions .183 P ~ .011
*= p  < .002, i.e. correlation significant at the adopted level of statistical
significance
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Tab|e 6.10.1 Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.l and FFM 
“Little Thirty” Facets for Jewish RpT nndents (N= 281
1 Little Thirty Facet Correlation with A.M.
Fantasy .566 p = .002*
1 Aesthetics .534 p = .003
Feelings .370 p = .  052
Ideas .197 p = .314
Actions .048 p = .809
Values .241 p = .217
Competence -.281 p = .976
Order -.418 p = . 020
Dutifulness -.430 p  = .022
Achievement-striving -.275 •II
Discipline -.344 p = .073
1 Deliberation -.172 p = .383
Anxiety .025 p = . 025
Angry Hostility -.071 p = . 720
! Depression .337 p = .079
Self-consciousness .236 p = .228
1 Impulsivity .204 p = .297
Vulnerability .228 p = .243
| Trust -.105 p = . 595
Straightforwardness -.166 p = .399
Altruism -.281 ^  = .148
! Pliability -.055 p = .782
1 Modesty -.207 p  = .291
Tender-mindedness .049 p  = .805
Warmth .201 p = .304
Gregariousness .129 p = .512
1 Assertiveness -.101 p = .610
Activity -.384 /? = .044
Excitement-seeking .241 p = .217
Positive Emotions -.163 p = .407
*= p < .002, i.e. correlation significant at the adopted level of statistical
significance
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la h J g A l0-2 Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.) and FFM
_Ljt*k.Th*rty_Facets for Christian Respondents (TV =
Little Thirty Facet Correlation with A.M.
1 Fantasy .096 p  = .452
Aesthetics .048 p  = .706
Feelings -.051 P  = .693
Ideas .134 p  = .295
Actions .195 p  -  .126
| Values .401 p  = .001*
Competence .169 p = .185
Order ________ .134 p  = .294
Dutifulness .078
IT)•II
1 Achievement-striving .192 p = .131
1 Discipline .128 p = .318
1 Deliberation .107 p = .405
1 Anxiety -.128 p = .317
1 Angry Hostility -.077 p = .546
1 Depression .020 p  = .877
1 Self-consciousness -.017 p  = .897
Impulsivity -.245
O
•II
1 Vulnerability -.102 p = .426 |
Trust -.070 5^ II Lfi oo
j Straightforwardness .005 p  = .966 1
Altruism -.047 •II
Pliability .065 p  = .611 1
Modesty .007 p = .956
Tender-mindedness .025 p = .844
Warmth .148 p = .248
Gregariousness .102 p = .424
Assertiveness .219 p = .084
Activity .072 p = .573
Excitement-seeking -.134 p = .294
Positive Emotions .012 p = .923
* = p <  .002, i.e. correlation significant at the adopted level of statistical
significance
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Table 6.10.3 Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.) and FFM
“Little Thirty” Facets Buddhist Respondents
f Little Thirty Facet Correlation with A.M.
Fantasy .084 p = .582
1 Aesthetics .201 5^ II
• OO C/t
Feelings .009 p = .009
Ideas .062 p = .685
1 Actions -.036 p = .813
Values -.055 p = .719
j Competence .090 p = .558
1 Order .056 p  = .714
Dutifulness_________ .065 p  = .673
; Achievement-striving .008 P =.-958
1 Discipline -.131 p = .390
Deliberation -.136 p = . 373
j Anxiety .232 p = .125
1 Angry Hostility .086 p = .S16
Depression .143 p=  .340
Self-consciousness .404 p = .404
Impulsivity .084 p — .585
Vulnerability .147 p=  .334
Trust -.265 p = .079
Straightforwardness .011 p = .944
Altruism .057 p = .712
Pliability -.002 p = .992
Modesty .133 p = .384
Tender-mindedness .145 p = .340
Warmth .-.035 p = .821
Gregariousness -.137 p = .370
Assertiveness -.174 p  = .254
Activity -.017 p = .913
Excitement-seeking -.105 p = .491
Positive Emotions .145 p = .342
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Table 6.10.4 Correlations between Attitudes to Mysticism (A.M.) and FFM
“Little Thirty” Facets an Resnonde
Little Thirty Facet Correlation with A.M.
Fantasy .165 p =  .215
Aesthetics .131 p =  .328
1 Feelings .242 p =  .067
Ideas .099 p =  .461
1 Actions .016 p =  .904
Values__________ .124 p  = .354
Competence .101 p =  .450
jOrder .327 p=  .012
| Dutifulness .341 p  =  .009
1 Achievement-striving .299 p =  -023
Discipline__________ .242 p  =  .067
Deliberation .056 p=  .674
1 Anxiety -.054 p =  .689
I Angry Hostility .096 p =  A16
1 Depression .022 II oc
Self-consciousness .115 p  =  .389
1 Impulsivity -.095 p =  A l l
1 Vulnerability -.086 p =  .523
Trust -.125 p =  .349
Straightforwardness .013 p =  .921
Altruism -.056 p  =  .675
Pliability -.009 p =  .948
Modesty -.012 P =  .927
Tender-mindedness .277 p =  .035
Warmth -.215 p =  .105
Gregariousness -.381 p = .003
Assertiveness -.180 P =  .177
Activity .126 p  = .348
Excitement-seeking -.326 p =  . 013
Positive Emotions -.012 p = .929
Inferential Tests of Hypotheses 6.11 and 6.12: Testing Hypotheses on Age 
and Length of Affiliation with Religious Group
Significant positive correlations between age and length of affiliation 
with current religion group had been predicted for the two pro-mystical groups 
(Pagans and Buddhists) but not the two non-mystical groups (Christians and
Jews) by Hypotheses 6.11 and 6.12. Pearson's product correlation coefficients
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were calculated to test these hypotheses. Intercorrelation matrices for age, 
reported length ol affiliation with current religion, mystical experience and 
attitudes to mysticism are displayed in Tables 6.11.1 to 6.11.3. Data from 
Jewish iespondents were not analysed in this way due to frequent equation 
between length ol affiliation with current religion (Judaism) and age found for 
many Jewish respondents. 29 of the 32 Jewish participants had provided data on 
both current age and length of affiliation with current religion. 79.31 % (23 out 
ol 29) indicated that they had always adhered to Judaism, if sometimes adding 
qualifiers such as "More orthodox when younger" "more so in the past 15 years" 
and "Always - previously was not member of a religious household". The latter 
comment indicated belief that Judaism should not be view ed as a social rather 
than religious movement, providing social rather than spiritual identity.
Age varied from length of affiliation to Judaism for several respondents 
who indicated affiliation with a specific movement (Reform Judaism, 
progressive Judaism or the Jewish Renewal movement) within Judaism. The 
high percentage of Jews who equated age with length of affiliation suggested 
that little value, in the case of Jewish respondents, of separate analyses of 
correlations with mystical experience for age and length of affiliation to 
Judaism. Neither mystical experience nor attitudes to mysticism correlated 
significantly with age for Jewish respondents.
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Table 6.11.1 Intercorrelation Matrix Displaying Correlations between
Length of Affiliation (L.A.). Age, Mystical Experience 1M.E.) and Attitudes 
to Mysticism (A.M.) for Christian Participants
A.M. Age L.A.
M.E. .290*
(A 64: p=.020)
.269*
(A =64; p =.030)
-.045
(A =59; p =.730)
A.M. .007
(A =63; p =.958)
-.278*
(A =57; p =.037)
Age .583**
A=59; p <.0001)
* = p <  0.05 **=/?< 0.01
Table 6.11.2 Intercorrelation Matrix Displaying Correlations between 
Length of Affiliation (L.A.), Age, Mystical Experience (M.E.) and Attitudes
to Mysticism (A.M.) for Buddhist Participants
A.M. Age L.A.
M.E. .359*
(A =48: p=.020)
.141
(N =49; p  =166)
.288*
(A =47; p =.025)
A.M. .176
(A =47; p = . 118)
.220
(A =45; p =.074)
Age .463**
(A =48; /?<0001)
*=/?<0.05 **=/?< 0.01
These data did not support Hypotheses 6.11, which had 
predicted significant positive correlations between age and mystical experience 
in pro-mystical but not anti-mystical religions. Age correlated significantly 
positively with mystical experience in Pagans but not in Buddhists, and also 
correlated significantly positively with age among the non-mystical Christians.
A.M. Age L.A.
M.E. .320*
(A =60; p=006)
.218*
(A =60; p =.047)
.304*
(A =51; =.015)
A.M. .227*
(A =59; p =.042)
.193
(N =50; p =.090)
Age .427**
N=  52; pc.OOOl)
* = p <  0.05 ** = p  < 0.01
Hypothesis 6.11 therefore had to be rejected. However, these data were in 
support of Hypothesis 6.12, which had predicted significant positive 
correlations between mystical experience and length of affiliation in pro- 
mystical but not anti-mystical religions. Such a correlation was observed for 
both Buddhists and Pagans but not for Christians.
A possible objection to analysis of data in this way for Christian 
respondents is that the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale includes sub-
scales which are really assessing religious experiences which are readily 
consistent with Christian teaching, specifically those based on James (1902/ 
1960). For Christians, a Pearson's Product Moment Correlation was therefore 
calculated to assess how strongly length of affiliation to current religion 
correlated with the unitive and noeticc sub-scales of the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale. These two sub-scales were taken as representing, 
respectively, a form of religious experience alien to and a form of religious 
experience accepted by Christian orthodoxy.
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Neither oi these sub-scales correlated significantly with length of 
affiliation to Christianity, challenging any suggestion that length of affiliation 
with Christianity would only correlate significantly with specifically "Christian" 
forms of experience among such respondents. Correlation coefficients between 
length of affiliation with Christianity and unitive quality and noetic quality 
were respectively .036 ( p  = .392) and -.092 ( p  = .244). For Christians, age 
correlated positively with both unitive quality (r = .261;/? = .018) and noetic 
quality (r = .213\ p  = .044) at a level reaching significance at the five per cent 
level. To adopt protocol to control for I ype One error when making multiple 
comparisons, that is, to adopt .025 as the new significance level after dividing 
0.05 by the number of coefficients, meant that only the former reached 
significance. Of interest is that a significant negative correlation between length 
of affiliation to current religion and attitudes to mysticism was found for 
Christian respondents.
6.3 Cross-creedal Differences in Personality
Data were explored further by a MANOVA at four levels (Religion:
Jews vs. Christians vs. Buddhists vs. Pagans) comparing these religions on the 
dependent variables of each of the six assessed personality traits. Although 
creedal personality differences had not been predicted by Hypotheses 6.1 -  
6.12, these comparisons enabled further exploration of potential personality 
differences between two pro-mystical religions (Pagans and Buddhists) and two 
anti-mystical religions (Christian Protestantism and Judaism).
Mean scores and ranges of scores on each trait for each group are 
displayed in Tables 6.12 and 6.12.1 respectively. F-ratios are displayed in Table
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6.13. Pairwise comparisons as assessed by Tukey's Honest Test of Significant 
Differences are displayed in Table 6.14.
The two groups designated as "pro-mystical" did not differ significantly 
from one another on psychoticism, but both obtained significantly higher mean
scores on this trait than the two groups designated "anti-mystical" (which again, 
did not differ significantly from each other on this trait). Main effects for 
religion were lound on each of the NEO traits representing distinguishable 
psychoticism facets (conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to 
experience). For conscientiousness and for agreeableness, these between-group 
differences related respectively to the high scores obtained by Jews and by 
Christians on these two traits. For openness to experience, the pattern of 
between-group differences resembled that found for attitudes to mysticism, with 
Pagans scoring significantly higher than all other groups and Buddhists scoring 
significantly more highly than the Christians or Jews, but the latter two groups 
not differing significantly from each other.
Table 6.12 Mean Scores of Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Pagans on 
Psychoticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Extraversion
and Openness to Experience
Group:
Trait: 
Psychoticism 
Neuroticism 
Extraversion
Openness to 
Experience
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Christians Jews
Mean
38.60 
140.01 
147.70
156.60
184.59
166.53
S.D
4.95 
21.30 
20.14 
17.54
15.34
17.16
Mean S.D.
40.80 6.47
135.55
155.34
165.00
173.57
177.75
22.78
19.43
19.20
22.60
23.44
Buddhists
Mean
48.85 
138.61
154.12
179.12
S.D
5.37
26.37 
19.52 
13.60
164.20
155.04
13.59
18.64
Pagans
Mean
48.92
135.81
152.31
187.17
164.20
160.44
S.D
7.06
28.09
22.08
17.09
20.48
16.73
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Table 6.12.1 Ranges of Scores for Christians. Jews. Bnddhktc and Pa ans
on Ps>ehotieism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness. Neuroticism
Extraversion and Openness to F.xneripnpp
I Group: Christians Jews Buddhists Pagans Total:
Variable:
1 Psychoticism 32-58 
(TV =65)
32-57 
(#  = 30)
37-58 
(#  = 53)
38-74
(#= 63)
32-74
(#=211)
FNeuroticism 78-202 
(#  = 64)
92-174
(#  = 29)
83-198
(#  = 49)
78-202
(#= 59)
78-202
(#=201)
1 Extraversion 89-198
(# = 6 4 )
114-194
(# = 2 9 )
103-198
(#  = 49)
89-193
(#= 59)
89-198
(#=201)
1 Openness to 
Experience
123-198
(#  = 64)
131-207
(#= 29)
154-219
(#  = 49)
126-217 
(#  = 59)
123-219
(#=201)
Agreeableness 149-219
(#  = 64)
98-197
(#= 29)
139-215 
(#  = 49)
104-203 
(N = 59)
98-219 
(#  = 201)
Conscientiousness 117-208
(#  = 64)
120-213
(#= 29)
109-202 
(#  = 49)
122-205 
(N= 59)
109-213 
(#  = 201)
Table 6.13 F-ratios comparing Jews, Pagans, Christians and Buddhists on
Traits of Psvchoticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
Extraversion and Openness to Experience
Trait F-ratio
Psychoticism 36.951 * p<.0001
Agreeableness 12.852* p<.0001
Conscientiousness 10.340* p<.0001
Neuroticism .388 p = .762
Extraversion 1.553 p = .202
Openness to Experience 36.986* pc.0001
* —= p <  .001
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Table 6..14 Mean Differences as Assessed bv Tukev's Honest Test of 
Significant Differences Dis t inan k h i n o Religious Groups on Personal! 
Trajts_for which F reached significance (Negatives = Higher Mean of
Second Group Listed)
Variable
Christians versus 
Jews
Christians versus 
Pagans 
Pagans versus Jews
-1.59
-9.86
8.26
-7.39
-31.14*
23.75
11.05
19.61
-8.56
Pairing: Psychoticism Openness Agreeableness Conscientiousness
Buddhists versus 
Christians
8.40* 21.58* -9.80* -12.25*
Buddhists versus 
Jews
6.80* 14.19* 1.25 -23.85*
Buddhists versus 
Pagans
-1.46 -9.56* 9.81* -6.33
* = p < 0.05; italicised figures are those for which p < 0.01.
-11.61*
5.92
-17.53*
Heterogeneity of Psychoticism
Appendix D provides some more detailed analyses statistical analyses of 
data obtained from the Psychoticism sub-scale. To apply Cronbach’s alpha to a 
scale used in a non-pilot investigation, especially an established sub-scale used 
in extensive research, may seem somewhat odd. However, results of the 
Cronbach’s alpha that are detailed in Appendix D show how data collected for 
the current thesis can be used to strengthen an argument that has been defended 
in this thesis, namely that psychoticism is not univocal (see Appendix D). Data 
presented in the current chapter and Appendix D jointly serve to illustrate the
FFM’s superiority in investigations of personality and mysticism.
6.5 Discussion
Three of the four hypotheses which made direct predictions about links 
between personality and mystical experience, Hypotheses 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4,
were not supported by the data reported in this chapter. A statistically
significant negative correlation was not found between mystical experience and
ps\ choticism, mystical experience did not relate significantly with either FFM
conscientiousness or with the impulsivity facet oi FFM conscientiousness; and
no easy contrast was discernible between the two pro-mystical and the two anti-
mystical religious groups in terms of personality correlates with mystical
experience. Of the four hypotheses that had made a direct prediction about the
personality correlates of mystical experience, only I lypothesis 6.3, predicting a
statistically significant and positive correlation between mystical experience and
FFM openness to experience, received support from the data.
Psychoticism, assessed as a global trait for the whole sample, 
correlated significantly positively with mystical experience; however, 
controlling for openness to experience suggested that this was best interpreted 
as evidence for linking mystical experience to creativity. The non-significant 
correlations observed between mystical experience and both FFM agreeableness 
and conscientiousness reinforced this interpretation ol the data.
Hypotheses 6.5 and 6.6 had predicted that Pagans and Buddhists would 
score higher on a scale to assess Attitudes to Mysticism than would Christians 
and Jews, and that this variable would correlate significantly positively with 
mystical experience. Both hypotheses were supported. The correlation between 
mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism was statistically significant for 
both the combined sample and for each religious group analysed separately.
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This improved confidence that this correlation was not due to a Type One error,
and provided evidence for the cross-creedal applicability of the new Attitudes to 
Mysticism Scale.
The magnitude of the correlation between attitudes to mysticism and 
mystical experience left some ambiguity about whether these constructs should 
be viewed as distinct. Observations of personality correlates, for example, the 
tact that opposite patterns ol correlation were found between Jews and Pagans 
between attitudes to mysticism and conscientiousness but not between mystical 
experience and this trait, strengthened the case for a conceptual distinction. This 
issue will be discussed more fully in the final two chapters.
Absence of any statistically significant correlations between attitudes 
to mysticism and personality in the Christians and Buddhists formed the basis 
for rejection of Hypotheses to 6.7 to 6.10, which had made predictions about the 
personality correlates of attitudes to mysticism in pro-mystical versus anti- 
mystical religions. However, of some note was that FFM conscientiousness 
correlated significantly positively with attitudes to mysticism among the pro- 
mystical Pagans and significantly negatively in Jewish respondents. Although 
psychoticism correlated significantly positively with mystical experience in the 
Jews, this appeared to result from both variables sharing a relationship with 
FFM openness to experience among Jewish respondents.
Questions emerge here as to why this asymmetry of correlation between 
FFM conscientiousness and attitudes to mysticism was not also observed in 
Buddhists and Christians. A plausible explanation is that attitudes to mysticism 
is a variable that relates to learning potential, and thus, will relate in different 
ways to traits which may be linked to learning capacity, such as FFM
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conscientiousness, in pro-mystical versus anti-mystical religions; but that this 
effect can only be observed in groups taking very strong or very negative 
attitudes to mysticism. In support ol this explanation is that the Pagans scored, 
on average, higher on the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale than the other three 
groups, also of note is how the Pagans scored significantly higher than, the Jews 
significantly lower than, the C hristians and Buddhists on the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale. Attitudes towards the specific form of unitive- 
mystical experience assessed in this study may therefore have been more 
extreme for Pagans and Jews than for Buddhists and Christians.
Hypotheses 6.11 and 6.12 had respectively predicted significant positive 
correlations between age and mystical experience and length of affiliation with 
current religion and mystical experience in pro-mystical but not anti-mystical 
religions. Of these two hypotheses, only the latter was supported by the data 
reported in this chapter. Length of affiliation with current religion w;as 
significantly and positively correlated with mystical experience for both Pagans 
and Buddhists, but only in the former was age correlated significantly and 
positively with mystical experience. An unpredicted finding was the significant 
and positive correlation between age and mystical experience in one of the 
groups not designated as "pro-mystical", the Christians.
6.5.1 Implications of Findings
Data presented in this chapter strongly imply that continued
assessments of broad measures of psychoticism in future research into the 
personality correlates of mystical experiences should be conducted alongside 
assessments of more specific traits, such as the FFM traits. Analyses based on
the "Little Thirty" facets of the five-factor model, and personality comparisons
between the pro-mystical and anti-mystical religious groups, reinforced this 
argument.
1 he data from the study presented here were taken to imply that a 
conceptual distinction can be made between mystical experience and attitudes 
to mysticism. These variables correlated significantly positively for the whole 
sample. However, for each specific religious group except the Jews, correlations 
between these variables, although statistically significant, still fell below .5, 
suggesting enough unshared variance for a conceptual distinction.
Stronger arguments for distinguishing attitudes to mysticism from 
mystical experience lay in the manner in which the between-group differences 
and correlates of these two constructs differed in important ways. For example, 
whereas both Pagans and Buddhists obtained higher scores for attitudes to 
mysticism than did either Christians or Jews, significant differences were not 
observed between Buddhists and Christians on mystical experience. Correlates 
of attitudes to mysticism and of mystical experience in Jews and in Pagans 
suggested that these two variables bear different relationships to traits indicative 
of conditionability. Asymmetrical relationships between FFM conscientiousness 
and attitudes to mysticism observed for Pagans versus Jews were not replicated 
for mystical experience, implying that of these two variables, attitudes to 
mysticism is more immediately relevant to conditionability into tender-minded
attitudes (and thus to social learning).
Evidence that mystical experience does relate to learning came from 
the data on length of affiliation with current religious group, which correlated 
significantly positively with mystical experience among Pagans and Buddhists.
This presents the question as to why mystical experience was not significantly 
negatively correlated with psychoticism in these two groups. Social 
constructivist attributions ol this lailure to a need to assess more finely graded 
traits than psychoticism would be hard to defend, as in neither group was FFM 
conscientiousness significantly related to mystical experience.
A parsimonious response would be rejection ol any simple endorsement 
of social constructivism. Data on religious affiliation length for Buddhists and 
Pagans provided evidence that mystical experience is a socially conditioned 
construct, but similar inferences could not be made from assessments of 
personality. It is possible that conditioning into tender-minded attitudes, 
interpreted by Francis (1992a) as explaining inverse relationships between non- 
experiential dimensions of religion and psychoticism, is a qualitatively different 
form of learning to that that underlies transpersonal experience onset. This 
observation highlights the limitations of using psychoticism assessments alone 
to infer that variables relate to learning propensity.
The implications of the data as sketched here may be summarized by 
stating that future research into the personality correlates of transpersonal 
experiences should aim to disentangle different facets of psychoticism, and that 
distinctions between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience are 
defensible. Superficially, these two issues may sound quite separate. However, 
they relate insofar as consideration of both issues helps to make an informed 
decision on whether it could be that global assessments of psychoticism are 
appropriate for certain dimensions ol religiosity, such as attitudes to mysticism, 
but not for mystical experience. These issues will be discussed more fully in the
final two chapters.
FINDINGS
7.1 Summary
Conclusions drawn from the empirical study reported in Chapter Six 
suggest that several issues merit further attention in transpersonal 
psychometrics. These are:
(i) A need for research into transpersonal experience to disentangle different 
facets of psychoticism;
(ii) The possibility that apparent relationships between mystical experience and 
psychoticism may be largely due to variance that both share with openness to 
experience;
(iii) The importance of researching attitudes to mysticism as a distinct concept 
from transpersonal experiences per se. That these two variables may correlate 
with different personality attributes, especially with regards to their relationship 
to psychoticism and its facets, should be considered in future research in 
transpersonal psychometrics.
Use of the NEO as well as the Psychoticism sub-scale of the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire in the study reported in the previous chapter provided 
evidence for the first two of the above points. The importance of attitudes to 
mysticism was evident in the higher scores ol the two groups that had been 
designated as "pro-mystical" (Buddhists and Pagans) than the Christians or Jews 
on this variable. The relationship of attitudes to mysticism to psychoticism and
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to NEO conscientiousness was not an exact replication of those found for 
mystical experience, providing evidence for distinguishing these two constructs.
These issues will be discussed and placed in a wider context throughout 
this chapter. This will follow an initial commentary on how two additional 
aspects of data, collected during the process of data collection for the study 
reported in Chapter Six, implied both reinforcements of and qualifications to the 
conclusions drawn, namely data collected using the Alister Hardy and David 
Wuthnow questions, and data collected from qualitative interviews with a 
representatives of each of the assessed creeds.
A general discussion of the findings of all three empirical studies 
reported in this thesis will be presented in Section 7.7, and their implications for 
the question of whether mystical experience should be viewed as socially 
constructed are reviewed in Section 7.8. A discussion of consistencies and 
inconsistencies between these findings and those reported in previous literature, 
and attempts to respond to potential criticisms of these studies, are reported in 
Section 7.9 and Section 7.10.
7.2 Responses to the Alister Hardy and David Wuthnow Questions
Percentages of respondents who had ticked (i) "Yes", (ii) "No" and 
(iii) "Don't know" in response to the Alister Hardy question: “Have you ever felt 
as if you were influenced by a Power or a Presence, whether you call it God or 
not, that was different to your everyday self?’ and the David Wuthnow 
question: “Have you ever felt as if you were in close contact with something 
sacred or holy?” were tabulated for each of the four groups. Distributions of 
figures for these two questions are displayed in lables 7.1 and 7.2.
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Tabje 7-1 Distributions of Responses to A l k t e r  Hardv Ouestion “Have von
ever felt as ,f vo„ were influenced hv a Power or a Present ,  whether you 
call it God or not, that different to your everyday self?
Buddhists, Christians. Pagans and Jews (Raw 
parentheses)
anion
ures are given i
Buddhists
YES
Christians
Pagans
Jews
49.05% (26)
78.79% (52)
84.13% (53)
NO
30.19% (16) 
9.09% (6)
DON'T
KNOW
NO
RESPONSE
GIVEN
25% (8)
1.59% (1)
11.3% (6) 
6.06% (4)
6.35% (4)
62.5% (20) 6.25% (2)
9% (5) 
6.06% (4)
7.94% (5)
6.25% (2)
Table 7.2 Distributions of Responses to David VVuthnow Ouestion “Have 
you ever felt as if you were in close contact with something sacred or 
holy?” among Buddhists, Christians, Pagans and Jews (Raw figures are 
given in parentheses)
YES NO DON'T
KNOW
NO
RESPONSE
GIVEN
Buddhists 69.81% (37) 20.75% (11) 1.89% (1) 7.54% (4)
Christians 80.03% (53) 10.61% (7) 3.03% (2) 6.06% (4)
Pagans 92.06% (58) 1.59% (1) 1.59% (1) 4.76% (3)
Jews 37.5% (12) 53.13% (17) 3.13% (1) 6.26% (2)
As the number of responses recorded in some cells in the above tables 
fell below five, it was not possible to perform chi-square analysis to offer a 
detailed comparison of differences in frequency of response distribution across 
creed. However, it was still considered important to compare the above figures 
with the affirmative response rate of around 33% typically found when these 
questions are set to more generic samples (Hay & Morisy, 1978; Hay, 1990). 
Whereas for Jewish respondents, the number of affirmative responses to these 
questions was slightly below this figure lor the Alister I lardy question and 
approximated this figure for the David Wuthnow question, percentages of 
affirmative responses greatly exceeded this figure the other three groups. This
high rate of affirmative responses lrom C hristian, Buddhist and Pagan
266
respondents indicated that the reporting of transpersonal experiences may be a 
feature that different religions have in common. This point is reinforced by 
noting how affirmative response rates for Jews, while smaller than those for the 
Pagans, Buddhists or Christians, were still considerably over 0% of the total 
number of Jewish respondents. This suggests the possibility of transpersonal 
experience in a religion where at least certain forms of transpersonal experience, 
such as mystical-unitive experience, are neither encouraged nor highly valued. 
Although prophecy as described in the Hebrew Bible may be cited as a form of 
transpersonal experience that is valued in Jewish tradition, to assign both this 
category of experience and unitive-mystical experience to the broader category 
of “transpersonal experience" indicates how the reporting of transpersonal 
experiences can still be found in different religions.
To cite the reporting of transpersonal experiences as a feature which 
different creeds have in common may seem to contradict earlier evidence, 
presented in this thesis, that different creeds, and different denominations within 
the same faith tradition, do obtain significantly different scores on measures of 
the mystical-unitive experience described by Stace (1960). The data presented 
in Chapter Six provided evidence that Pagans, for example, are more likely to 
have had such experiences than Jews, while statistical data presented in Chapter 
Four were evidence that, at least within the Judeao-Christian tradition, the 
liberal wings rather than the conservative wings are more likely to have had this 
specific type of transpersonal experience. An immediate response to these 
apparently divergent findings would be to state that whether statistical data will 
support perennialists such as Forman (1998) or constructivists such as Katz 
(1978) will depend upon how specific a definition of transpersonal experience is
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being adopted in research, with general definitions likely to lead to support for 
Forman and specific definitions likely to lead to support for Katz.
A different position is defended here. This is that, although at a very 
global level, people in different creeds do experience a state of being that is so 
qualitati\el\ different to normal waking consciousness that it can be called a 
transpersonal experience , precise post hoc cognitive representations of such 
experiences vary across creed. This is not a simple replication of Stace’s (1960) 
argument that unitive experience is interpreted in different ways in different 
religions. What is proposed here is that a more generic form of “transpersonal
experience*' is accompanied by different sets of cognitive representations in 
different creeds.
Evidence for these cross-creedal differences in cognitive 
representations of experiences were implied by Pagans' responses to the Alister 
Hardy question, “Have you ever felt as if you were influenced by a Power or a 
Presence, whether you call it “God'' or not, that was different to your everyday 
self?" Pagans would often respond affirmatively, but in a number of instances, 
deleted the word “God" in the question and replaced it with the word 
“Goddess". This indicates how Pagans are likely to differ from Christians or 
Jews in their representations of such experiences, being more likely to rely upon 
feminine concepts (in none of the other three groups did responses imply a 
similar substitution of terms).
Buddhists gave a higher percentage of affirmative responses to the 
Alister Hardy and David Wuthnow questions than is typically found in research 
using these questions, but their rate ol affirmative responding was still below 
that of the Pagans and Christians. Informal communications with some of the
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respondents indicated a likely reason why. Doctrinal atheism endorsed by some 
Buddhists may have inhibited their willingness to respond to concepts referring 
to concepts such as “God”. That adherents of this particular tradition may not 
relate their experiences to monotheistic theology is further evidence for cross- 
creedal variation in cognitive representations of transpersonal experiences.
The possibility that a qualitatively different type of experience of a 
somewhat general nature is experienced in different religions, but is attached to
different cognitive representations in different faiths raises the question of
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whether lay understandings of such experiences do actually imply that such 
experiences should be regarded as "religious experiences”. This possibility was 
explored in a series of qualitative interviews with one representative from each 
of the creeds sampled in the study reported in Chapter Six. Although these 
interviews did not form a major part of the data collection exercise for the study 
reported in Chapter Six, they did enable a closer inspection of the lay 
representations of transpersonal experiences of at least one Pagan, one 
Christian, one Buddhist and one Jew, and the attitudes to mystical experience 
expressed by a member of each of these faith traditions.
7.3 Data from the Qualitative Interviews
Four people were approached to take part in these interviews. All gave 
their consent. They were assured that their responses recorded during interviews 
would be treated as confidential. Respondents were also assured written reports 
of their interviews would not enable their identification. Three of the 
respondents had supplied their names and addresses when returning 
questionnaires for the quantitative study reported in Chapter Six. These
respondents comprised one Jew, one Zen Buddhist and one Pagan. A fourth
(Christian) respondent had not completed questionnaires for the study, but had
heard about it from people at her church who had completed questionnaires for 
it.
One oi these respondents lived in the same locality as researcher, and 
was therefore able to meet the researcher and to be interviewed in person. This 
participant agreed to the interview being tape-recorded. The other participants 
lived considerable distances away from the researcher, and were therefore 
telephoned. Notes were taken of their responses.
7.3.1 The Interview
A semi-structured interview format was employed. The same 
questions were set to all respondents (see Appendix E) but enough flexibility 
was allowed by the researcher to respond to each respondent's particular points 
in an appropriate manner. These questions were devised to gain a further in- 
depth insight into the lay person's understanding of concepts such as “religious 
experience”, and also to explore the attitudes that people held towards specific 
types of experiences. They also enabled investigation of whether each 
representative considered certain dimensions of faith to be more central to his or 
her faith tradition than the experiential dimension.
7.3.2 Results of Interv iews
Data from these interviews provided evidence, from an idiographic 
viewpoint, that at least one adherent of Judaism and one adherent of Christianity 
held less favourable attitudes to mystical experiences than did a follower of
Paganism and a representative of Buddhism. Quotes from the interviews with 
the Christian, Jewish and Pagan respondents also indicated how such differing 
attitudes may be placed within a broader context of an individual’s attitudes and 
beliefs. (A full transcript of the interview which took place in person, and fuller 
notes from the interviews that took place by telephone, can be obtained from the 
researcher, here, quotes will only be offered to illustrate salient points).
The Christian gave the following responses when asked to define the 
terms religious experience and mystical experience:
Christian respondent's definition o f religious experience: A deeper sense of 
being touched. I think that the church would define religious experience in 
pretty much the same way. A religious experience is when - you realize that 
there is something special.
Christian respondent's definition o f mystical experience: I think that 
"mystical experience" is different to "religious experience", lam a bit 
skeptical about "mystical experience". It is not something 1 would personally 
wish to get involved in. However, 1 do know people who have had "mystical 
experiences". And at the time, 1 have believed them.
Prima facie, the most obvious implication of this part of the interview is 
that a Christian was drawing a distinction between the terms religious 
experience and mystical experience. A sceptical reaction might be that this was 
because the use of both terms in the question set to the respondent prompted the 
respondent to think about different ways of defining these terms. However, on
closer analysis, this respondent appeared to he taking negative attitudes towards 
mystical rather than religious experience. There was nothing in the way the 
questions were worded to suggest that, when asked for a definition of mystical 
experience, one should have taken a negative position on it; but, quite
spontaneously, the respondent did express some negative attitudes here (“I am a 
bit sceptical about mystical experience. It is not something I would personally 
wish to get involved in ). Yet, during the interview, the Christian respondent 
readily spoke about other forms of religious experience, such as healing 
experiences, adding the comment that "They are not talked about as much as 
they should".
A similar set of negative attitudes towards mystical experiences, and 
arguably towards transpersonal experiences in general, were expressed by the 
Jewish respondent. This participant's responses suggested that Judaism, at least 
in its mainstream forms, is not a religion taking pro-mystical attitudes. He 
depicted the Lubavitch school of Hasidism as holding more pro-mystical 
attitudes than is common in Judaism:
Jewish respondent: And the religions o f the Lubavitch - one sect within 
Hassidism - their chief was Rabbi Menachem, who died, I suppose three or 
four years ago. And when he died, his believers, actually believed he was 
going to be resurrected. They really did believe that he was going to be 
resurrected. That he - um, the Hassidic who are in this country, the 
Lubavitch who are in this country, really did believe that he would be 
resurrected, and fly across the planet and come back and see them. Now to 
accept that, you have to have a very (longpause) - a very strong and
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P0Sltlve rel'gious belief. You have to have a real belief in mystical 
experiences, i f  you like.
The respondent then quickly contrasted this with the less mystical elements of 
mainstream Judaism:
Jewish respondent: And in religion and experience. Now, most Jewish people
would have frankly laughed at the idea, and they would have been right, of 
course.
During the interview, the Jewish respondent related a personal 
account of an experience of a transpersonal nature that he had had, but tried to 
offer a rational explanation for it. He described a transpersonal experience he 
and some friends and relatives had had in Eastern Europe, when they visited a 
site of importance in Judaism's history and saw visions of, to use the 
respondent's own term, "Chagall-like figures". A certain amount of skepticisim 
and suspicion about such experiences formed part of his description:
Jewish respondent: Urn, that was inspired, i f  you like, by the surroundings, 
by what we had seen that day, in fact, probably by too much wine. And that is 
the closest I ’ve ever come in my life to actually having what 1 might term a
"spiritual experience ".
In contrast to these rather negative attitudes towards mysticism 
expressed by the Christian and Jew, the Pagan's responses suggested strongly
pro-mystical attitudes. The Pagan described the likely consequences, for a 
Pagan, of having a mystical experience as follows:
Pagan respondent: Among Pagans, it (the experience) would be discussed 
But other people would not believe it.
This suggests that not only did the Pagan present contemporary 
Paganism as a pro-mystical religion. It also suggests that to identify oneself as a
means adopting more sympathetic attitudes towards 
mystical experience than is typically found in the general lay public.
The interview with the Buddhist respondent indicated how quiet sitting 
0dashen) is a likely trigger for experiences in Zen Buddhism, and how many 
Zen Buddhists would see themselves as atheists, suggesting a sharp distinction 
between the doctrinal and experiential dimensions of religion. This suggests that 
more specifically that commitment to a creed's set of doctrines cannot be, and 
should not be, seen as a necessary condition for religious experience
7.3.3. Attitudes to Mysticism in a Wider Context
These interviews provided qualitative evidence that a Pagan, a 
Christian, a Buddhist and a Jew did differ in their attitudes to mystical 
experience. However, when viewed in their entirety, these interviews provided 
more information than mere indication that the four religions studied could be 
rated in a purely quantitative sense on the variable ol attitudes to mysticism.
They indicated likely reasons for the divergent attitudes to mystical experiences 
found within each faith tradition. The full set of interview responses from the 
Jewish respondent suggested that Judaism emphasises the ethical teachings of
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religion, and also solidarity with one's family (including respect for forebears) 
rather than engagement in activities that may promote mystical experience. The 
Christian respondent stressed the importance of fellowship, noting how people 
at the church the participant attended shared the same cup for Holy 
Communion. Such emphases suggest focus on the social aspects of reliuion 
rather than the experiential, and a willingness to engage with others in a manner 
too collective to allow for more personal, individual forms of experience.
The Pagan respondent indicated that Pagans have a general belief in 
factors that are popularly described as "occult", holding the term mystical 
experience to refer to matters unseen. This participant drew attention to a sense 
of community with Nature gained from Paganism. This gave grounds for 
interesting future research questions, based on hypothesised links between 
ecological concern sympathies and pro-mystical attitudes. Recent scholarship 
has considered links between theological liberalism and increased 
environmental concerns (Bloch, 1998; Tarakeshwar, Swank, Pargament & 
Mahony, 2000). The evidence that a member of a somewhat unconventional 
creed, found to score high on mystical experience, placed the tenets of this faith 
tradition within a context of ecological concern suggests a future avenue of 
research, examining relationships between religious liberalism, mystical
experience and pro-environmental sympathies.
The Buddhist respondent indicated that quiet sitting, or dashen, a 
practice likely to promote experiences such as satori, is an important feature ol 
Soto Zen Buddhism. The Buddhist's acknowledgement ol beliefs that are 
technically atheistic endorsed by many Zen Buddhists provided evidence that 
Buddhism stresses the experiential dimension of religion more than the
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doctrinal.
The small sample ol participants interviewed makes over-generalisation 
difficult. Moreover, to cite sections of these interviews as evidence that 
Christianity and Judaism take less positive attitudes towards mystical 
experience than do Buddhism or Paganism invites criticism that such an 
approach is tantamount to holding a priori beliefs in a proposition, and then 
merely collecting data to demonstrate what one already knows to be true, rather 
than testing any hypotheses. A considered effort was therefore made to detect 
evidence that the interview data offered for important qualifications that needed 
to be made to the conclusions drawn from the statistical study reported in 
Chapter Six.
An important finding here concerned differences between Judaism and 
Christianity. The Jewish respondent expressed general skepticism about the 
experiential dimension of religion, and suggested that this was a feature 
common to mainstream Judaism, as was implied by this respondent's comments 
on the Lubavitch. However, it should be recalled that while the Christian 
respondent had expressed scepticism about what she termed "mystical 
experience”, she did not appear quite as negative when using the more global 
term “religious experience".
In terms of the taxonomic schemes of Glock and Stark (1965) and Smart 
(1989) outlined in Chapter One, this suggests that, in spite of the negative 
attitudes towards specifically mystical experience taken by both Christianity and 
Judaism, the former religion places more emphasis than the latter on the 
experiential dimension of religion in general. As with the analysis of the 
responses to the Alister Hardy and David Wuthnow questions, this suggests that
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transpersonal psychometricians need to consider very carefully whether they are 
pitching their definitions ol transpersonal experience at an appropriate level of 
specificity in continued work in this area. Contrary to the suggestion by Stark 
and Glock (1968) that, ol dimensions of religion, all give predominant emphasis 
to the dimension of beliel or doctrine, the Buddhist's responses suggested that 
this is not the case in Buddhism, which appears to treat the doctrinal dimension 
of religion as being secondary to the experiential.
Important suggestions are implied here for future research. An 
obvious implication of the point just made about Judaism and Christianity is 
that research which looks at transpersonal experience as a global term may not 
replicate that which has looked at more specific types of transpersonal 
experience. Heterogeneity of psychoticism has been suggested as one potential 
reason as to why studies of the personality correlates of religious experience 
have failed to replicate findings obtained from studies of personality correlates 
of other religious dimensions. Another reason suggested here, that could prove 
worthwhile to explore in future research, is that of whether appropriately 
specific or indeed, general measures of religious experience have been taken in 
the former field of research. The possibility that cross-creedal representations of 
transpersonal experiences will become more visible when more specific forms 
of transpersonal experience become the focus ol attention merits attention in
future research.
7.4 The Need for Study of Attitudes to Mysticism,
Personality traits, religious orientation and mental health status were the
three classes of intrapsychic variable, outlined in connection with their
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relationship to transpersonal experience, considered in the review presented in 
Chapter Three. Reference was made to how demographic variables, such as age 
(Levin, 1993), gender (Carroll, 1983) and socio-economic status (Back &
Bourque, 1970, Hay & Morisy, 1978), have also been researched in connection 
with assessments of transpersonal experience. A fourth class of potential 
correlate of transpersonal experience, attitudes to mysticism, was not
considered, because considerations of this variable have been absent from the 
published literature.
Empirical studies presented in this thesis have suggested that this 
variable merits attention in future research. Previous scholars such as Rung 
(1991) or Ghose (1993) have presented theoretical arguments that certain 
religious groups can be regarded as "pro-mystical" or "anti-mystical", as is 
explicit in Kung's (1991) taxonomy of religions as being religions-of-prophecy, 
religions-of-mysticism or religions-of-harmony. Whereas such scholars have 
based such distinctions on purely theoretical grounds, this thesis has made an 
original contribution by providing questionnaire-based statistical evidence, 
supported by qualitative interview data, that certain religious groups such as 
Judaism can be regarded as "anti-mystical" and others such as Buddhism as
"pro-mystical".
Results from the study reported in the previous chapter certainly 
challenge any efforts to link "pro-mystical" and "anti-mystical" religions with 
Eastern and Western spirituality respectively. Such associations can be found in 
the work of scholars who have based taxonomies largely on theoretical grounds, 
in the absence of statistical data. Rung's (1991) equation of religions-of- 
prophecy and religions-of-mysticism with those of respectively Semitic and
Indian origins is an excellent case in point. The finding that, of the four groups 
assessed in the study reported in Chapter Six. the Pagans obtained highest mean 
scores on both the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale and the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale provides an empirically-based challenge to this 
viewpoint. Spirituality of this diverse group has been based largely upon 
Western mystery tradition. Qualitative responses to the question on religious 
affiliation indicated how Pagans would sometimes explicitly refer to North 
American or European influences, such as the Welsh pantheon, Celtic 
spirituality, or Native American tradition, in influencing their spirituality. Here, 
therefore, is a form of spirituality for which description of "pro-mystical" can be 
defended on empirical grounds, and which very much forms part of Western, 
not Eastern, spirituality.
Post hoc comparisons between Jews and Pagans reported in Chapter Six 
indicated very clearly that these two groups, designated respectively as "anti- 
mystical" and "pro-mystical", could be distinguished in terms of both self- 
reports of mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism. However, 
comparisons between the Buddhists and the Christians indicated how these two 
groups only differed (at least at a level that reached statistical significance) on 
attitudes to mysticism. This suggests that a taxonomy which distinguishes 
religions into "pro-mystical" and "anti-mystical" should be regarded as 
primarily one of how creeds differ in their attitudes to mysticism, and only 
secondarily in terms of whether individual practitioners ol a creed do 
themselves report cases of mystical experience. It should also be emphasised 
that the fact that Buddhism and Christianity dillered at a level reaching 
statistical significance on only one of these two variables strongly implies
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treating attitudes to mysticism as a distinct construct to mystical experience.
A key theoretical issue that may benefit from a more informed 
knowledge of psychometric research into the correlates of transpersonal 
experiences is, as has been argued in this thesis, that of whether mystical 
experience arises through social conditioning, as has been defended in works by 
Katz (1978) and Proudfoot (1985). In making his case, Katz (1978) attempted to 
present contrasts between Judaism and Buddhism as evidence for his position. 
However, rather absent from his discussion was a detailed consideration of 
whether such distinctions relate to attitudes to mysticism rather than to mystical 
experience per se. Significant correlations with psychoticism or other traits 
indicative of learning potential may relate to the former rather than the latter if it 
is differences in learning of attitudes to mysticism that really distinguish faith 
traditions.
Counter-arguments can be presented to this attempt to draw a distinction 
between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. It seems conservative 
to predict that groups that score higher on attitudes to mysticism will also, on 
average, score higher on questionnaire-based measures of mystical experience. 
Observations of the Pagan participants certainly supported this prediction, as 
this group scored significantly higher on both ol these variables than did any ol 
the three other groups. Accepting a potential relationship between attitudes to 
mysticism and mystical experience, this again emphasises how a religion drawn 
from the Western tradition can legitimately be classified as a pro-mystical 
religious movement", thus stressing the independence ol distinctions of religion 
into Eastern and Western from distinctions of religion into pro-mystical and 
anti-mystical kinds. An issue that must be addressed here, however, is that ol
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whether the data presented in this thesis have provided defensible grounds for 
distinguishing these two constructs.
Attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience were consistently 
observed to be significantly and positively correlated, at the level of/? < 0.01, 
but at no point did the absolute magnitude of the correlation between these two 
variables emerge as being greater than around +.5 to +.6, indicating that these 
variables share around 25-36% variance. The correlation between these two
variables was slightly over +.6 for the Jewish respondents in the study reported

in Chapter Six, but for the other three groups, the Pagans, the Buddhists and the 
Christians, the correlation was slightly in excess o f+.3. These groups had 
higher Ar values than the Jews, and so such correlations still reached significance 
at the level o fp  < 0.01. These figures indicated how' these variables were not 
found to share more than 36% variance, implying a consistent finding of at least 
64% unshared variance.
The magnitude of the correlation found between the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale and the new' Attitudes to Mysticism Scale as 
reported in Chapter Five, around about +.5, is comparable to that found by 
Francis and Greer (1990) between the Francis Scale of Attitudes to Christianity 
and measured church attendance in a Northern Ireland sample. Francis and 
Greer took a correlation of this magnitude (approximately r +*.5) as evidence 
of the validity of their scale, but a correlation of this magnitude also permits the 
conclusion that the Francis Scale of Attitudes to Christianity is assessing 
something over and above a purely behavioural-based measure ol religiosity. In 
terms of the Glock and Stark (1965) model, measures of church attendance 
frequency only assess the ritual side of religiosity, whereas the Francis Scale of
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Attitudes to Christianity can legitimately be regarded as assessing at least the 
doctrinal and ritual dimensions. Francis and Greer’s (1990) data suggested 
considerable unshared variance between a purely behavioural measure of 
religiosity and a questionnaire-based measure, providing evidence that the latter 
form of measurement reveals new information beyond mere frequency counts of 
church attendance. In the same way, the considerable unshared variance 
detectable between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience, while not so 
high as to invalidate the scale, allows the conclusion that the attitudes to
mysticism scale was providing new information beyond a measure of mystical 
experience.
Observations of other correlates and of between-group differences 
strengthened the case for this distinction. Without introducing the measure of 
attitudes to mysticism, important information about the correlates of 
psychoticism, of NEO conscientiousness and significant differences would not 
have been detected.
7.4.1 Theoretical Reasons for Distinguishing Concepts
Good theoretical reasons exist for viewing attitudes to mysticism and 
mystical experience as conceptually distinct. An individual w7ho has read a wide 
body of literature on mysticism and feels positively drawn to mystical 
teachings, or alternatively has been influenced by his/ her creed in such a way as 
to honour mystics, may still feel that s/he has never personally had a mystical 
experience". Conversely, individuals who strongly believe that they have had 
such experiences may still treat them with suspicion, attributing them to 
pathology or to Satanic forces, as is evident in Teresa of Avila's attribution of
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some ol her visions to Satan (Mavrodes, 1978; Pike, 1978)
This distinction has an important implication for one of the cardinal 
concerns of the current thesis, that of how transpersonal variables relate to the 
personality trait of psychoticism and its facets. It is quite possible that future 
research will reveal that one of the most important reasons for distinguishing 
between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience is that these two 
variables are correlated with different sets of personality attributes. Indeed, data 
presented in Chapter Six can rightly be regarded as the commencement of such 
research. In terms ol their relationship to psychoticism, this provides an 
increased understanding of why research into the experiential dimension of 
religion has tailed to replicate that found for other religiosity dimensions.
Francis (1992a) presented psychoticism as a global trait related 
inversely to measured religiosity. Throughout this thesis, it has been maintained 
that this inverse relationship is more typically found for the doctrinal and ritual 
dimensions of religiosity than the experiential. Attitudes to mysticism can be 
categorised, along with religiosity's doctrinal dimension, as a variable that 
connects to cognition, intellect and belief, as opposed to those features of 
religion that are more directly associated with affect and experience, such as 
mystical experience itself. Scrutinised carefully, data from the study presented 
in Chapter Six suggested that global assessments ol psychoticism are more 
adequate for assessments of attitudes to mysticism than they are lor mystical
experience.
Arguments presented in this thesis have challenged attempts to use 
global measurements of psychoticism to assess the personality correlates ol 
mystical experience. Statistical evidence for confidence in this position was
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achieved through assessments of the NEO traits germane to psychoticism in the 
study reported in Chapter Six. The apparent correlation between mystical 
experience and psychoticism reported in this chapter was reduced when 
controlling for the effects of openness to experience and religion. However, 
such partialling did not have such a major impact on the significant and positive 
correlation observed between attitudes to mysticism and psychoticism. In some 
ways, low scores on the attitudes to mysticism scale could be taken as evidence 
ot endorsement ot mainstream C hurch or synagogue teachings, at least in a 
culture where predominant state religion (the Church of England) has not been 
especially "pro-mystical” (see Chapter Eight). This is therefore consistent with 
the regularly found inverse relation between psychoticism and religiosity's 
doctrinal dimension found in previous literature. This suggests that future 
research into attitudes to mysticism can legitimately continue to focus on 
psychoticism as a global variable, even if different strands of psychoticism need 
to be distinguished when researching mystical experience.
Implications are raised here for theory. If Francis (1992a) is right to 
link an inverse relationship between religion and psychoticism as evidence for 
linking both to conditioning into tender-minded attitudes, this suggests that 
particular attitudes to mysticism may arise, in part, through social conditioning 
even if mystical experience does not. Comparisons between Jews and Pagans on 
the NEO trait which, of all the NEO traits representing recognisably distinct 
facets of psychoticism, has most conceptual relevance to low impulsivity and 
heightened conditionability, namely NEO conscientiousness, strengthened this 
argument. This trait correlated positively with attitudes to mysticism in the pro- 
mystical Pagans, negatively with attitudes to mysticism in the anti-mystical
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Jews. Absence of a similar asymmetry between these two group for mystical 
experience is exactly as would be expected if it were the case that attitudes to
mysticism is a variable which arises in large part through social learning, 
whereas mystical experience does not.
TiSJjsychoticism and Openness to Experience: Is Psvchotirism a Trait Too
Far?
Different answers now appear to be needed in deciding whether 
separate facets of psychoticism should be disentangled in transpersonal 
psychometrics, depending upon whether the focus of attention is mystical 
experience or attitudes to mysticism. An affirmative answer may be required for 
the former but not the latter. Francis' (1992a) question "Is psychoticism really a 
dimension of personality fundamental to religiosity?" may be qualified to read 
"Is psychoticism really a dimension of personality fundamental to religious
experience and its specific manifestations?" A reasoned answer would be that, 
at least in the case of mystical experience, psychoticism is not a trait 
fundamental to mystical experience per se, but may still be relevant to beliefs
about and attitudes towards such phenomena.
If psychoticism is not fundamental to an understanding of mystical 
experience, the question emerges as to which traits are. Data presented in 
Chapter Six were evidence that NEO openness to experience is such a trait. This 
was supported by the reduced correlation between mystical experience and
psychoticism when partialling for this trait.
This link between NEO openness to experience and mystical experience
raises the question as to whether, as argued in Chapters Three and four,
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mystical experience should be associated with increased liberalism. It is 
important to acknowledge a finding from the study reported in the previous 
chapter, which gave ground for questioning this assertion. Examinations of how 
strongly each of the "Little Thirty" facets of the five basic factors correlated 
with mystical experience revealed how a weaker correlation was found between 
the liberal values facet of NEO openness to experience and mystical experience 
than was the case tor most other facets of this trait, suggesting that creativity 
rather than social liberalism is germane to mystical experience.
Far from affecting arguments that research into mystical experience 
must use more finely graded measurements of traits than global psychoticism 
assessments, this observation reinforced such arguments. The three NEO traits 
of openness to experience, agreeableness and conscientiousness can all be 
viewed as more specific than psychoticism. If global measures of these traits 
obscure the precise personality correlates of mystical experience, the 
implications are that psychoticism assessments must, ipso facto, be too global to 
obtain maximal findings from research in this field.
Implications are raised here for the question of mystical experience and 
pathology. Superficially, a positive correlation between mystical experience and 
psychoticism for a generic sample would seem to provide evidence that mystical 
experience is a form of pathology, linked at least to vulnerability to the 
psychotic class of disorders. However, through assessments of NEO traits, 
reasons became clearer as to why data from the study reported in the previous 
chapter challenge this viewpoint. An apparently positive correlation between 
mystical experience and psychoticism in a study such as that reported in the last 
chapter could be evidence that those who have had such experiences are more
creative, rather than more prone to pathology.
Francis (1992a) question may be re-phrased by asking: "Is openness to 
experience really a personality trait fundamental to the more mystical forms of 
religion?" Data presented in Chapter Six suggest that the answer is yes.
The taxonomy in Chapter Two, which distinguished Christianity and 
Judaism from Buddhism and Paganism on their standing of the variable of 
attitudes to mysticism, has now received empirical support, from the data 
presented in Chapter Six, and the interview' data presented in this chapter. A 
possible counter-argument here is that because religions differ on many 
variables, the higher mean scores of Buddhists and Pagans on Attitudes to 
Mysticism than those found for Jews and Christians should not hastily be 
followed with conclusions that the prime difference between these two religious 
groupings lies in their different attitudes to mysticism. Higher mean scores 
obtained by Pagans and Buddhists on psychoticism compared with Christians or 
Jews, for example, readily invites the skeptical response that these religious 
groupings could be placed in the two categories of "psychotic" and "non- 
psychotic" religions just as easily as they could be designated to the categories
of "pro-mystical" and "anti-mystical" religions.
Such allegations can be answered by observations that the strongest 
main effect reported for religion in Chapter Six was for Attitudes to Mysticism, 
and that this greatly exceeded that found for all other dependent variables, 
including self-reported mystical experience, as well as that for psychoticism.
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This suggested that, of the dependent variables assessed in Chapter Six,
Paganism and Buddhism belong to a different category of religion to
Christianity and Judaism primarily through differing attitudes to mysticism.
However, further reasons exist as to why it would be misleading to describe the
former as "psychotic" religions, the latter as "non-psychotic" religions. These
relate to a theme that has been argued so consistently in this thesis, the need to
take greater cognizance ot the heterogeneity of psychoticism in research in this 
field.
In the study reported in Chapter Six, a pattern that replicated the 
statistically significant differences found for the four religious groups on 
attitudes to mysticism was found for only one of the five NEO traits. This was 
openness to experience. Pagans scored higher on this trait than did any of the 
other three groups, although the difference between Buddhists and Pagans was 
less great than that between the Abrahamic faiths and the Pagans; and Buddhists 
scored higher on this trait than did the Abrahamic faiths. Although significant 
differences between these four creeds were found for NEO conscientiousness 
and NEO agreeableness, patterns of between-group differences for these two 
traits did not match the distinction that is defended here between pro-mystical 
and anti-mystical religions. Jewish respondents scored significantly more highly 
than representatives of the two pro-mystical religions on conscientiousness, but 
also scored significantly higher on conscientiousness than did representatives of 
the other non-mystical religion (Christianity). Similarly, Christians scored 
higher on agreeableness than representatives of the two pro-mystical religions, 
but also scored significantly higher on this trait than did the Jews. Distinctions 
of pro-mystical and anti-mystical religions in terms of the personality traits that
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are likely to eharaeterise representatives of either group should therefore focus 
on openness to experience rather than psychoticism. It is also note-worthy that 
whereas all three traits from the five-factor model related to psychoticism 
clearly resulted in between-groups differences for religion, the highest F-ratio 
found for any of these variables was for openness to experience. Indeed, this
\ariable produced the highest main effect for religion for any assessed between- 
groups variable after attitudes to mysticism.
Critiques of taxonomies which distinguish religions along a sinule 
variable should consider other variables which, at least as general tendencies, 
may distinguish faiths occupying different wings of this variable, insofar as this 
helps to establish the heuristic value of such taxonomies by suggesting potential 
correlates of such variables. Certain variables may be expected to characterise 
anti-mvstical and pro-mystical religions other than the standings these faiths 
hold on the variable of attitudes to mysticism itself. Arguments have already 
been presented as to why the assumption, implicit in some scholarship, that the 
former can be linked to Western religion, the latter to Eastern religion, should 
be challenged. A far more credible statement appears to be that openness to 
experience is likely to distinguish between pro-mystical and anti-mystical 
religions, with members of the former tending to score higher than members of
the latter.
Such a claim poses important research questions. One concerns direction 
of causality. The question remains as to whether membership ol a religion that 
takes more positive attitudes to mysticism contributes to increased creativity, or 
whether such a link arises through more creative people seeking out and joining 
religions that are more "pro-mystical". A third possibility, that pro-mystical
attitudes and creat.vity are both linked with an additional variable or set of 
variables, should also be considered
Another important question stems from the fact the study reported in the 
previous chapter took place in a culture (the United Kingdom) where neither of 
the two pro-mystical religious groups constituted either the State or the 
predominant religion. This leaves open the question of whether similar links 
between positive attitudes to mysticism and creativity will be found in cultures 
where a religion such as Buddhism predominates. Further data are needed to 
answer such questions, but the fact that they can be posed at all demonstrates 
the considerable heuristic value of the variable of attitudes to mysticism.
7.7 Overall Implications of Empirical Data presented in Chanters Four to 
Six
Taken together, the three studies reported in Chapters Four to Six 
inclusive consistently point towards several important conclusions. These relate 
to associations between religious liberalism and mystical experience, to 
sampling issues and to the question of whether any intrapersonal variables are 
significantly and positively correlated with mystical experience in all religious 
groups. Each issue will now be discussed in turn, drawing on how the data 
presented in this thesis have provided empirical support ior these assertions. 
Implications for continued assessments ol psychoticism in research into the 
intrapersonal correlates of transpersonal experience w ill be considered in
discussions of each issue.
(i) Religious liberalism and mysticism
The first and third studies provided evidence for linking religious 
liberalism to mystical experience, the first in finding that religious groups that 
scored higher on Quest religious orientation also scored higher on mystical 
experience, the third in finding that scores on mystical experience were higher 
for religions that could be judged somewhat liberal and apart from mainstream 
(Pagans and Buddhists) than more "conservative" religions (Christian and 
Jews). It is true that close analysis of the six facets of NEO openness to 
experience reported in Chapter Six gave some grounds for caution here, as the 
liberal values facet of this trait correlated less strongly with mystical experience 
for the sample taken as a whole than did other facets of this trait. Nevertheless, 
viewed in their entirety, the studies reported in this thesis suggest that those who 
are sympathetic towards more liberal rather than conservative religious 
movements are those who are more likely to score high on measures of assessed 
mystical experience.
It is as well to acknowledge that the liberal values facet of NEO 
openness to experience is assessed by several questions indicative of secular 
rather than religious liberalism. Two items used to assess the liberal values facet 
of openness to experience, one asking whether religious leaders should be seen 
as guardians of morality and one asking whether today s permissive morality is 
really no morality at all, could both be taken as implying a tacit assumption that 
liberalism is to be equated with endorsement of secular values. Distinctions 
between religious and secular liberalism and the possibility that mystical 
experience is more common only among religious liberals (those who value 
religious commitments but in an unconventional way) are issues that certainly
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assess
merit attention in work in transpersonal psychometrics.
Important implications are raised here for attempts to 
psychoticism as a global trait in research into transpersonal experience's 
personality correlates. If, as Heath and Martin's (1990) data imply, endorsement 
of radical social values is a facet of psychoticism, the question can be raised of 
whether psychoticism is associated with endorsement of secular values, 
especially in the wake of findings such as Francis (1992a) linking reduced 
psychoticism to heightened religiosity. If this is so, it may not be enough to
9
report on potential relationships between mystical experience and psychoticism. 
Rather, research will need to consider carefully variables which relate 
specifically to liberalism within a religious context, such as Batson's concept of 
quest religious orientation.
(ii) Sampling Issues
Studies such as that reported by Francis and Thomas (1996) examined 
exclusively Christian samples; data from the study reported in Chapter Six 
suggested important reasons for considering the religions from which samples 
are drawn. With one important exception, the variables found to correlate with 
mystical experience were not identical for each religious group. Theoretical 
reasons have been presented in this thesis as to why this is exactly the pattern 
that social constructivism predicts. However, the divergent patterns ol 
correlation did not match exactly those that would be predicted by social 
constructivism, that is, mystical experience correlating positively with NEO 
conscientiousness and negatively with psychoticism among Pagans and 
Buddhists but not in Christians and Jews. Indeed, the only group for which
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NEO conscientiousness was significantly positively correlated with mystical 
experience was one of the two anti-mystical groups (the Christians).
It is the comparisons between the specific religious groups studied that 
really amplify the necessity of breaking down psychoticism into component 
parts. Any evidence that psychoticism is found to correlate positively with 
m\stical experience in a sample drawn from a generic population should be 
treated with caution. Data from Chapter Six suggest that this could merely be 
because adherents of faiths which score higher on mystical experience are also 
adherents of faiths which score higher on psychoticism; and that this, in turn, 
arises purely because such people also score higher on openness to experience.
(iii) The common correlate of transpersonal experience
The one variable that was found to correlate significantly and positively 
with mystical experience in all four groups studied was attitudes to mysticism. 
Acknowledging that grounds have been made for drawing distinctions between 
these two constructs, it is nevertheless held here that this suggests that any 
correlates of mystical experience common across different religions relate to 
social cognitions of such experiences rather than to personality traits.
Within each religion sampled, these two variables appeared to be 
related, but reasons have been offered above for treating them as distinct 
constructs. Assessments of psychoticism as a global trait may be more 
defensible when assessing personality correlates ol attitudes to mysticism than 
when assessing personality correlates ol mystical experience. Controlling for 
religion and openness to experience did not have such major impact on the 
positive correlation, observed for the whole sample in Chapter Six, between
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attitudes to mysticism and psychoticism as between mystical experience and
psychoticism. Interesting questions for further research attention are raised here 
(see Chapter Eight).
7.8 Implications for Debate on Whether Mystical Experience is a Learnt 
Construct
Data presented in Chapter Six on mystical experience and psychoticism 
should be placed within the wider context of the literature, reviewed in detail in 
Chapter Three, on personality and general religiosity. Studies that have 
employed assessments of the doctrinal and ritual dimensions of religion have 
generally reported negative correlations between psychoticism and assessed 
religiosity. Such negative correlations have typically been attributed, as by 
Francis, Pearson. Carter and Kay (1981) and Francis (1992a; 1992b), as due to 
the associations between low psychoticism and greater conditionability into 
tender-minded attitudes. The underlying assumption behind such attributions, 
therefore, is that of the importance of social learning in acquisition of allegiance 
to religious doctrines and practices. Absence ol a negative correlation between 
mystical experience and psychoticism among pro-mystical Buddhist and Pagan 
samples can be interpreted most parsimoniously as ev idence against the view 
that social learning affects mystical experience. Prima facie, this appears to 
render Forman's (1998) perennialism more plausible than the social 
constructivism of Katz (1978). However, one element of the data reported in 
Chapter Six did offer support for at least a moderate version of social
constructivism.
This was the finding that length of affiliation with one's religious group
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correlated positively with mystical experience in the two pro-mystical groups. 
The most parsimonious explanation of this finding is that longer affiliations 
with groups promoting mysticism will increase the likelihood of learning and 
incorporating the teachings of such a movement, thereby increasing the chances 
that one will oneself have a personal experience of the mystical states promoted 
by such a group. Problematic with such an explanation is that direction of 
causality cannot be inferred from a correlation. A defensible alternative 
explanation would be that people w'ho are prone to have mystical experiences
are more likely to stay in religious groups promoting such experiences for 
longer periods of time, if social constructivists may defend their rival 
explanation in terms of having greater parsimony.
To present length of affiliation with religious group as having causal 
primacy implies that mystical experience, if not entirely a learnt phenomenon, 
may be affected by learning processes. What is then raised is the question of 
why mystical experience did not, among the two pro-mystical groups, show an 
inverse relationship with psychoticism.
One possibility is that psychoticism is too broad a trait to make such an 
inference, as has been argued at length in this thesis, and that only by looking at 
more finely focussed traits such as conscientiousness on the NEO-PI will the 
correlations predicted by social constructivist accounts of mystical experience 
be detectable. Against this viewpoint, NEO-PI conscientiousness was not found 
to be positively correlated with mystical experience in either ol the two pro- 
mystical groups. A rather different thesis, that mystical experiences and other 
forms of religiosity are influenced by social learning but in different ways, is
advocated here.
Personality correlates of both attitudes to mysticism and mystical 
experience presented in the previous chapter imply that learning patterns related 
to the former have more in common with patterns of learning related to 
doctrinal and ritual elements of religion than do any patterns of learning that 
underlie mystical experience. Attitudes to mysticism was found to correlate 
positively with conscientiousness as measured on the NEO in a pro-mystical 
group (the Pagans), whereas a significantly negative correlation between these 
variables was observed lor the Jews. In Chapter Two, the personality trait of 
NEO conscientiousness was presented as the key facet of psychoticism most 
immediately relevant to conditionability levels. These different relationships 
between attitudes to mysticism and NEO conscientiousness are therefore to be 
expected if (a) acquisition of the prescriptive norms of one's group reflects 
conditionability level and (b) attitudes to mysticism exemplifies a prescriptive 
norm that is learnt. Absence of a similar asymmetry between the Jews and 
Pagans did not exist for broad measures of psychoticism. However, this finding 
can still be taken as evidence that attitudes to mysticism are more influenced 
socio-cultural conditioning processes that may influence other lorms ol 
religiosity than is mystical experience per se. Absence ol such an asymmetry lor 
psychoticism merely suggests that very sensitive measures (defined in this 
context as traits more narrow-band than broad psychoticism) are needed to
observe this.
Taken in conjunction with the findings on mystical experience, this 
observation means that attitudes to mysticism does appear likely to have a 
similar partem of ontogenetic development to other forms ol religiosity 
sensitive to soeio-eultural learning, whereas mystical experience does not.
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Implicit in this assertion is that if social learning does affect mystical 
experience, it does so in a qualitatively distinct way from its influence on other 
religiosity -related variables. Thus, an important distinction between attitudes to 
mysticism and mystical experience could be that these variables have different 
patterns ol ontogenesis. Attitudes to mysticism may be sensitive to the same 
conditioning processes that underlie conditioning of tender-minded attitudes, 
acquisition ot religious doctrinal teachings and allegiance to ritual; mystical 
experience may be influenced by learning, but by a distinct pattern of learning 
to any form of learning that underlies these variables. This premise is reinforced 
by the observation that length of affiliation with one's current religious group, in 
the two pro-mystical groups, did not correlate significantly and positively with 
attitudes to mysticism.
7.9 Consistencies and Apparent Inconsistencies with Previously Published 
Findings
The finding of a positive correlation between psychoticism and mystical 
experience appears, prima facie, inconsistent with a number of previous studies 
(Caird, 1987; Francis & Louden, 1996). Close inspection of such studies, 
however, reveals their use of samples which were more homogeneous with 
respect to religious membership group than was the case with the combined 
sample used for the study reported in Chapter Six. Such inconsistency is 
therefore to be expected if this apparently positive correlation between 
psychoticism and mystical experience is attributed to between-groups 
differences on both variables. Indeed, when religious groups were analysed 
separately, a positive correlation between psychoticism and mystical experience
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was found lor only one religious group (the Jews), and this appeared to have 
been a function of both variables relating to the NEO trait of openness to 
experience. The data reported in Chapter Six are, therefore, actually consistent 
with data reported by Francis and Thomas (1996), who limited their sample to 
Anglican clergy and found no evidence of either a positive or negative 
correlation between psychoticism and mystical experience.
The apparently positive correlation between psychoticism and mystical 
experience, reported for the whole sample in the study reported in Chapter Six, 
was almost certainly a between-groups difference. Buddhists and Pagans 
obtained higher mean scores for psychoticism and also for mystical experience 
than did Christians or Jews. The implications of Section 7.6 are that the 
apparently elevated scores for psychoticism of the former groups only emerged 
due to their increased scores for openness to experience. Although these two 
groups scored higher on this trait than did Christians or Jews, an equivalent 
pattern of between-groups difference was not found for NEO conscientiousness 
or NEO agreeableness. This underlines how essential it is for research in this 
area to investigate components of psychoticism rather than to continue to report 
correlations between mystical experience and psychoticism when the latter is 
portrayed as a broad trait.
An apparently positive relationship between psychoticism and mystical 
experience is consistent with the Findings ol 1 halboume and Delin (1999). 
These authors found that mystical experience correlated positively with three 
traits - manic experience, depressive symptoms and hypomania - indicative of 
psychotic symptomatology. However, the arguments above suggest caution in 
interpreting the findings from the current study as totally consistent with those
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of Thalboume and Delin (1999). Early research into the personality correlates of 
mystical experience (Hood, 1975; Hood et al., 1979) did not find mystical 
experience to be correlated with any Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory measurements indicative of psychosis-proneness, but did find 
mystical experience to correlate with openness to experience (Hood, 1975); and, 
as noted in Chapter Three, found mystical experience to be negatively 
correlated with value orthodoxy as measured on the Jackson Personality 
Inventory, at least among female respondents (Hood et ah, 1979). Close scrutiny 
of the data presented in Chapter Six reveals how they are more consistent with 
the findings of Hood than with those of Thalbourne and Delin. for such scrutiny 
reveals how, in opposition to Thalboume and Delin (1999) but in common with
Hood (1975), such data suggested that mystical experience is linked to openness
to experience rather than psychoticism.
This observation is important, for it clarifies important limitations not 
considered by Thalboume and Delin in reporting their data. In noting 
inconsistencies between their data and those of Hood (1975), Thalboume and
Delin claimed that there may have been important differences between Hood's 
sample (N = 29) and their own sample of over 100 participants. Aside from 
mentioning the obvious size difference, however, Thalbourne and Delin failed 
to cite reasons why their sample was likely to have ditlered from Hood s. Hood 
had drawn his sample from a population of students at a fairly conservative 
Christian Protestant college, which may have led to homogeneity of the 
religious population being sampled; whereas religious heterogeneity 
characterised Thalboume and Delin's sample. Christian theist, non-Christian 
theist. atheist and agnostic participants all took part in Thalbourne and Delin’s
study. As Thalboume and Delin did not report on whether statistically 
significant correlations existed for any of these four groups taken alone, their 
data were uninformative as to whether the links they found between traits 
related to psychosis-proneness and mystical experience were really between- 
groups differences, with certain groups scoring significantly higher on both sets 
of variable, rather than a universal association found in different creeds.
Findings of orthogonality between NEO assessments of neuroticism and 
mystical experience in the study reported in Chapter Six, both for the combined
A
sample and for each specific religious group, challenged any attempt to link 
mystical experience with psycho-pathology of a neurotic rather than psychotic 
kind. This can certainly be declared inconsistent with the correlation observed 
by Thalboume and Delin between depression and mystical experience, if not 
with their apparent correlation between mystical experience and two more 
psychosis-related forms of potentially pathological trait (manic experience and 
hypomania). Consistencies between the current study and those of Thalboume 
and Delin (1999), therefore, may be more apparent than real. This lack of a 
relationship between neuroticism and mystical experience is, however, 
consistent with what has been found in previous studies that have used the EPQ 
rather than the NEO-PI-S to assess neuroticism (Caird, 1987; Francis &
Thomas, 1996).
The absence of a significant negative correlation between psychoticism 
and mystical experience for any ol the lour groups assessed in the study 
reported in Chapter Six may appear inconsistent with the literature, reviewed in 
Chapter Three, suggesting that religiosity is negatively correlated with 
psychoticism. Indeed, failure to find a negative correlation between
psychoticism and mystical experience is sometimes taken, as by Francis and 
Thomas (1996), as inconsistent with previous findings. These findings are 
merely taken here to refer to a need to disentangle different dimensions of 
religion, however, and an acceptance that what is true of the experiential 
dimension ol religion may not be true of the doctrinal or ritual dimensions.
7.10 Criticisms of Empirical Studies
A review of the empirical studies outlined in this thesis invites 
potential criticisms, especially in terms of sampling issues and those that relate 
to psychometrics and statistics. These criticisms, beginning with those relating 
to sampling issues, will now be addressed. Potential answers to such criticisms 
will give grounds for defending the conclusions that have been drawn from 
these studies.
7.10.1 Sampling Issues
While the first empirical study reported in this thesis is open to the 
charge of using a relatively small sample, the sample was at least comparable in 
magnitude to that used in Hood's (1975) study with the M-Scale, which used a 
sample of 29 students in assessing relationships between the MMPI and 
mystical experience. Deeper problems related to sampling concerned age 
ranges of the samples studied. The Quakers and Unitarians in the study reported 
in Chapter Four generally came from older age ranges than did the evangelicals, 
who included a substantial number ol participants under the age of forty. If 
quest and mystical experience, therefore, are really both indicative of spiritual 
maturity, as claimed by Maltby (1999b), the elevated scores for quest and
mystical experience lound lor Unitarians and Quakers may have been due to 
age variation across group, rather than to differences in conservatism-liberalism. 
Similarly, as students in the study in Chapter five were, on average, younger 
than participants lrom the other groups, one could argue that the variations 
found in scores on the Attitudes to Mysticism scale were due to age-based 
differences, not to ideological differences of groups sampled.
In responding to such criticisms, it should be remembered that the two 
groups who scored highest on mystical experience in the study reported in 
Chapter Six, Pagans and Buddhists, were, on average, younger than the other 
two groups sampled. Between-groups differences in mystical experiences 
reported throughout this thesis can therefore be interpreted more consistently as 
being due to differences in group ideology than due to age.
To attribute the higher quest scores of the Quakers and the Unitarians to 
their higher age status is somewhat odd. Accepting Maltby's (1999b) claim that 
both mystical experience and quest may indicate greater spiritual maturity, it 
still seems somewhat strange to suggest that attitudes are likely to grow more 
rather than less liberal with age. Such a premise contradicts the popular, if often 
anecdotal, observation that social attitudes generally grow more conservative 
with age. There is also evidence that quest scores decline with age (Wulff,
1997), making it difficult to defend any allegations that quest differences in 
Chapter Four were due to age variations in the groups studied.
Considerations of age bias in the samples used in the study reported in 
Chapter Five should keep in mind that the group which were, on average, of 
highest age status, Mensa Paranormal, did not obtain significantly higher scores 
than the youngest group, the students, explanation ol dillercnces on the scales
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observed in terms ol age-based diiferences would only be defensible, therefore, 
if one genuinely considered there to be a curvilinear relationship, rather than a 
simple linear correlation, between age and both mystical experience and 
attitudes to mysticism. Interpretation of the data as support for a curvilinear 
relationship between age and these variables would be to suggest that both 
mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism peak in the 30s and 40s (the 
mean average ages of the Reichi healers and Buddhists), and decline after the 
age of fifty. Empirical research in the psychology of religion has not, typically, 
found this pattern of curvilinear relationship between age and religion. Indeed, 
an early review of studies of development of religiosity over the lifespan 
suggested that when a curvilinear relationship between age and religion is 
found, the trend follows exactly the opposite pattern. This review suggested that 
religiosity shows a gradual decline in the 30s and 40s and subsequent rise again 
after the age of fifty (Argyle, 1958).
The fact that respondents who participated in the studies reported in this 
thesis had given informed consent to take part in questionnaire-based studies of 
mystical experience, and that people who do this may themselves constitute a 
select sample of respondents, is another sampling issue that merits 
consideration. As noted in Chapter Six, only a small percentage of synagogues 
contacted responded to requests to participate in the study, and a mere 50% of 
contacted United Reformed Churches in the East Midlands offered such 
consent. This suggests considerable selectivity of the Jews and Christians that 
were prepared to answer questions on spiritual experiences for the purpose of 
the study. The large membership numbers of many of the East Midlands 
churches which were contacted, coupled with the fact that only a relatively
small number of participants per church agreed to complete questionnaires, 
further suggested that the C hristians in the sample were a select sample with 
respects to likely interests in mysticism and spiritual experiences.
This bias acknowledged, it should be clarified that, if anything, it is 
likely to have underestimated the main effect sizes found for religious group. A 
very conservative conjecture is that the Jewish sample, for example, was biased 
insofar as it included Jews who, having given consent to take part in a study on 
spiritual experience, had above average levels of interest in the experiential 
dimensions of religion compared with Jewish populations in general. Yet, Jews 
still scored significantly lower on attitudes to mysticism than Buddhists and 
Pagans, and significantly lower on mystical experience than did all three other 
religious groups. If this assumption about the particular Jews who consented to 
participate in the study is correct, it is likely that assessment of a more generic 
sample of Jews would have resulted in even stronger between-groups 
differences. (Obviously, obtaining such a sample would have been difficult 
without violation of the ethical principle of informed consent). Between-groups 
differences reported in Chapter Six can therefore be viewed as consistent with 
the taxonomy presented in Chapter Two of some religions as "anti-mystical" 
and others as "pro-mystical”, and if anything, are likely to have underestimated
these differences.
A final point about sampling concerns methodology used to recruit 
Pagan participants. These participants were collected chiefly by recruitment 
after seeing advertisements for research in journals, unlike participants recruited 
for the other three religious groups. This therefore begs the question of whether 
any observed differences between the Pagans and the other groups may have
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related less to religious group differences than to possible differences between 
people who respond to advertisements in research journals and those who agree 
to participate in research following alternative sampling methods.
This is a defensible criticism in terms of scores on the Francis-Louden 
Mystical Orientation Scale. Of the Pagans who saw advertisements asking for 
respondents interested in participating into spiritual experiences, only those 
Pagans who personally believed that they themselves had had such experiences 
may have responded. This may have accounted for the Pagans' significantly 
higher scores on mystical experience than were found with the three other 
religious groups. However, in the case of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale, the 
use of another pro-mystical group, the Buddhists, who were not recruited 
through use of magazine or journal advertisements, can be regarded as use of a 
control group whose presence in the sample addressed this criticism. As with 
Pagans, the Buddhists scored significantly higher on the "Attitudes to 
Mysticism" scale than did either the Christians or Jews. This suggests that the 
taxonomy outlined at the end of Chapter Two is valid, and that the fact that the 
Buddhists and Pagans both scored significantly higher on the scale than did the 
Christians or Jews really did relate to differences in the ideological 
commitments of the religious groups sampled, rather than to differences 
between people who do versus those who do not read specialist journals or
publications related to their creed.
It should also be emphasised that initial attempts to recruit Jewish
participants by placing an advertisement in a Jewish publication had to be 
abandoned, following a zero response rate. There therefore appears to be no 
guarantee that placing of an advertisement in a journal will necessarily attract
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all those followers ol a creed who believe that they have had a "mystical" or 
"spiritual" experience.
7.10.2 Psychometric and Statistical Issues 
(i) Psychometric issues
Issues ol reliability and validity of the scales used for empirical data 
collection have already been addressed throughout the previous two chapters. 
The new "Attitudes to Mysticism" scale, the Francis-Louden Mystical 
Orientation Scale and the NEO all have high enough Cronbach's alpha 
coefficients to judged high in internal consistency. The EPQ psychoticism sub-
scale has lower internal consistency (Eysenck et al., 1985; Heath & Martin, 
1990; see also Appendix D of the current thesis). However, this should not be 
taken as a challenge to the use of this sub-scale for research in this particular 
thesis, as the very heterogeneity of psychoticism implied by this low internal 
consistency has been part of the rationale for this research.
The central psychometric issue that will be addressed here is that of 
whether the questionnaires used have been equally appropriate for all religious 
groups studied. Potential sources of bias in questionnaires in researching 
transpersonal issues were addressed in a paper by the author of this thesis 
(Edwards, 2003). Two of these are particularly relevant to the study reported in
Chapter Six:
(a) The "monotheistic bias" of certain questionnaires. Questions that 
specifically address respondents to think about "God" may be difficult for 
atheistic religions, such as certain lorms ol Buddhism,
(b) The "patriarchal bias". References to "God" on certain questionnaires may
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create problems lor some respondents, such as certain neo-Pagans, who 
typically think of a "Goddess" rather than "God".
Both categories of bias indicate the problems that were found for 
Pagan and Buddhist respondents during in collecting data for the study reported 
in Chapter Six, a process which itself inspired Edwards' (2003) paper. That both 
forms ol bias may operate in the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale, 
which includes items referring to “God", suggests the possibility that the scale 
carries an inherent bias towards a vocabulary that will be understood by 
Christian respondents. Use of this scale can be defended against charges that it 
is only measuring an exclusively Christian type of experience, for the Pagans 
obtained highest scores on the scale, and the Buddhists obtained slightly - if not 
significantly - higher scores on the scale than the Christians. Nevertheless, 
these potential sources of bias in the questionnaire carry important implications 
for its use in future research, suggesting amendments (such as allowing 
participants to substitute the word “Goddess" for “God" on certain items) may 
be needed for respondents from religious populations such as Wicca.
(ii) Statistical issues
Powell, Shahabi and Thoresen (2003), in reviewing studies on health 
and religion, point out that if a study is to use a number of multiple measures of 
religion, chances of a Type One error will increase. Their recommendation is, 
therefore, to make adequate controls when multiple measures are employed, 
such as decreasing the value of p set for judgment of an effect as significant.
In response, it should be recalled that, for the study reported in
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Chapter Six,/? values were adjusted accordingly when looking at how strongly 
each of the Little 1 hirty" correlated with mystical experience. The consistency 
of certain findings should also be stressed. Attitudes to mysticism was regularly 
found to correlate with mystical experience, both for each creedal group and for 
the whole sample, at a level of/? < 0.01. Consistencies of such a finding at such 
a P value make it unlikely that relationship between these variables was ever 
due to a Type One error. A large number of statistical results may have been 
reported in Chapter Six; but the highly significant values of /? for some of these 
findings reduces the chance that these arose due to Type One errors.
7.11 Summary and Implications of Chapter Seven
The key theme that may be inferred from empirical data presented in this 
thesis is that mystical experience is positively related to openness to experience 
rather than to psychoticism. An additional conclusion that may be drawn from 
data collected for this study is that a variable that has been under-researched in
this area is that of attitudes to mysticism. Qualitative data presented in this 
chapter, as well as the quantitative data presented in Chapter Six, provided 
grounds for supposing that the four groups studied differ in their attitudes to
mysticism.
The possibility that the relationship this variable bears to psychoticism 
differs from that that mystical experience bears to psychoticism has important 
implications as to which, of these two variables, can more readily be linked to 
propensity for conditioning into tender-minded attitudes. This in turn has 
important implications for a theoretical debate that has been cited in this thesis 
as one which should take greater cognizance of psychometric study of
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personalit} correlates ol mystical experience, that between perennialists such as 
Forman (1998) and constructivists such as Katz (1978). These issues, 
accompanied by considerations of whether global psychoticism assessments of 
psychoticism are more appropriate when studying attitudes to mysticism than 
mystical experience, will be considered more fully in the final chapter.
Katz s (1978) denial of unmediated experiences and Forman’s (1998) 
claim for innate core "experiences" in different religions may both, 
paradoxically, be valid claims. This paradox may be resolved by reference to 
the variable of attitudes to mysticism. The qualitative data reported in this 
chapter indicated that a respondent from one of the two "anti-mystical" groups 
had had an experience that could be regarded as a "spiritual experience", even 
though skeptical attitudes towards mystical phenomena were expressed by the 
same respondent; and in none of the four groups studied was a total null 
response observed for frequency counts of responses to the Alister Hardy and 
David Wuthnow questions. This suggested that in each of the four groups, there 
had been at least some members who had experienced transpersonal 
experiences, supporting Forman's (1998) claim that transpersonal experiences 
can be cross-creedal. However, if attitudes to mysticism is another important 
variable to be addressed in this field, and the variations on this scale across 
religious group do arise because of socio-cultural learning differences between 
adherents of different creeds, important implications arise as for an original 
interpretation of Katz's (1978) statement that reports of mystical experiences are 
not unmediated, and for how best to present this argument in a way that is 
backed by empirical data. This issue will be addressed in the next and final
chapter.
A major question behind this thesis, namely that of whether or not 
research into personality correlates ol mystical experience should consider 
different facets ol psychoticism as well as psychoticism as a broad trait, can 
now be answered affirmatively. In the main empirical study reported in this 
thesis, the more mystical creeds scored higher on psychoticism than the less 
mystical creeds, mystical experience related significantly to psychoticism for 
the whole sample, and mystical experience related significantly to psychoticism 
among Jewish respondents. Without the assessments of distinguishable facets of 
psychoticism achieved through use of the NEO, the reason for these findings 
would have been obscured. All three findings appeared to relate to potential 
links between openness to experience, a trait that was found to be significantly 
and positively correlated with psychoticism, and mystical experience. Mere 
assessments of psychoticism as a global trait would not have allowed for 
observation of this possibility. Effects of partialling for openness to experience 
strengthened this conclusion.
It has been consistently maintained throughout this thesis that an 
attempt to build up personality profiles of people who report mystical 
experiences should not be considered a purely descriptive exercise. To do so has 
major implications for theoretical questions. Two such theoretical questions are 
that of whether mystical experience is associated with pathology or with better- 
than-average mental health status, and that of whether mystical experience is a 
learnt or innate construct. Both may benefit from considered awareness of how 
mystical experience relates to specific facets of psychoticism, rather than simple
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observations of how psychoticism as a broad trait may relate to mystical 
experience. Following a brief summary of the key findings obtained in this 
thesis, their implications lor these questions will be considered. The importance 
of attitudes to mysticism as a construct to research in this field, and the issue of 
whether psychoticism has a different relationship to this variable to that found 
for mystical experience, will also be discussed.
8.1 Key Findings of Studies
To summarize the key findings of this thesis, quest orientation was 
found to be associated with mystical experience in Study One; attitudes to 
mysticism was found to be associated with mystical experience in Study Two; 
and in the main study reported in this thesis, Study Three as reported in Chapter 
Six, an apparent relationship between mystical experience and psychoticism
was observed for a generic sample consisting of respondents drawn from four
distinct creedal groups. The latter finding will be taken as a key psychometric 
finding from research prepared for this thesis; but the stress on the word 
"apparent" in the last sentence is important.
In this key study, scores on the Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation 
Scale were higher among respondents scoring higher on psychoticism as 
measured on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire of Eysenck et al. (1985). 
Two groups, Buddhists and Pagans, scored significantly more highly than did 
Christians or Jews on psychoticism - and, at least in the case of the Pagans, 
higher on mystical experience than these latter two religious groups. This may 
appear to imply associations between mystical experience and the psychosis- 
linked forms of psycho-pathology. However, closer inspection of the data
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revealed how this apparent correlation observed between psychoticism and 
mystical experience was reduced after controlling for openness to experience 
and religion (to non-significance after controlling for the latter).
Psychoticism, as argued in Chapter Two, is a broad, arguably over-
broad, trait, included within its gamut are traits which could, indeed, be seen as 
positive. An example is creativity; to the list may be added readiness to question 
mores and convention, indicative ol high levels of moral development in
Kohlbergian models ot moral reasoning. That apparent relationships between
%
psychoticism and mystical experience may be explained by reference to such 
attributes implies that it may be wrong to interpret phenomena such as a sense 
of oneness with the Universe as incipient signs of latent psychotic tendencies. 
Rather, such experiences can be taken as evidence that a person has successfully 
achieved a level of creativity enabling him/ her to break with conventional and 
mundane patterns of thinking.
8.2 Is Mystical Experience Really Associated with Predisposition towards 
Psychosis?
Assertions that mystical experience could be symptomatic of 
pathology raise the question of whether or not such experiences are associated 
with any specific type of pathological disorder. At least at a covert level, an 
assumption behind empirical data collection for this thesis has been that the 
pathological disorders that most obviously share commonalities with mystical 
experience are the psychoses in general. Visions, hallucinations or hearing 
voices in schizophrenia, for example, give prima facie grounds for observing
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how, at a surface level, certain psychoses and certain forms of transpersonal 
experiences may not be identical, but nevertheless share common features.
The data reported in this thesis are relevant to an increased 
understanding ol relationships between mystical experience and psychoses 
insolar as psychoticism has been linked with psychoses at extreme levels 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). Assessments of a cross-creedal population, in 
which respondents from different creeds completed both a measure of mystical 
experience and a measure of psychoticism suggested that people who score 
higher on mystical experience also score higher on psychoticism. This trait's 
relationship to vulnerability to psychoses in Eysenckian theories may lead to 
conclusions from this finding that mystical experiences can be interpreted as 
premorbid symptoms of full-blown psychoses such as schizophrenia. However, 
closer inspection of the findings of this thesis challenges this rather over- 
simplistic conclusion.
The question “Is mysticism associated with psychoticism?" is given here 
the simple answer here: "Yes". However, the rather different question "Is 
mysticism associated with psychosis?" is answered here "No". A major 
limitation of both Eysenck's position and the theory of Einheitspsychosen upon 
which the concept of psychoticism is based is that as psychoticism is such a 
heterogeneous concept, assessments of psychoticism on their own are not fully 
informative as to the precise personality correlates of mystical and other 
transpersonal experiences. Such heterogeneity obscures how specific facets of 
psychoticism could be construed as positive traits. Links between psychoticism 
and mystical experience, such as those reported in this thesis, could therefore,
paradoxically, be taken as evidence that mystical experience is associated with 
greater, not lesser, than average mental health status.
8.2.1 Mystical Experience, Psychoticism and Creativity
That both FFM openness to experience and mystical experience were 
found to be associated with higher scores on psychoticism for a cross-creedal 
population suggests that an apparent association between mystical experience
and psychoticism should not be taken as evidence that people who report
%
mystical experience are more psychosis-prone, but rather, that they are more 
creative than the average person. Creativity has been defined as "a process in 
which two or more pre-existing elements - whether they be colours of forms, 
musical notes or words, or ideas in general - have been put into a relationship 
that is arrestingly unexpected, a relationship that may variously be regarded as 
aesthetically pleasing, mind-expanding, interesting and even useful, depending 
on the context" (Thalboume & Delin, 1994, p4). Inferences of associations 
between mystical experience and psychoticism from the data presented in this 
thesis may be misleading if both are linked with elevated creativity. Creativity 
has been related to the psychoses, not just schizophrenia but also manic- 
depressive psychosis, as by Goodwin and Jamison (1990).
Both creativity and mystical experience, it is argued here, indicate 
preparedness to depart from rigid adherence to the conventional patterns ol 
thinking learnt during the course of mundane activities. Indeed, this readiness to 
depart from conventional patterns of associative cognition may be the root cause 
of both. This readiness may be termed here as “Capacity for Transcendence o f
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C onventional C ognition . To associate such capacity presents, as will be 
articulated below, significant challenges to social constructivism (Section 8.6).
A model ol religious experience that has important implications for how 
a readiness to depart from conventional structured patterns of thinking may be 
correlated with transpersonal experiences is that of Batson et al. (1993), termed 
by Edwards and Lowis (2001) the B.S.V. model of religious experience (as the 
model will be termed here). Based upon Wallas' (1926) four-stage model of 
creativity, Batson et al. presented this model as describing four stages that 
characterise the typical course of a religious experience. Firstly, there is a stage 
of self-abandonment, then of self-surrender, then of new vision and finally, a 
stage of new life.
The central feature of the model that is to be considered here is its 
implication that religious experiences involve cognitive restructuring. Edwards 
and Lowis (2001) criticised the B.S.V. model for too one-sided an emphasis on 
cognition and too little on affective aspects of transpersonal experiences, but it 
is important to see that Edwards and Lowis (2001) did not deny that cognitive 
processes, as well as affect, are important to an understanding of religious 
experiences. They merely called for increased attention to the power of affect in 
the process of religious experience. Both the BSV model and the reformulation 
offered by Edwards and Lowis (2001) suggest that cognitive restructuring is an 
important component of religious experience. Ability to enter into this cognitive 
re-structuring as a pre-requisite for mystical experience is exactly what is being
argued here.
Edwards and Lowis’ (2001) reformulation of the BSV model, partly 
through its greater attention to ascetic practices and to guilt in religious
experiences than was found in the original model, implied that increased 
conscientiousness may correlate with religious experience. Their reformulation 
therefore suggested that both a healthy component of low psychoticism 
(conscientiousness) and a healthy component of high psychoticism (openness to
experience) will correlate significantly positively with increased mystical 
experience.
The most distinctive contribution that the senior author of the B.S.V. 
model, C. Daniel Batson, has made to the psychology of religion has probably 
been his presentation of quest as a form of religious orientation. This may be 
considered to be a variable linked with readiness to break with conventional 
cognition, and hence, according to arguments presented here, with increased 
tendency to mystical experiences. Quest has been found to be linked to 
cognitive flexibility (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 1983). If the arguments here are 
sound, quest can therefore be expected to be positively related to mystical 
experience, exactly as w^ as found in the first study reported in this thesis.
A position advanced in this thesis after Study One, and somewhat 
more tentatively, after Study Three, is that mystical experience is associated 
with increased liberalism. This may seem diametrically opposed to the 
implications of the title of a widely cited piece by Katz (1983) "The 
‘Conservative’ Character of Mystical Experience". However, it is important to 
appreciate that, when read in its entirety, Katz's essay does acknowledge radical 
as well as conservative elements in the onset of mystical experience. What Katz 
appeared to be saying in this essay is that apparently radical re-interpretations of 
traditional Scriptures of one's faith are used by mystics, in a covert way, to 
defend the importance of teaching derived from such Scriptures for their faith
tradition. Such claims imply considerable creativity on the part of the mystic. If 
even Katz ( 198j ) is ready to attribute such creativity to mystics, it suggests that 
it is by no means misguided to link mystical experience with creativity, an 
association supported by the statistically significant associations between NEO
openness to experience and mystical experience found in the study reported in 
Chapter Six.
8.2.2 Thalbourne's Concept of Transliminality and Implications for 
Creativity Research
A variable that may underlie both readiness to depart from 
conventional cognition and mysticism is transliminality (Thalboume & Delin,
1994; 1999), proposed by these authors as “the common thread" (Thalbourne &
Delin, 1994) that may underlie a number of inter-related variables. Although
conceptual problems with this trait have been outlined earlier (Chapter Two), 
empirical findings upon which Thalboume and Delin based their thinking may 
help to enhance an understanding of some of the correlates reported in this
thesis.
Links between mystical experience, creativity and belief in the 
paranormal were implied by studies cited by Thalboume and Delin (1994). At 
least in a nonclinical sample, Thalboume and Delin found these three variables 
to be significantly and positively correlated. Among the student (nonclinical) 
sample these authors studied, the correlation between mystical experience and 
creativity was r = .48, suggesting that mystical experience and creativity share 
just over 23% variance in a nonclinical population. Although Thalbourne and
Delin found that both schizophrenics and manic-depressives scored significantly
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higher than did students on a measure of mystical experience, they nevertheless 
pleaded tor caution about whether one should interpret this relationship as 
meaning that mysticism is pathological, "or is in fact an addition to the list of 
genuinely positive experiences, such as social ease, sexual intensity,
productivity and so on, often reported by bipolar patients" (Thalboume &
Delin. 1994, p i5).
It would be an over-simplification to say that the position taken here is 
a clear endorsement of the latter perspective. It is true that the data reported in 
this thesis have been correlational, so inferences about directions of causality 
between the related variables of psychoticism, mystical experience and 
creativity are difficult. Suppose, however, that a high level of creativity both 
resulted from increased psychoticism and took causal primacy in increasing 
probability of mystical experience. If this suggestion of direction of causality is 
accurate, what would then become defensible is a statement that creativity may 
be one of the positive consequences of psychosis cited by Thalboume and 
Delin, and that increased psychoticism only indirectly increases likelihood of 
mystical experience by virtue of its associations with increased creativity. Other 
factors besides increased psychoticism may lead to increased creativity, and if 
such arguments are sound, these other factors should also increase probability of
mystical experience.
Data reported in this thesis provided evidence for an odd possibility. 
This is that transpersonal experiences such as auditory hallucinations or senses 
of ego loss should not be taken as an incipient signs of latent psychoses, yet,
deep interest in and positive views on mysticism could be. Evidence for this was 
that partialling lor openness to experience was found to have a less dramatic 
impact on the correlation observed between attitudes to mysticism and 
psychoticism than between mystical experience and psychoticism
A declaration that positive attitudes towards mystical teachings 
indicate proneness to psychosis is not the only possible explanation for this 
Ending. Two rather different explanations will be considered here. One relates 
to sampling issues; the other to criticisms of the social constructivism of Streng 
(1978).
(a) Nature of Population from Which Samples Were Drawn
All samples used for the study reported in Chapter Six came from a 
population in the United Kingdom. The dominant state religion of this nation, 
the Church of England, has not been classified in this thesis as a "pro-mystical" 
religion. Participants are likely to have been influenced, directly or indirectly, 
by this movement's values, whatever their current religion (indeed, at least one 
of the Druids stated having been raised in an Anglican background before 
turning to Druidry). This implies that these participants came from a population 
where Church-based anti-mystical suspicion formed the prescriptive norm.
This helps to explain why positive attitudes to mysticism correlated 
significantly positively with psychoticism, even after controlling for religion 
and openness to experience. Psychoticism is a trait that may be expected to be 
associated with rejection of conventional mores of one's society; therefore, 
those forms of religiosity that challenge the religiosity taught by the status quo 
may be those most readily associated with higher psychoticism scores. To
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summarize, this positive relationship between psychoticism and attitudes to 
mysticism could be understood in terms of low psychoticism participants being 
more likely to endorse the values of mainstream religion in the United 
Kingdom. A fascinating lollow-up would be to observe a culture where the 
mainstream religion is likely to be pro-mystical, as would be the case with 
certain Buddhist countries in the Orient, to assess whether this positive 
correlation between psychoticism and attitudes to mysticism still held.
(b) Attitudes to Mysticism as a Prescriptive Concept
The second interpretation relates to the fact that at least certain 
aspects of psychoticism relate to willingness to question norms. Questions such 
as "Should people always obey the law?" for which a negative answer means 
greater psychoticism, reflect the anti-authoritarian tendencies that may be 
observed in high psychoticism participants.
It is argued here that attitudes to mysticism is a prescriptive concept. 
This position is rather different to that of Streng (1978), who has argued that the 
language describing mystical experiences is, in reality, less descriptive and 
more prescriptive than is commonly realized. In opposition to Streng's claims, it 
is argued here that accounts of mystical experiences can indeed be couched in 
purely descriptive language. What is proposed here instead as being prescriptive 
are attitudes to mysticism, with certain religions prescribing against and others 
for mystical experiences.
If. as argued above, the general state religion of the population from 
which participants were drawn worked with a prescriptive norm that 
discouraged mysticism, it is of no surprise that those participants who are higher
in a trait marked (in part) by anti-authoritarian tendencies may score higher on 
attitudes to mysticism than those less high in this trait, precisely because the 
former are less likely than the latter to accept conventional prescriptions. 
Streng s position may therefore be criticised for failing to draw an adequate 
distinction between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience.
8.4. Social Constructivism and Perennialism: Towards a Synthesis
Attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience did not bear identical 
relationships with the Eysenckian trait of psychoticism, which strengthens the 
case for their conceptual distinction. To be consistent with the stress on the 
heterogeneity of psychoticism that has been maintained throughout this thesis, 
such claims require consideration of whether the more specific facets of the 
five-factor model were found to be related in different ways to mystical 
experience and to attitudes to mysticism. Indeed this was so. FFM 
conscientiousness was found to share opposite patterns of relationship to 
attitudes to mysticism among Jews and Pagans, but this was not replicated for 
mystical experience.
Such observations suggest that, if one were to use assessments of 
psychoticism or of its facets to guide thinking on the extent to which a variable 
is associated with conditionability, it is attitudes to mysticism, rather than 
mystical experience, that arises through a process of learning related to the 
process of conditioning. A failure to make an important conceptual distinction 
between mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism has, it is declared here, 
resulted in failure to address a potentially illuminating rapprochement between 
social constructivism and perennialism.
Conceptual distinctions between mystical experience and the cognitive 
frameworks attached to them are certainly not original with the current thesis. 
Thev can be observed in Stace's (1960) attempts to distinguish mystical 
experiences from interpretations of them. Stace has, however, frequently been
criticized for insufficient clarity in attempts to distinguish interpretation from 
experience (Payne, 1984).
Interpretation and attitudes to mysticism should not, by any means, be 
taken as identical. Interpretation need not involve any emotional evaluation of a 
state of being. Attitudes to mysticism does. This allows for the possibility, 
defended below, that mystical experiences may be both innate and cross- 
creedally invariant and yet still mediated in terms of their precise 
phenomenology, if the latter is described in terms of affective factors. Herein 
one can see exciting grounds for claiming that mystical experiences are, in 
important respects, both learnt and innate. It is true that these claims at this 
stage may sound speculative, but by presenting them as they are presented 
below it will become clearer that the grounds offered for reconciliation between 
social constructivism and perennialism are ones which can be evaluated in 
future psychometric study.
Stace's premise was based purely upon theory and did not stem from 
empirical research into transpersonal experience. When first put forth, his 
distinctions between mystical experience and post hoc interpretations of such 
experiences lacked any grounding in rigorous psychometrics. The development 
of a psychometric scale to assess Stace's (1960) position did not occur until 
some 15 years after the publication of Mysticism and Philosophy, in the form of 
Hood's M-Scale (Hood, 1975). Even this scale was not specifically designed as
a scale with two separate sub-scales, one to measure experience and one to 
measure interpretation. Factor analyses of the M-Scale have frequently been 
seen as evidence for this distinction (Hood, 1975; Hood et al., 1993), but such 
judgments have been post hoc considerations of the results of subsequent 
studies and were not built into initial considerations in design of the M-Scale.
A very different situation can be seen behind the distinction made here 
between attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. The use of separate 
questionnaires to assess either construct in empirical research presented in this 
thesis has indicated how this distinction was put forth with psychometric 
considerations in mind. It is held here that not only do the data support 
conceptual distinctions between these two variables, but that a distinction 
between attitudes and experience offers clearer grounds for a possible 
rapprochement between social constructivism and perennialism than does one 
between interpretation and experience.
Interpretations of the M-Scale as assessing a mystical experience factor 
and a so-called religious interpretation factor are questionable. The religious 
interpretation factor is frequently related to its sub-scales assessing perceived 
bliss, perceived information gains and perceived religious quality in an 
experience. A case could be made that the first two of these sub-scales relate to 
experience directly, and not to interpretation. A plea is made here for 
transpersonal researchers to consider distinctions between attitudes and 
experience, rather than between interpretation and experience.
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8.4.1 Mystical Experiences: Innate but Mediated?
It is argued here that attitudes to mysticism, being conceptually more 
similar to doctrinal assent than is mystical experience, more closely relate to 
learning ol prescriptive norms than does mystical experience per se. Evidence 
lor this proposition came from the fact that mystical experience was not, as was 
attitudes to mysticism, positively correlated with NEO conscientiousness in a 
pro-mystical group, and negatively correlated with NEO conscientiousness in an 
anti-mystical group. II psychoticism is to be defined in general as a trait of 
which the key feature is reduced conditionability, this could also explain why 
attitudes to mysticism was found to relate more strongly to psychoticism than 
was mystical experience, as was evident from how partialling for NEO
openness had a less dramatic influence on the correlation between attitudes to
mysticism and psychoticism than it had on the correlation between mystical
experience and psychoticism.
Although learning and conditioning may have more of a direct effect on 
attitudes to mysticism than on mystical experience, the latter could still be 
influenced by social learning in a way that is mediated by learnt attitudes to 
mysticism. Mystical experiences may be innate, but still affected by the learning 
processes brought about by the learning of specific attitudes towards mysticism.
An analogy helps to clarify this point. Suppose that two people both 
watch a video of a wrestling match. Prior to seeing this video, one has received 
instructions that wrestling is a highly dangerous sport, the other that wrestling is 
exciting. Suppose, further, that these divergent instructions were successful in 
producing negative attitudes attitudes towards wrestling on the part of the first 
individual, positive attitudes towards wrestling on the part of the second. While
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watching the wrestling match, both may be having an identical experience of 
increased adrenalin flow and heightened arousal. However, their divergent
attitudes towards wrestling may lead to variations in whether such an experience 
is linked to fear or excitement.
Something similar may underlie the precise phenomenology of mystical 
experience. It may be correct to suppose, as argued by Forman (1998), that an 
identical experience can be experienced by all human beings; but equally
correct to deny, as does Katz (1978), the possibility of unmediated experiences.
%
People from different traditions may all experience a sense of unity, constituting 
mystical experience as described by Stace (1960); what their religion may have 
taught them is whether to view such experiences positively or negatively. 
Learning processes may therefore, in a manner mediated by attitudes to 
mysticism, produce emotions of opposite valence during otherwise identical 
experiences.
This can be illustrated by imagining a scenario where two people 
have both had the core unitive mystical experience as described by Stace 
(1960). One is from a background of pro-mystical Paganism; the other an anti- 
mystical Jew. Both individuals may be high in learning propensity. The former 
has learnt from his/ her co-religionists to value such experiences; the latter to 
regard such states with suspicion and disdain. Although the raw reports both 
individuals could provide on such an experience might reveal identical features, 
the precise emotions they attached to such experiences would vary in
accordance with their divergent learning histories.
Social constructivists could challenge this statement, holding that the the 
higher scores obtained by Pagans and Buddhists than Christians and Jews on a
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measure of mystical experience could more parsimoniously be interpreted as 
unqualified support lor social constructivism. These between-group differences 
could be explained by arguments that continued exposure to the teachings of 
pro-mystical religions leads to greater probability of mystical experience, much 
as Argyle and Hills (2000) have attributed the greater frequency of religious 
experience found for church attendees than non-attendees to exposure to church 
teachings. However, as with correlational data, between-groups differences need
not imply any particular direction of causality. Members of pro-mystical
%
religions may report more mystical experiences because exposure to such 
groups increases chances of a mystical experiences; but it could also be that if 
certain individuals have had mystical experiences, and come from backgrounds 
not sympathetic to such experiences, they seek out religions that are.
An interesting case here is that of Miriam Soros, better known to many 
people as the neo-Pagan Starrhawk. As Greenwood (2000) has observed, 
Starrhawk was raised as a Jew, but turned to neo-Paganism after her mystical 
experiences. This was in no doubt partly due the latter religion being able to 
accommodate her mystical experiences more readily.
It is true that intense longitudinal study will be needed to further assess 
the confidence that one may take in either of two possible interpretations of 
Pagans and scoring higher on mystical experience than Christians or Jews. This 
could be taken as evidence that people who have had such experiences are likely 
to enter into movements such as neo-Paganism; or as evidence that the 
teachings of such movements enhance chances of mystical experience. Such 
longitudinal study is clearly needed before total confidence can be declared in 
the proposition that mystical experience is innate, but is affected by learning
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insofar as the processes of learning that are likely to affect attitudes to 
mysticism have a mediated impact on such experiences. Nevertheless, if these 
claims about mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism having different 
relationships with conditionability are valid, traits linked to conditionability, 
such as psvchoticism, should show non-identical relationships with these two 
variables. This is exactly as was found in this thesis.
8.4.2 Learning and Emotional Valence
It may seem self-contradictory to claim, as is being claimed here, that 
certain features of mystical experience could be innate, but that the emotional 
valence attached to such experiences may vary in accordance with one's 
learning experiences. Scrutiny should therefore be given to the social 
psychology experiment that inspired the constructivism of Proudfoot (1985), 
namely that of Schacter and Singer (1962). In this study, genuine participants 
were injected with adrenalin. All experienced increased arousal; whether this 
was experienced as excitement or anxiety depended on cues from actors 
participating in the experiment.
Proudfoot’s (1985) claims that this experiment is evidence for the social 
construction of emotions, and that similar social constructions underlie religious 
experiences, are challenged here. Participants who experienced anxiety in this 
experiment had an identical experience to those who experienced excitement 
insofar as both groups experienced heightened arousal. What did differentiate 
participants was the emotional valence they attached to this experience.
It is proposed here that a similar set of processes happens with mystical 
experiences. Suppose that dancing around a fire in the night of a full moon had
the inherent potential to induce a state of consciousness marked by a sense of 
unit\ w ith the natural world, and that, further, this event resulted in the same 
sense of unity lor every one, regardless of past learning experiences. Let us 
imagine a situation where both an individual from a background of Calvinist 
Christianity and a Wiccan Pagan are asked to perform this ritual, and both 
comply. II this activity really does result in a state of mystical union for every 
one, it would induce the same sense of mystical union in both individuals. 
However, if the former has been taught to link such experiences with Satanism, 
the latter to see such experiences more positively, emotional valence of such 
people would differ, resulting from their divergent attitudes to mysticism.
If there has been an argument which, above all else, is proposed here 
as being both an original contribution and well-supported by psychometric data 
collected for the current thesis, it is the necessity of distinguishing between 
attitudes to mysticism and mystical experience. The claim that mystical 
experiences may be mediated, and yet also responses to triggers that carry the 
inherent potential to arouse such states, is easier to defend after this distinction 
is made. Thus, attitudes to mysticism will be designated here as "the missing 
link" which has been overlooked in both previous psychometric study and in 
philosophical debate. This omission may have blinded scholars to potential 
grounds for a reconciliation between perennialism and social constructivism.
An important finding relating to the variable of attitudes to mysticism 
is that it was very high among adherents of the Western Mystery tradition. High
scores for attitudes to mysticism were found for Druids, Wiccans and Native
American sympathizers, challenging any efforts to link pro-mystical attitudes 
exclusively with Eastern religion.
Important questions for the social constructivist-perennialist debate 
are raised il pro-mystical attitudes are found in adherents of Western as well as 
Eastern religions. It may sound as if preceding arguments have attributed 
variance in attitudes to mysticism in large part to learning, but it should be 
clarified that at no point have learnt factors been viewed as the only factor 
determining the attitudes an individual takes towards mysticism. Tesser (1993) 
challenged the conventional social psychological wisdom of attributing attitude 
development exclusively to learning, holding that, because factors brought 
about by heredity may contribute to preferences for stimuli such as certain foods 
or music forms, heredity is likely to have an indirect influence on attitudes. In 
the same way, if pro-mystical attitudes result from private history' of having had 
mystical experiences as well as exposure to teaching, it could be that Eastern 
and Western religions have both developed pro-mystical attitudes because an 
innate experience of mystical union has been reported in these diverse cultures.
Future research is needed to establish whether or not attitudes to 
mysticism can be the effect rather than cause of mystical experience, as is 
assumed by such a position. If it does point in such directions, strong challenges 
to social constructivism are implied, insofar as a very parsimonious way of 
accounting for mystical experiences arising in geographically separated 
communities would be to attribute such experiences to innate factors.
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8.6 Individual Differences and Mystical Experience
Debates between perennialists and social constructivists on the nature of 
mystical experience have frequently overlooked an important point about such 
phenomena that should be obvious to any psychologist aiming to research the 
personality correlates of such experiences. This is that considerable individual 
differences may exist in the propensity people have towards such experiences, 
within creeds as well as between creeds. Forman (1998) acknowledged this in 
his declaration that, although a universal core experience exists, empirical data 
suggest that only a minority of people have had such experiences. However, he 
did not consider what the personality differences between people within a creed 
who do and do not experience such phenomena may be.
Rather than attribute such variations in mystical experience to 
individual differences in psychoticism, such variation may be attributable to 
individual differences in traits such as creativity, quest religious orientation or 
what has been termed above as “Capacity for Transcendence of Conventional 
Cognition”. Data in this thesis have consistently suggested links between traits 
indicative of potential for cognitive flexibility and mystical experience. If 
variation in such traits is innate, as is consistent with behaviour genetic study of 
such traits, it would strengthen the case for supposing mystical experience to 
reflect an "innate capacity". However, this link between traits indicative of 
cognitive flexibility and mystical experience offers a more direct challenge to 
social constructivism. Similar to Forman's (1998) claim that mystical 
experiences involve Vargcsscnhcit of learnt constructs, to attribute mystical 
experiences, in part, to cognitive processes that challenge conventional patterns 
of cognition acquired during day-to-day learning suggests that mystical
experiences are more readily experienced by those prepared to challenge, rather 
than endorse, conventional teachings.
Evidence lor an association between a variable indicative of cognitive 
flexibility and mystical experience came from the links between quest and 
mystical experience observed in Study One, while Study Three provided further 
evidence for this association in its reported correlations between openness to 
experience and mystical experience. Larger samples may have been needed to 
defend proposed links between openness to experience and mysticism 
(significant and positive correlations between NEO openness to experience and 
mystical experience were not found, for example, for Christians and Buddhists 
when considered as separate groups, possibly because very large samples may 
be necessary to detect such associations when such samples are homogeneous), 
but the possibility that mystical experience relates more strongly to NEO 
openness to experience rather than psychoticism is evidence for a central claim 
that has been defended in this thesis. This is that psychoticism is too 
heterogeneous to be interpreted as having an unequivocal relationship with 
mysticism.
If this is so, it becomes quite plausible to suggest that people who have 
had mystical experiences (as distinct from psychotic breakdowns) will be those 
high in certain facets of broad psychoticism, low in other facets of this broad 
trait. Specifically, people high in creativity, cognitive flexibility or unusual 
patterns of associative thinking, but also high in capacity for discipline and 
conscientiousness may be precisely those most likely to report mystical 
experiences. This premise can explain a number of observations that have been 
made throughout the course of this thesis. One such observation is the fact that
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apparent correlations between psychoticism and mystical experience appeared 
to be a function ot a relationship both variables shared with NEO openness to 
experience. The links between heightened conscientiousness and mystical 
experience, and the supposition that this may be informative about innate 
factors in human psychology which carry the potential to promote mystical 
experiences rather than a vindication of social constructivism, emerged in the 
evidence that NEO conscientiousness was found to be positively correlated with 
mystical experience in one of the two anti-mystical groups, the Christians. 
Finally, literature reviewed in Chapter Three indicated that religious liberals 
may have elevated scores on conscientiousness as well as openness to 
experience. The argument presented here therefore implies associations between 
religious liberalism and mystical experience - exactly as was found in empirical 
work reported in this thesis.
8.7 Further Research
Future research will need to address potential reasons for an 
association between religious liberalism and mystical experience. Social 
constructivists may claim that people who are more likely to adopt radical views 
may join religious groups which, at least in the culture in which such people 
live, are conventionally judged as more "radical", for example neo-Paganism, 
and because these groups are more likely to teach people about mystical 
experiences, such an association arises. Perennialists may explain this 
association by arguing that both mystical experiences and greater liberalism are 
linked with an innate cognitive style predisposing one to cognitive flexibility. 
Mystical experience may be linked with such traits because it involves
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temporary abandonment ol one's conventional pattern of cognition (at least 
temporarily), liberalism because it also implies readiness to challenge 
conventional patterns of cognition. To test these rival hypotheses would make 
for an interesting future research study. Identification of the innate cognitive 
style that perennialists may hold is behind both increased liberalism and
increased chance ol mystical experience would certainly set an interesting 
agenda for future research.
Batson and Raynor-Prince (1983) found quest to be associated with
A
greater cognitive flexibility. It is thus perfectly possible that increased cognitive 
flexibility contributes to both elevated quest scores and mystical experience, 
explaining correlations such as that reported in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
Future research is now needed to find out whether quest correlates with attitudes 
to mysticism as well as mystical experience per se. Critics of Batson such as 
Donahue (1985) have claimed that quest's failure to correlate in any meaningful 
way with any religiosity-related variable implies that quest should not be seen 
as a form of religious orientation. Attitudes to mysticism could be the very 
variable that is found to be both explicitly linked with religion and with quest in 
future studies.
One of the interesting findings about attitudes to mysticism was how 
its correlation with psychoticism remained significant after controlling for 
N.E.O.openness and also for religion. This raises the question of whether latent 
psychotic tendencies may be linked with increased interest in mystical 
phenomena rather than reports of such experiences. Such a possibility merits 
future research attention, and has implications for how to conceptualise
disorders such as the schizotypal personality disorder as described in Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Associations between liberalism and mystical experience lead to the 
question of whether or not social groups generally associated with less 
conservative attitudes report greater frequency of mystical experiences. This 
would imply, for example, that in highly oppressive societies where certain 
minority groups have been marginalised and are ready to challenge the status
quo, it is members of such minority groups who may be more likely to report
#
mystical experiences. This sounds at odds with studies such as Hay and Morisy 
(1978), which found greater frequency of mystical experiences among middle- 
class respondents; and also with historical evidence from cases such as the 
Buddha, whose rather well-to-do background in nobility does not appear to have 
prevented him from reporting transpersonal experiences. However, it may be 
that it is those respondents of middle-class status who also endorse liberal 
attitudes, and are sympathetic to plans to change the status quo, who are most 
likely to report mystical experiences. Future research is therefore needed to look 
at potential correlations between mystical experience and liberalism in 
conjunction with social and contextual factors.
Interesting future research into attitudes to mysticism could prove to 
yield seminal findings when using larger samples of each group studied in 
Chapter Six, big enough to allow for comparisons between sub-group within 
each creed. An interesting future research project would be to assess a group 
such as the Pentecostal/ charismatic movement on this variable, which may 
value religious experiences but not mystical experiences. Predictions can be 
made that certain movements within the groups sampled will score higher than
average tor their creed on the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale - a good example 
being that Hassidic Jews will score higher on this scale than mainstream Jews.
Assertions made throughout this thesis that attitudes to mysticism and 
mystical experience are both related to greater liberalism have always meant 
liberalism in a specifically religious context. Assessment of attitudes to 
mysticism and mystical experience in a more generic sample, including atheists, 
agnostics and secularists, may yield a different finding to a simple linear 
relationship between liberalism and mystical experience. Thus, liberalism may 
need to be viewed in conjunction with religious commitment if such correlations 
are to be found. It should also be remembered that the data in this thesis have 
been correlational. Future longitudinal research involving cross-lagged panel 
analysis could prove fruitful in assessing whether, for example, pro-mystical 
attitudes are better viewed as the cause or effect of mystical experience.
8.8 Conclusion
This thesis has made original contributions to transpersonal 
psychometrics, both by its attempts to elucidate how apparent links between 
psychoticism and mystical experience may best be interpreted with 
considerations of increased creativity in mind, and its stress on the differences 
between the relationships that mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism 
bear to psychoticism. Original contributions have also been made in exploring
data from a cross-creedal population.
Such findings will be of value to philosophers of religion, helping them
to consider important philosophical questions on the nature of mysticism, but 
are also of value to psychometrics itself. Thanks to the study of potential
correlates of mystical experience, psychometricians may gain a better
understanding of how traits such as "psychoticism" may encompass both 
positive and negative elements.
The issues studied in this thesis have bearings on diverse fields of 
scholarship, philosophy and anthropology as well as psychometrics. Important 
findings emerging from this thesis should be pivotal in guiding future research 
in both psychometrics and the study ol mysticism. Psychoticism may be so 
multi-faceted that whether one declares that mysticism is linked with pathology 
or not invites the response: "It all depends what one means by psychoticism". 
Mystical experience and attitudes to mysticism were found to correlate with 
rather different lists of variables, and thus appear to be distinct constructs. 
Precise correlates of attitudes to mysticism may depend upon whether one is 
examining a pro-mystical or anti-mystical religion, as comparisons of Pagans 
and Jews clarified. Through application of psychometric methodology to the 
study of transpersonal experiences, the scholar who wishes to study such states 
can be deemed wiser - if still on an on-going quest to learn more about this 
important aspect of human life.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Materials Used in Study One 
Instruction Sheet Set to Respondents:
The following is a booklet in three sections, looking at the topic of religious 
experience. Each section is a questionnaire - the first section is a questionnaire 
that should take about twenty to twenty-live minutes to complete, the second 
and third sections should take in total between five and ten minutes to complete.
It would be greatly appreciated if you could spare an odd thirty or thirty-five 
minutes to complete this booklet. The questionnaires should be completed in 
privacy and in your own time. Please note that ALL sections of this booklet are 
to be completed anonymously - at no point will you be asked to indicate any 
identifiable details about yourself other than your gender and age. However, you 
may find some of the questions to be highly personal ones. If. at any time, you 
feel the questions are getting either too personal or too difficult for you to 
answer, you may return the questionnaires uncompleted. Sections A and C 
relate to religious experience, while Section B relates to the manner in which 
people hold their religious beliefs; you may return the booklet now if you feel 
you would rather not be assessed on either topic. (N.B. data collected using this 
booklet will be used purely for academic purposes).
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Questionnaires used in Study One.
Hood's M-Scale (Hood, 1975^
Section A
Listed below are descriptions of experiences which people claim to 
have had. Please write by each statement whether you think each description is 
true of your own experience as follows:
+2 it you think the description is definitely true of your own experiences;
+ 1 if you think the description is probably true of your own experiences;
-1 it you think the description is probably not true of your own experiences; 
-2 if you think the description is definitely not true of your own experiences;
? if you are uncertain or unsure about whether the description matches your 
own experiences (please try to avoid this option as much as possible)'’.
There then followed the 32 items of Hood's (1975) M-Scale as follows:
1. I have had an experience which was both timeless and spaceless
2. I have never had an experience which was incapable of being expressed in 
words
3. I have had an experience in which something greater than myself seemed to 
absorb me
4. I have had an experience in which everything seemed to disappear from my 
mind until I was conscious of only a void
5. 1 have experienced profound joy
6. I have never had an experience in which I felt myself to be absorbed as one with 
all things
7. I have never experienced a perfectly peaceful state
8. I have never had an experience in which 1 felt that all things were alive
9. 1 have never had an experience which seemed holy to me
10.1 have never had an experience in which al things seemed to be aware
11.1 have had an experience in which I had no sense of time or space
12. I have had an experience in which I realized the oneness of myself with all
things
13. I have had an experience in which a new view of reality was revealed to me
14.1 have never experienced anything to be divine
15. I have never had an experience in which time and space were non-existent
16. I have never experienced anything that I could call ultimate reality
17. I have had an experience in which ultimate reality was revealed to me
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18.1 have had an experience in which felt that all was perfection at the time
19. I have had an experience in which I felt everything to be part of the same whole
2 0 .1 have had an experience which I knew to be sacred
21.1 have never had an experience which I was unable to express adequately 
through language
22 .1 have had an experience which left me with a feeling of awe
23 .1 have had an experience which was impossible to communicate
2 4 .1 have never had an experience in which my own self seemed to merge into 
something greater
25 .1 have never had an experience which left me with a feeling of wonder
26 .1 have never had an experience in which deeper aspects of reality were revealed 
to me
27 .1 have never had an experience in which time, place and distance were 
meaningless
28 .1 have never had an experience in which I became aware of a unity to all things
29 .1 have had an experience in which all things seemed to be conscious
30 .1 have never had an experience in which all things seemed to be unified into a 
single whole
31.1 have had an experience in which I felt nothing is ever really dead
32.1 had had an experience which cannot be expressed in words
Section B
Quest sub-scale of Religious Life Inventory (Batson et al., 1993)
"Here are twelve statements asking about your religious beliefs. 
Please read each statement carefully and circle the appropriate option each time, 
ranging from 1 (indicating that you strongly disagree with a statement) to 5 
(indicating that you strongly agree with a statement). Please be re-assured that 
responses on this questionnaire are to be kept anonymous and are only being 
used purely for academic research".
1. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change 
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
3. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
4. I was not very interested in my religion until I began asking questions about the 
meaning and purpose of my life
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
5. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
6. I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
7. I find religious doubts upsetting
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
8. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the 
tensions in my world and in my relation to my world
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
9. My life experiences have led me to re-think my religious convictions
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
10. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
11. God wasn't very important to me until I began to ask questions about the 
meaning of my life
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
12. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
Questions used to Assess General Religious Experiences in Study One 
Section C, based on Hay and Heald (1987)
Section C was headed by the instructions:
"Listed below are six different types of experiences. To the right of each 
experience, place:
A +2 if you feel that you have definitely had that type of experience;
A +1 if you feel that you have probably had that type of experience;
A ? if you are uncertain about whether you have had that type of experience; 
A -1 if you feel that you have probably not had that type of experience;
A - 2 if you feel that you definitely have not had that type of experience".
A sense of order or patterning behind events in my life 
A sense of the Presence of God
A sense of receiving help or guidance in answer to prayers 
A sense of a sacred presence in Nature 
A sense of the presence of the Dead
A sense of an evil presence
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Appendix B. Scales Used In Study Two as Reported in Chapter Five 
Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale (Francis & Louden, 2000a
Please indicate, on the 1-5 scale each time, whether you can recognise having 
had each ol the experiences listed below, ranging from 1 (to indicate that you 
have NEVER had the experience listed) to 5 (indicating that you have 
DEFINITELY had the experience listed).
1. Experiencing something that I could not put into words
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
2. Sensing God in the beauty of nature
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
3. Brief glimpses into the heart of things
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
4. Being overwhelmed by a sense of wonder
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
5. Feeling at one with the universe
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
6. Losing a sense ol time, place and person
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
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7. Being absorbed within the Divine
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
8. Feeling moved by a Power or Presence beyond description
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
9. Knowing that I was surrounded by a Presence
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5
•
Definitely had this
experience experience
10. Transient visions of the transcendental
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
11. Being in a state of mystery outside my body
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
12. Feeling at one with all living things
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
13. Being conscious of only timelessness and eternity
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
14. Losing myself in a greater being
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
15. Being aware of more than I could ever describe
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience
16. Hearing God speak to me
experience
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience
17. Passing moments of Divine revelation
experience
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5*- Definitely had this
w
experience experience
18. Being grasped by a Power beyond my control
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
y
experience
19. Sensing the unity in all things
experience
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience
20. The merging of past, present and future
experience
Never had this 1 2 3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
21. Feeling myself absorbed in the depths of being
Never had this 1 2  3 4 5 Definitely had this
experience experience
Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 32 statements 
listed below, by circling your appropriate response on the 1-5 scale each time, 
ranging from 1 ( strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree").
If I were to think of a prototypical religious person, I would think of a mystic or
some one who reports religious experiences, rather than some one who attends 
religious services regularly
9
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
Some of the most moving literature ever written has been the work of the 
world's great mystics
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
Possession of a great deal of factual knowledge about one's faith (e.g. about its
history, literature or ritual) is really a very poor shadow of the great insights that
can be obtained during mystical experience
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
Our sins are justified through faith, that is, through belief that God alone can
save us from our sins - we are not likely to get very far by constant reliance on
our own attempts at the spiritual quest
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
I can really understand why many people (including religious leaders such as
the clergy or rabbis) have perceived mystics as mad
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
6. God alone is the lountainhead of all religious revelations, so mystics deceive
themselves to think that they can obtain union with God by their own efforts 
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
7. Mystics of all faiths, creeds and indeed, of no traditional religion are all 
involved in the same spiritual journey
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
8. The mystical quest for union with the Divine is one which - partly thanks to the 
mystic’s own efforts - is often likely to prove extremely fruitful
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
9. If one wants to know about one's faith, one should apply lots of academic study 
to its history, texts and theology, rather than engage in practices that might or 
might not bring about mystical experiences
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
10. Religious authorities such as church leaders, the Pope or rabbis have every right 
to be suspicious of mystics
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
11. The mystical viewpoint that life is like a ladder, and that by appropriate spiritual 
journey, one may ascend this ladder to reach the realms of God, is one which 
deserves a lot of respect
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
12. I find that people who write about their so-called mystical or religious
experiences rather contradict themselves - they claim to have received 
revelations, but to me, their experiences hardly reveal anything at all 
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
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13. Theologians are more important figures in the world religions than are mystics
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
14. Major and important differences exist between the hallucinations of psychotics 
and the experiences of mystics
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
15. Religious people should put more trust in formally designated religious 
authorities (e.g. vicars in Christianity, rabbis in Judaism) than in mystics or 
those who claim to have had religious or mystical experiences
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
16. To agree with the doctrines of a particular creed does not really matter in the 
long run - what really matters is to have had, in one's heart, experience of the 
Divine
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
17.1 get excited when I read accounts of mystical, religious or spiritual experiences 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
18. There are cases in many different religions where earnest seekers have had an 
experience of union with the Divine, or at least, glimpses of God
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
19. It would not surprise me if it turned out that the vast majority of those who 
claim to have had mystical experiences turn out to be suffering from some type
of psychiatric illness
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
20. The practices of the mystic are a more true path to God than regular attendance
at religious services
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
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21. One can learn at least as much about God from those who report religiio u s  or
mystical experiences as one can from theologians
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
22. One should never trust any one who claims to follow a religion, but who takes a
deep interest in the teachings of religions or creeds other than the one he or she 
claims to profess
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
23. Established religious authorities - such as the Christian church - are wrong if 
they think that the experiences reported by mystics should be seen as 
pathological
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
24. I would get rather annoyed if I had to read mystical literature, as most of it
would be quite incomprehensible to me
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
25. The mystic is some one often far closer to God than are those with formally 
designated religious authority (e.g. bishops, rabbis)
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
26. To have had a religious or mystical experience indicates more commitment to 
one's faith than whether one goes to one's place of worship regularly
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
27. The revelation awarded to one during a mystical experience is an important 
experience for any one, regardless of whatever he or she believes
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
28.1 he mystical path is a more sure path to God than that taken by hierarchically 
organized structures in the world religions
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
29. Divine providence and the sovereignty of God imply that mystics cannot 
achieve true union with God
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
30.1 am rather suspicious ol those who would have us believe that mystical
experiences in all ol the world religions are more or less the same 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
31. One should pay special scrutiny to what those reporting religious or mystical 
experiences really believe in, especially if they come from a religious 
background different to one's own
Strongly Disagree 1 2  3 4 5 Strongly Agree
32. If I were a religious person, I would see regular attendance at a church, mosque, 
synagogue or other place of worship as being more central to my faith than 
whether I had ever had a "mystical" or "religious" experience
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
24-item version of Attitudes to Mysticism Scale
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to number o f corresponding item in the original 32-item 
version o f the scale.
1 i get excited when I read accounts of mystical, religious or spiritual experiences
(17)
2. Possession of ample factual knowledge about one's faith is really a very poor 
shadow of the insights that can be gained during mystical experience (4)
3. Religious people should put more trust in formal religious authorities (e.g.
vicars, rabbis) than in mystics or those who claim to have had religious 
experiences (15)
4. Some of the most moving literature ever written had been that of the world's 
great mystics (2)
5. Mystics ot all laiths, creeds and indeed of no traditional faith are all involved in 
the same spiritual journey (7)
6. Theologians are more important figures in the world religions than are mystics
(13)
7. I would get annoyed if I had to read mystical literature, as most of it would be 
quite incomprehensible to me (24)
8. The mystical quest for union with the Divine is one which - partly thanks to the 
mystics own efforts - is likely to prove extremely fruitful (8)
9. To gain knowledge of one's faith, one should do lots of academic study of 
history, texts and theology, rather than engage in practices that might or might
not bring about mystical experiences (9)
10. Religious authorities (e.g. vicars, rabbis) have every right to be suspicious of
mystics (10)
11. To agree with the doctrines of a particular creed does not matter in the long run 
- what really matters is to have had, in one's heart, experience of the Divine (16)
12. Mystical practices are a more trustworthy spiritual path than are attendance of
religious services (20)
13. Those who report mystical experiences provide at least as much religious 
knowledge as do theologians (21)
14. It is wrong for established religious authorities (e.g. the Christian church) to 
think that those who report mystical experiences are mentally ill (23)
15.1 am rather suspicious ot those who claim that mystical experiences in all the 
world religions are more or less the same (30)
16. If I were a religious person, I would see regular attendance at a church, mosque, 
synagogue or other place of worship as being more central to my faith than 
whether I had ever had a "mystical" or "religious" experience (32)
17. The revelations gained during mystical experiences are important to any one,
*
regardless of what he or she believes (27)
18. People who report mystical experiences contradict themselves - they claim to 
have received revelations, but to me their reports reveal nothing (24)
19. There are cases in many faiths where seekers have experienced Divine union.
20. The mystical path is a more trustworthy spiritual path than the hierarchically 
organized structures in the world religions (28)
21. One should never trust any one who claims to follow a religion, but who takes a 
deep interest in the mystical teachings of creeds or religions other than the one 
he or she claims to profess (22)
22. The mystic is often some one far closer to God than are those with formally
designated religious authority (e.g. bishops, rabbis) (25)
23. It would not surprise me if it turned out that the vast majority of those who 
report mystical experiences turn out to be suffering from some type of
psychiatric illness (19)
24. The mystical viewpoint that life is like a ladder, and that by appropriate spiritual 
journey, one may ascend this ladder to reach new spiritual realms, deserves
much respect (11)
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Appendix C
Materials presented to participants for study reported in Chapter Six
Participants were presented with the following instruction sheet, headed 
"Religious Experience/ Spirituality Survey":
Religious experience - what is it, why do people have these experiences and 
how many people have had them? What is the nature of human spirituality? 
Pursuing these important questions may give us a fuller understanding of human 
nature. Anthony Edwards, Senior Lecturer in Psychology at University College 
Northampton, is researching this exciting topic. If you can help by completing 
the enclosed questionnaires, he will be most grateful for your participation.
There are four questionnaires that participants are being asked to 
complete for this study. The first two relate to spiritual experiences/ interests in 
this field, and may take 10-15 minutes or less to complete. There is then a 32- 
item questionnaire that may take 10 minutes of less, and a longer, 240-item 
personality inventory that may take around 30 minutes to complete. All scales 
may be completed anonymously. As total time taken for completion of these 
scales may take up to an hour, please DO NOT feel that you have to do all four 
questionnaires at one sitting - if you wish to take them away and spend twenty 
minutes on them on three consecutive evenings, that is fine, just so long as you 
can get them back within a fortnight of receiving them. (If you don't think you 
will have time to complete them, please return them now in the stamped 
addressed envelope provided. All help, will, however, be much appreciated!) 
N.B. VERY IMPORTANT: PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN THE BOOKLET 
HEADED NEO-PI. This questionnaire is an expensive and copyright booklet 
and must be returned to the researcher unmarked. Instead, please write your
answers in the answer-sheet (the document with "Hand-Scoring Answer sheet" 
in the top right-hand corner) provided. There is NO need to write your name/ 
initials in the spaces on this answer-sheet - all these scales may be completed 
anonymously (at the end, you will be asked to complete some optional questions 
on \our age, gender and religious affiliation, but at no point will you be asked to 
offer any identifiable detail about yourself). You may like to look through these 
booklets belore deciding whether you wish to go ahead with this study. If, at 
any time, you feel the questions are getting too difficult/ too personal, or have 
other reasons for not wishing to complete these scales, you may return the 
scales uncompleted in the envelope provided (you need not state a reason for 
doing this).
You may like to note that all data being collected in this research are 
being used purely for academic purposes. If you do decided you wish to 
participate in this research (in the stamped addressed envelope provided) to 
Anthony Edwards, Division of Psychology, University College Northampton, 
Park Campus, NORTHAMPTON, NN2 7AL. PLEASE remember to include the 
NEO-PI question booklet!
Should you have further queries about this study, or wish to learn more 
about developments in my research programme in general (including 
information on forthcoming publications in this area), please write to Anthony 
Edwards, at the above address, or contact me on e-mail on 
anthonv.edwards@northampton.ac.uk or via telephone on (01604) 7335500
x2411 I shall happily give a full explanation as to the aims of this research as
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soon as I have collected an adequate pool of data. Thank you for your time.
Anthony Edwards
P.S. It would help il you could return your responses within a fortnight. Thank 
you.
There then followed the following scales:
9
(a) The Francis-Louden Mystical Orientation Scale and 24-item version of the 
Attitudes to Mysticism Scale as presented in Appendix B;
(b) The 24-item version of the Attitudes to Mysticism Scale as presented in 
Appendix B (iii);
(c) The 32-item Psychoticism sub-scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory- 
Revised (Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985);
(d) The 240-item version of the NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1992a).
The final sheet presented to respondents was as follows:
Some final questions.
Thank you for your help. The following questions are optional, but your 
completion of them will useful for demographic research purposes:
Your gender (please circle): MALE FEMALE 
Age:..................... years ............ months
Religious Affiliation.............................................
It would help il you could say a little more about the particular form of religion
(e.g. particular Christian denomination or particular form of Judaism to which 
you adhere) in the lines below):
Have you always adhered to this religion or to this particular form of this 
religion, and if not, how long have you adhered to it?
Would you say that there are any particular forms of religious experiences (e.g. 
mystical experiences, healing experiences) that are held as particularly central to 
your faith, and if so, which?
Have you ever felt as if you were influenced by a Power or a Presence - 
whether you call it God or not - that was different to your everyday self?
Yes No Don't Know
Have you ever felt as if you were in close contact with something holy or 
sacred?
Yes No Don't Know
Thank you. You may - if you so wish - use the remaining space to describe any 
religious experiences that you feel you have personally had, continuing overleaf
if necessary.
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APPENDIX D. Evidence for the heterogeneity of psychoticism
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised is available in the public 
domain in Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett (1985). Work for the current thesis 
found the C ronbach's alpha of the psychoticism sub-scale to be +.73, similar to 
that reported by Eysenck et al. (1985); however, as clarified by the table below, 
individual item-to-scale correlations were often low, highlighting the 
heterogeneity ot psychoticism. Despite the widespread practice of psychoticism 
assessment in religiosity-personality studies, future research is therefore advised 
to introduce alternative personality measures, exactly as has been done in this 
thesis.
Cronbach's Alpha and the Psvchoticism sub-scale of the E.P.Q.-R.
Item Cronbach’s Item Cronbach’sLoading on Scale Loading on Scale1 .1636 17 .33682 .1604 18 .26113 .2363 19 .19384 .2270 20 .29125 .1671 21 .09266 .1560 22 .32307 .4606 23 .15248 .3257 24 .22009 .3214 25 .262210 .4475 26 .285811 .0975 27 .280412 .2247 28 .255113 .2689 29 .217514 .2791 30 .285815 .4089 31 .283216 .1819 32 .2485
APPENDIX E
Questions set to respondents during qualitative interviews reported in 
Chapter Seven.
1. One thing this research is trying to find out is how different religions define the 
terms ’’mystical experience" and "religious experience". So would you like to 
say in your personal opinion whether you think (your religion) has any 
particular way of defining these terms?
2. How would you personally define the terms "mystical experience" and
#"religious experience"?
3. In your questionnaire data, a question that you and other respondents were 
asked was whether there are any religious experiences held central by your 
faith. I wondered whether, in responding to this question, you thought there 
were some types of religious experience that were particularly important in your 
religion.
NOTE: This particular question was adapted, in keeping with the semi- 
structured nature of the interview, when presented to different respondents in 
responding to the questionnaire data. Precise wording was adapted in the case of 
the Christian respondent, who attended a church had completed for the study 
but had not actually completed the questionnaires herself.
3a. Are there any other dimensions of religion (ethical, ritual, belief) that you 
think are more important to your religion than the experiential?
4. When people in your religion do report a "religious experience", do they - in 
your view - show the influence of your creed, and if so, how?
In your personal opinion, what might be the effect of some one having had a
religious experience in your religion? Feel free to talk about any consequences 
that you deem likely, positive or negative.
What activities, if any, are associated with your religion that might also be 
associated with "religious experience"?
Did you wish to say anything about how your religion may have influenced 
your life in general, not necessarily to do with "experience"?
